Mr. K's Chinese Dragon

By DESMOND DONNELLY, MP THE real significance of the great Russia- ' China clash is that it is not new. Basically it is the same argument that has gone on between the two Communist parties since the Chinese Communist debacle of 1927 and Mao Tse-tung's dismissal from the Chinese Polit- bureau. In my view, the argument will continue indefinitely. As China's economic and military strength grows, it will have far-reaching effects on the development of Communism. Eventually it may alter the course of world history.

To understand the argument, one has to go back to the early history of the Chinese Com- munist Party and to the experiences of Russian leadership that are imprinted upon Mao Tse- lung and his immediate circle.

The Chinese Communist Party began in the 1920s as an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party, under Russian influence. It soon had a resident Russian adviser, Borodin, whom Mao says openly was 'a right-wing blunderer.' Upon flat orders from the Cominform—at that time it had no power to reject them—the Chinese Communist Party was forced •to practise peaceful co- existence with Chiang Kai-shek. As gratitude for this collaboration, Chiang Kai-shek organised his infamous coup d'etat in 1927, executing or imprisoning the majority of the Chinese Corn- munist leaders and compelling the survivors either to flee to Russia with Borodin, in an old Ford car laden with petrol cans—or to go underground, as Mao did.

During this chaotic period, in an attempt to rescue something from the wreckage brought about by the disastrous Russian direction, Mao led an abortive uprising in Hunan. For doing this without Russian-approved orders, he was dismissed from the Politbureau, and his group publicly denounced as 'the rifle Movement.' Undeterred, he made his way to the mountain fastness of Chingkanshan, eventually joining forces with General Chu Teh, who had fought his way to the same spot with a small Corn- munist force.

There began Mao's own process of political evolution, which led eventually—through the incredible vicissitudes of the Long March, many years of civil war, the Sino-Japanese conflict, the World War, and more civil war—to the proclamation of the Government of the People's Republic of China from the great red Tien An Men Gate in Peking, on October 1, 1949.

Mao rejected the Russian doctrine of the up- rising of the urban proletariat. Instead, he based his Chinese party upon rural revolution. The extent of the Chinese-Russian gulf that grew

THE SPECTATOR SEPTEMBER 2, thereby is illustrated by the fact that it was five years after the Chinese Communists' final victory before any top-level Russian leader established personal contact with him. This was in late 1954, long after Stalin's death, when Khrushchev and Bulganin appeared in Peking with offers of economic assistance. One cannot imagine a comparable gap of five years with no Personal contact between the heads -of the United States and Britain. following on such a significant change of government.

After the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit there was a Sino-Soviet honeymoon-1 saw some of the evidence myself in the sudden change in Chinese propaganda, as I was in Peking at this Period. After the honeymoon, a more regular marital relationship developed, with minor disagreements becoming more marked as time proceeded.

The first sign of the pattern of current conflict Over attitudes towards the West was visible at the Geneva Indo-China conference, in the summer of 1954 (even before the Khrushchev- flulganin visit to Peking). At Geneva, the Chinese delegation led by Chou En-lai was far More truculent than the Russians. I recall visiting Mr. Eden at his lakeside villa one morning during the conference when the British Foreign Secretary was full of praise for Mr. Molotov and his reasonableness, as com- Pared with the Chinese. For a period, during 1955-56, the Sino-Soviet alliance worked reasonably well—the Chinese were still appreciative of the aid they were re- ceiving under the 1954 Agreement, and Mao ...

se-tung's Government was preoccupied with the collectivisation drive. The next significant indications of an independent Chinese policy— this time in doctrinal matters—was the report that the Peking leaders had intervened in the Polish-Russian dispute in October, 1956. This time the Chinese support was lent towards a i.,fitrire liberal policy. For some months the `-'inese liberal trend continued—although Chou ,It n-lai was called upon to endorse Russian action 111 Hungary when liberalisation went too far. It reached its final culmination in the so-called Hundred Flowers' era in early 1957, and wilted when the flowers did. Iret over the whole of this period, 1955:57, there were important differences of attitude between the Chinese and Russian Communist Parties. At no time did their relationships

approach those which existed between the Russian and East European parties.

Two illustrations will suffice. In China,.

Congress famous secret speech to the 20th

‘-igress was not circulated to local parties but suPPressed. In Russia, Mao Tse-tung's speech (3,.n Contradictions within the socialist society was Published, but discussion of it was pro- hibited.

The current phase of dispute acntary began In 1958 when Khrushchev suddenly cancelled

;18 Visit to the UN and flew dramatically to Peking instead. The Russians were worried about the artificial Quemoy crisis in the autumn of 158; and the Communes idea also seriously alarmed them because it implied Chinese doc- trinal leadership of the bloc. They therefore

4.Plied strong economic pressure during the *Inter of 1958-59; and when the Chinese Com- munist Party finally accepted Russian leader- ship of the bloc, their reward was the new Sino- Soviet Economic Agreement, 1959, involving 5,000,000,000 roubles of Russian aid and credits.

Now, we are back to the same argument, which stems from the differing requirements of the two Communist parties. Broadly, it is because China is so underdeveloped—as com- pared with Russia—that the local need is for greater tensions in order to demand sacrifices to further the industrialisation drives. In Russia, on the other hand, industrialisation and de- Stalinisation have created the opposite need.

Also, the overt argument is not about basic aims but tactics—for the Kremlin has not aban- doned its belief in eventual Communist world domination, any more than the Imperial City. It is that Mr. Khrushchev is far closer to accept- ing the theory of the nuclear deterrent than Mao Tse-tung and he has different ideas as to how to set about achieving their basic aim in the modern world. To that extent it is wrong to present Mr. Khrushchev in the role of a gallant Russian Adlai Stevenson—the liberal to be supported at all costs. To be realistic, he remains the man with the instincts of Palmerston, the background of the Inquisition and the training of Al Capone.

As China grows stronger economically her political independence is likely to increase. Of course, in time, she too will become a great in- dustrial power and be faced by the same social and political problems as in Russia. But although she could become the third industrial power in the world, in aggregate, in the 1970s, China's population and its rate of growth are so vast that individual standards of life will remain much lower for much longer than in Russia—thereby prolonging the political re- quirements for tension. A careful scrutiny of the efforts that have been made in the direction of a birth-control policy shows that little head- way has been made so far—the Marxist rejec- tion of Malthus as `bourgeois nonsense . . there's no such thing as over-population . . . only under-production and under-consumption' is still accepted.

From the Russian point of view, their own relationship with China resembles that of the Kaiser's Germany to the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. But with this difference: the `Empire' is ruled by fanatical and isolated men, who persist in their reactionary faith. The deep-seated fear in Moscow is that their ally may drag the whole bloc into a military venture which it will be impossible to limit—as the Austro-Hungarian Empire did in 1914.

China is expected to explode her own nuclear Weapons in 1962-64. Already she has announced militia training with the declared intention of arming and training every third person—men and women—of her population. This will give her a trained military reserve of 230,000,000 persons on present figures. provided that the organisation keeps pace with the intention.

Thus it is not surprising that Khrushchev and his Russian colleagues are seriously concerned. The implications for Russia and the world of growing Chinese strength, coupled with overt Chinese intransigence, are profound. The situa- tion is made even more difficult for him by Chinese memories of earlier Russian mistakes, and also by the lamentable and arid attitudes towards China adopted by the Western powers. The Sino-Soviet dispute is too important to both sides for either to risk a break, as in the case of Yugoslavia. But the differences are likely to fluctuate and to grow, reflecting the fact that Communism emerges at different rates in dif- ferent soils and proving that, where national interests are affected, the monolith cracks.

---Tnne.% hare been hard. 0 Moloch.