Disarmament
FOR more than five weeks the Preparatory Com- mission for the Disarmament Conference has been sitting at Geneva, and it is difficult to know exactly how to appraise the results. The safest thing to say is that those who expected much will be bitterly disappointed, and that those who expected nothing may feel contented with the reflection that the cause is not lost.
For our part, we always placed our hopes very low because we felt that to try to draw up a single scheme for the limitation of all naval, military, and air force was to Attempt too much. It was rather like making a set of rules which would cover cricket, football and golf. At all events, there was something definite to discuss, as Great Britain and France at once tabled schemes. From the outset these two schemes revealed an acute difference of principle.
Consider these simple facts. France desired that a universal disarmament scheme should limit ships of war, not by different classes but by the total amount of a nation's tonnage. If such a rule were applied, it would probably mean in practice that Great Britain would not have enough ships for the essential work of policing the British Empire, while France (using up the same tonnage in submarines and destroyers) would have a much larger navy of small craft than she has now. Nevertheless, anyone would be both intolerant and wanting in understanding who did not see that the French point of view is sincere. France holds that she has no need of a navy of large ships with a long radius of action. Her requirements are met by a sufficiently strong defensive flotilla. She even argues that her acceptance of a purely defensive naval policy is a proof of her pacific intentions. "We do not want to attack anybody,". she seems to exclaim ; "we only want to protect our shores. It is obvious that submarines and destroyers cannot carry war into distant waters, but arc the weapons of a Power which complacently con- fesses itself to be navally weak."
Against this Great Britain, without impugning the French motive, points out that as a matter of hard . fact the French policy means no disarmament at all, but on the contrary a possible increase of tonnage. Great Britain is bound to have large ships. .She argues —convincingly, as we think, though we fear there is no prospect of most other countries agreeing with us— that submarines arc unnecessary for the proper functions of a navy, and that if the whole world would act on civilized lines submarines might be abolished.
Take, again, the argument of France about military strength. So far she has refused, to think of limiting her Reserves. " Why ! " she cries, "these Reserves are: not, in the strict sense, soldiers at all. They are .men who have returned into civil life, and you surely cannot imagine that we should put ourselves in the position of not being able to call them all out if a blow were struck at the existence of France ? " When Great Britain answerspained rhetoric like that, France. replies in effect that a nation Whieh normally does not have conscript- army Cannot possibly understand how a country thinks: which believes its safety to depend entirely upon passing all its manhood through a -military training. -And, Of course, . so far as mere arguinent goes, the conscript nation has the best, of it every time.
Take yet a third point to illustrate the vital difference between France and Great Britain. France. (character- istically in love with ideas which arc. argumentatively complete) would like to have whatever naval limitation might be agreed upon supervised by some central body. One notes the same method. of thought at work which produced, during the 'peace negotiations, the ideas of a super-State and of a General Staff of Europe. Great Britain, on her side, does not much believe: in any sueli control. British people know from experience that all superfluous investigation, officialdom running wild, the constant filling-up of documents, and so on, 'tend rather to provoke evasion than to ensure compliance. The British view is simply that the Washington plan of trusting to a nation's conscience has worked very well, and would go on working well in regard to further limitation. This opinion is based not on sentimentality but on common sense, the truth being that no nation with a reputation to lose could afford to be caught nit in deception.
The various unofficial reports which come from Geneva suggest that the Preparatory Commission has done no more than suggest certain principles upon which a general plan of limitation may some day be reached. No scheme of actual limitation has yet hem proposed. It seems that we shall have to wait till 1 next year for a continuation of the discussion, and even then the value of what has already been done ; will depend upon certain conditions being fulfilled. I The fulfilment of some of these conditions appears to be remote, to say the least of it. For instance, all the States whose frontiers march with Russia say that they will not reduce their strength till she undertakes to reduce hers. But what chance is there of that ? In these circumstances Lord Cecil's estimate of what has been achieved seems to be too flattering.. "It has been proved to demonstration," he said, "that dis- armament is a practical policy." We wish that we could think so, but there is no need to despair because proof is still wanting. The crying need for disarmament is only the measure of the tremendous efforts which we must make to secure it. Gradually it cart and must be obtained.
The relative failure which we have described gives a fresh and fortunate importance to the Naval :Conference between Great Britain, the United States and Japan, which is to meet on June 12th. Even if. the gnat all-round scheme should fail, there may be in a Three- Power Agreement for further naval limitation, all invaluable pledge of peace and an example that will school the world. It may provide us with a regional naval pact of such magnitude that no conceivable naval combination could prevail against it. There is no question, of course, of Great Britain, America and Japan entering into an alliance ; that would be regarded as minatory; but the fact that they were standing together as sworn keepers of the peace would -almost oblige them to act in unison against wanton mischief-makers.
The naval correspondent of Clic Daily News says that th Admiralty favours reversion to -a -mistier type of. cruiser. Let us hope. that this is -true. The new large. cruisers are tremenchnisly expensive, and do not seem. to be necessary. The size of capital ships- could also he _restricted. The three Powers might agree to limit: the size" Of submarines if they. cannot _be- abolished-- Japan will; no doubt, state her case againit the British, base at Singapore and the American base_ at Hawaii. Not one of these subjects of contention is insign. WINO, but there is the gratifying certainty. that between the three, Powers the will to agree will be_preSent.
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