TOPICS OF THE DAY
A POLICY FOR CHINA
ARECOIL into indifference or apathy is always most violent after the failure of a well-meant effort. We see such a reaction now among the Powers who are concerned in China. Hopes ran high and intentions were certainly good when the Tariff Con- ference met at Peking. Everybody felt that the rising tide of Chinese nationalism must be recognized as a reality, and be guided rather than thwarted. But when the Powers had at last made up their minds to alter the Treaties which the Chinese found objectionable, if not humiliating, the rival War Lords of China upset everything by throwing their country into a worse state of chaos than ever. No authoritative Government or person was left in the whole country with whom the Powers could deal.
The question now is : What can be done ? At present there is a policy of drift tempered by bursts of action here and there where it is necessary to protect foreign subjects from the violence of Chinese bandits and looters. In a way this policy of drift is creditable, because it means that no Power is thirsting for an opportunity to take China at a disadvantage and make her pay the forfeits which in the past the weak have too often been compelled to pay to the strong. The policy is, nevertheless, a dangerous thing in itself. If the Powers do not agree quickly upon what to do, one Government will take to acting separately. If that should happen, the situation would be very much worse than it was before the Washington Conference.
Japan is reported to be more inclined than any other country to take independent action. We do not know whether the reports are true, but it is quite certain that if there is any dangrr of that sort it ought to be fore- stalled. At the Washington Conference, Japan professed aims which were identical with our own and with those of America, and if any divergence has since occurred it ought to be possible to restore the harmony. Japan, after all, is very nearly concerned in China, and it can hardly be expected that she should be so patient as Englishmen, to whom the sufferings and losses of other Englishmen in China seem—unfortunately—very remote events. The present silence of America seems strange when we compare it with her eagerness to act just before the Tariff Conference met at Peking. She then said that if the Conference did not satisfy China quickly she would declare an independent policy. We should like to see an effort made at once to establish a common Japanese- American-British policy. If, owing to the jealousy between America and Japan, or for some other cause, that should not prove possible by the ordinary diplomatic means, the Washington Conference ought to be sum- moned again.
What should the nature of the policy be ? The first thing to be quite sure about is that it must not be the old-fashioned policy of general aggression or any scheme of dividing China into spheres of influence. The one thing which would be likely to throw the tuchuns into a permanently anti-foreign attitude would be the calculated use of force. It is very tempting to say that we need only pick out the War Lord who seems to have the best chance of success in the civil war, and to help him with troops and ships and money till he has asserted his supremacy and established general order. History has, however, revealed to its students that, whenever th6 foreigner arrives to help one side against another (even though it might have been supposed that his help would be welcome to those who are oppressed), a national consciousness begins to assert itself. As in certain chemical processes, disparate ingredients begin suddenly to be attracted to one another and to form a solid body. China would probably be no exception to the rule.
Although this is, or ought to be, well enough known, the desire to play with such a policy is always mani- festing itself. For example, a resident in Swatow has just sent us a most interesting letter which is unhappily too long for publication. It commands our deep sympathy because it is a bitter cry from a member of one of those British colonies which feel that they are neglected, if not forgotten. Nevertheless, we cannot agree with our correspondent's conclusion that every- thing would become quite simple if Canton and Swatow were blockaded. He unfolds arguments which are very persuasive in themselves. He points out that as the best of the Cantonese troops have advanced northwards into the Yangtze valley—and having damaged the army of Wu Pei-fu, are now apparently about to engage that powerful tuchun, Sun Chuan-fang—now is the time for the blockade. The necessary naval force, he explains, is on the spot, and the Cantonese Navy is not worth mentioning. He thinks that the discontented factions of the Cantonese would instantly seize upon the dis- organization caused by the blockade to stir up public feeling against the Red rulers. He believes that the strike organizations, which derive most of their revenue from shipping, would fall to pieces. "Why not do it ? " he asks. His letter was written, of .course, before the Cantonese offered to end the boycott of Hong-Kong. We do not take that offer too seriously, but even so it would be a very bad moment to establish a blockade when the chief justification for it had become a doubtful point.
Our correspondent goes on to discuss the suggestion that the Powers should jointly take over the administra- tion of China and create several new Government Services similar to the Maritime Customs. He also discusses the policy (which he deplores) of simply waiting for one of the various tuchuns to assert his superiority over all the others. He remarks sadly that there is no prospect whatever of the appearance of a new 'Yuan Shih-kai. We agree that China seems to have fallen asunder in such a way that the parts are extremely unlikely ever to be joined together again. A federation of the provinces might be conceivable if only there were enough cement to make them adhere in the form of a union ; but even that seems to be lacking. For this reason our correspondent judges any unified control, whether by a Chinese Government or person or by foreign Powers, to be out of the question. It is too late.
An idea, which is elaborated by our correspondent and which has nothing to do with his blockade policy, is, however, well worth considering. He suggests that the various independent Governments should be recog- nized as de facto Governments. The Powers could then inform them that the Treaties now in force with the Chinese Republic applied equally to them. It is a mere mockery to send Notes and protests to the so-called Central Government at Peking, which has become a wan ghost haunting the famous places of the Manchu Dynasty. A beginning might be made with two or three of the least disorderly provinces, and they might be persuaded to demilitarize their railways. It could be pointed out to them that we simply must, and always shall, protect our nationals. The worst possible argument the provinces can bring forward for the abolition of the "Unequal Treaties" is a demonstration that under Chinese rule foreign lives are not safe.
The British Labour Press pretends that we have no right to protect our own people, as they have "no right to be in China." This is, of course, ridiculous. Even though it be true that traders planted themselves originally under the protection of naval guns, China has willingly entered in the past into contractual relations with foreign Powers. On the strength of those relations great and rich colonies have been built up, and the Chinese have profited quite as much as anybody else from the resulting trade. The true way for the Provinces to get the "Unequal Treaties " abolished is to prove that there is no need for them.
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