TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CLOUD IN THE FAR EAST.
LONG approaching, with steady steps, the probability of a war between England and the Chinese Empire seems nearer than at any period since the murder of Mr. Margery. Not many weeks ago, we were informed that Li Hung-Chung, the Viceroy, had behaved with marked rudeness to Mr. Wade, and although the correctness of that story was doubted, it now appears that Mr. Wade was kept waiting outside the Yemen so long that he thought fit to show his sense of the indignity by returning at once to his residence. The Viceroy, finding he had gone too far, did not scruple to make the best of his error, and seek himself a personal interview with the British Envoy to tender an apologetic explanation. The incident did not, in itself, furnish a sufficient ground for a decisive rupture, but it showed how delicate were the relations between the Ambassador and the Court of Pekin. One result was that the Fleet steamed northward and took up a station at Chefoo. Coupled with the more than equivocal conduct of the Burmese Monarch and the pre- sence of a Chinese General in Mandalay, the scene with the Vice- roy must have given a sharp alert to the authorities in Calcutta. The apprehensions aroused in the public mind here were soothed for a moment by another intimation, telling us that the demands of Mr. Wade had been accepted, and that our case against the Celestials was to be fully met. But so soon as it became known that no official confirmation of the story had reached Downing Street, the momentary satisfaction died a sudden death. It is not improbable that Mr. Wade believed himself to be on the eve of success, but if so, his judgment, though doubtless formed on reasonable grounds, was over-san- guine. The arrangements apparently adopted in principle at Tien-tsin did not find immediate favour in the capital, and his arrival there showed him that Li Hung-Chung was still hesi- tating between submission and resistance, or intent on modify- ing the terms which formed the substance of British demands. Now we have the third, and apparently final step in the business. Having waited months for satisfaction, and having encountered protracted delay, Mr. Wade is reported to have acted with commendable decision. A telegram, dated Shanghai, September 27, asserts that "the Chinese Govern- ment shun effectual performance of the terms laid down at Tien-tsin ;" that Mr. Wade will leave Pekin on the 13th of October, "unless a satisfactory settlement is conceded," adding that "the punishment of the Yunnan officials and the publi- cation of foreign affairs in the Gazette are reported to be the chief difficulties." If these statements are authentic, and we have no reason to doubt them—then the quarrel has at length reached a definite issue, and within a fortnight we may be on the brink of a twofold war, waged for the purpose of coercing alike the Court of Pekin and the King of Burmah. The two States, the huge empire and the little kingdom, hang together, for the Burman obviously derives his chief confidence from the Chinese Government, to which he has become a vassal ; and in the event of a rupture, we must be prepared to overrun the Irrawaddy basin, and make such an infraction of Chinese terri- tory as will enforce an absolute surrender, bringing not only full compliance with our terms, but actual, indubitable perform- ance thereof.
No European Power, and England least of all, can afford to daily with an Asiatic State. Beyond certain undefined limits of courtesy and longanimity, none can safely go. Generosity is sure to be misunderstood, or accepted as a sign of weakness. In the present case, so different from other causes of quarrel, the wrong we have suffered is clear and flagrant. No amount of special pleading will suffice to prove, for example, that the Yunnan authorities, if not instigators, could not have pre- vented the murder of Mr. Margery, or make any sensible observer believe that there was not direct complicity between the assassins and the Burmese Court. No Asiatic, from the Red to the Yellow Sea, can have a single doubt on that score. If we sat down quietly and accepted the wrong and insult, our meekness of spirit would be imputed to fear, and in a day we should have lost more prestige than we gained by the march to Magdaia. It would be known instantly from one end of the continent to the other that the British had endured a great defeat, our discomfiture would be accepted as a symptom of decay, and every great and little potentate with whom we have relations would lift up his head, and assume the air of a con- queror. The effect of any weakness would be intensified by the fact that Shine, engaged in a hot dispute with Japan on the score of Formosa, promptly yielded to resolute treat- ment; and the contrast between the great sea power and the small island kingdom would be quickly drawn. Nor are the policy pursued at Mandalay, the conspiracy between the Burmese and the Yunnan officials, the slaying of Mr. Margery, the only solid griefs we have against the Pekin Executive. To this day, the treaties, embodying our acquired rights, have never been properly published in the Official Gazette ; and, we assume, it is not only these, but the new convention or en- gagement, which Mr. Wade very, justly demands should be made known on indisputable authority to the Chinese people. The point may be a hard one to concede, but not harder, any means, than such as European Governments exact from each other; and a tenderness which finds no place in the West is far more impolitic in the East. On the ques- tion of disputed duties at the Treaty ports and in the interior we cannot take up so strong a position, since British subjects and resident traders in China have not, in all instances, themselves dealt quite fairly with Govern- ment. But on the other points we have an irrefragable case, and no alternative but to exact ample reparation or enforce it by stress of arms. Nor would this suffice for the future, if we failed again, as in times past, to see that stipulations were actually observed, promises kept, and pledges fulfilled. The pressure which extorted redress or concession should not be removed until the work was complete ; we should not with- draw the coercive agency in blind reliance even upon written engagements, but meet any delay or evasion by the seizure of some useful material guarantee.
Of course it is quite possible that Li Hung-Chung may not yet have gathered together resources which, in his opinion, would render a war politic at this moment. Although the Government as purchased arms and built or collected a showy -looking fleet, and although men abound, some of which have, at least, the veneer of European discipline, there is no reason to believe that in arms, equip- ment, organisation, tactics, or real soldiership the Chinese are relatively more advanced than they were during the last war. The Viceroy may believe that he has an army and a fleet, but there is a strong chance that, when put to the crucial test of choosing between peace and war, his confidence will give way. The squadron at Chefoo will certainly revive unpleasant recol- lections of penalties exacted which more than wiped out the affront we endured in the Peiho estuary. At the last moment, therefore, the Government may deem it wiser to succumb, and sign the paper presented by the Ambassador. An additional reason telling in favour of that issue may be found in the curious movement among the higher Mandarins, who are now engaged in pressing the idea that China should send out Envoys to Europe. Some expressions in the memorials addressed to the Emperor are remarkable, as implying that the war-party 'does not enjoy a complete ascendancy. For example, the Governor of Fo-kien insists that one resulting advantage would be "the progress of amicable relations, and every particular regarding the country in which they reside would be regularly communicated, and then the 'eyes and ears' of China would be sharpened, and no such wide gulf as before would exist between us." The Governor of Shantung denounces "those who cling to traditional ideas," speaks contemptuously of their "preten- tious talk and high-flown, bombastic notions," and tells them_ that as they despise foreign affairs, so "when emergencies arise they know not how to meet them." He is also made to say that if the Government wants able officials, it must insist that "talented and high-minded men should give their attention with all earnestness to the progress of the times." If these sentences are correctly rendered, then it is plain that Li Hung- Chung is not without an opposition, and that a more consider- able breach has been made in the old policy of seclusion than has been generally supposed. At any rate, the memorials we have quoted display a breadth of view which contrasts strikingly with the stiffness exhibited by the dominant party in Pekin. At present, however, we only know that Mr. Wade is face to face with the obstinacy of that party, and that it is doubtful on which side the determining influences will lean. Under these circumstances, not a moment should be lost in directing the Indian Government to take the needful preliminary steps towards, at least, selecting the troops which may be required, and in adopting such measures at home as will enable us to strike, should that course become imperative, as speedily as time and distance will permit. Nor must there be any half" measures. In the existing political condition of Asia, England must not only win, but win promptly, signally, and effectually. If the thing can be done without offence to allies, we should this time wage war alone, and secure the full advantages of success, so conducting our enterprise to a decisive end as to make it a distinct monition to possibly hostile Powers, and at the same time prove conclusively to a new generation that we can repeat the stupendous efforts of 1857-58, and that we limit the display of our Oriental power only by considerations of expediency, and a wise belief in the virtues of moderation.
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