Germany and Europe
AS result of last Sunday's elections Herr Adolf Hitler achieved substantially what he was expected to achieve, and the situation created is substantially what it was expected to be. Of the various State elections the only one that seriously matters is the Prussian, and what matters about that is not so much the political dilemma created in that greatest of German States, as the bearing the voting has on the international problems with whose solution the statesmen of the world are grappling. The question of order or chaos in Prussia itself is important, of course, for Prussia contains nearly two-thirds of the population of Germany, and includes most of the great cities of Germany, notably Berlin and Frankfurt. A 'Hitlerite Prussian government, resting on some secure coalition in the Landtag, controlling a vast administrative machine and able gradually to instal its own men in key positions (most notably in the police force), would make the position of Reich Ministers like Dr. Britning and General Groener almost impossible.
Fortunately—since the overthrow of Dr. Briining at this juncture would be an unqualified disaster—the transference of the administration in Prussia to Hitlerite hands is very far from a certainty. The Left Centre coalition government under Dr. Otto Braun, and with Herr Severing in the key position of Minister of the Interior remains in office not merely till it resigns, but till the Diet by a clear 50 per cent. vote elects a Prime Minister of some other colour. The Hitlerites alone can.- not get their nominee chosen, for they command only 163 votes out of 422. The addition of the 31 Nationalists will not carry them to office, though it will carry them very near it, and even the support of another ten members from odd groups will not quite suffice. If the 57 Communists joined forces with the Nazis the situation would be very different, but the Communists can hardly desire to see Herr Hitler Dictator of Prussia. Herr Braun is more likely to continue in office, governing as best he can without a majority in the Diet, with the possibility always in the background of the Government of the Reich taking over part, at any rate, of the functions of the Prussian Govern- Ment under an emergency decree.
There are other conceivable developments. The Nazis may succeed in making terms with the Catholic Centre, but in that case they would have to commit them- selves not only to a definite policy (which they have never done yet) but a reasonable policy. Many worse things could happen than that, for the responsibility of office might sober enough of the party to leave the incurable extremists impotent, while intelligible anger at exclusion of office through a doubtful manoeuvre, like the eleventh- hour change in the procedure rules for the election of Prime Minister, might well find its only issue in extra- Parliamentary action. National Socialism is undeniably the predominant political phenomenon in Germany to-day. That is incontestable, whether at this particular moment the National Socialists gain office in Prussia or are kept out of it. Hitlerism has been created out of an acute Sense of national grievance, skilfully exploited. To foment feeling in a country suffering economically as Germany is suffering is easy enough, and the failure of the rest of the world to keep faith with Germany in the matter of disarmament gives Herr Hitler one more effective weapon, while it goes far to paralyse his more moderate opponents. While Stresemann was alive his policy of fulfilment of Treaty obligations produced visible and tangible results. There were Locarno and Germany's entry into the League of Nations. The Dawes and Young plans were believed; at any rate, to be alleviating
the burden of Reparations. A disarmament treaty was being worked out at Geneva. The Rhineland was evacuated in 1930. All those enabled the moderates in Germany, represented by President Hindenburg and Dr. Bruning, in spite of their different origins, in Germany to-day, to hold their own against all internal assaults.
Now Stresemann is gone, and Briand, whose policy did as much for Stresemann in Germany as his own wisdom and courage, is gone too. The Young Plan has foundered, Germany can no longer make reparation payments, and when Dr. Bruning, compelled to make some concession to a public opinion assiduously excited by Herr Hitler, says he sees no prospect of being able to resume them, the whole Press of Paris denounces him as a deliberate treaty-breaker. When, on the other hand, Hitler justifies his repudiation of the Versailles pledges by the refusal of the Allied Powers to honour their undertakings in the matter of disarmament, Dr. Bruning, with the facts staring the world in the face, is left powerless to reply. Hitler, rallying to his standard the unemployed workers, whom he has housed and paid two marks a day, and equally the unemployed intelligentsia emerging year by year from the universities with no careers open for them and no satisfaction for their often laudable, if misdirected, aspirations, has turned to the utmost political advantage the discontent and unrest with which Germany, abnormally sensitive to the pressure of world conditions, is in ferment, and the result is the Nazi victory in Prussia.
If Hitlerism is to be checked it must be at least as much by forces outside Germany as inside. Dr. Bruning is fighting for sane government with a courage and an ability that provoke profound admiration. He is one of the great statesmen of Europe, greater unquestionably than any man in the political arena in France since Briand's death, and both in Germany's interests and Europe's he deserves all the support the politicians of other countries can give him. International problems, of course, cannot be given a particular solution just because that solution would suit Germany, or the present German Government, but when the obviously right solution of certain problems happens to be a solution that would tend to strengthen the sober against the subversive elements in Germany, there is a double reason for pressing that solution forward. That double reason exists in regard to the two outstanding problems in the inter- national field, disarmament and reparations. The results of the Disarmament Conference and the Lausanne Con- ference will affect Germany profoundly. Meanwhile France goes to the polls. The expression of German Nationalism involved in Hitler's victory might well evoke an answering expression of French Nationalism. In some sections of the Press there are signs of that, but fewer than might have been feared. If the French elector is wise, if the growing financial and economic stringency in his own country warns him of the perils threatening Europe, he will realize that the one hope lies in Franco-German co-operation, most notably in such matters as reparations and disarmament, and he will vote for men prepared to put that policy into practice. It will not be a plain road all the way. Germany has made abundant mistakes. The choice of time and method for launching the Customs Union last year was deplorably inept. But the past must be left to itself and the future faced, and the future -of Europe depends more at this moment on the wisdom and breadth of vision of the people of France than on any other factor;
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