THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.
laillEN the time arrives for presenting to Germany the Y V final terms of peace for her acceptance or rejection, it will he of the utmost importance that all the Associated Powers should speak with one voice. To this end it is essential that each Power should frankly state its own point of view wherever that, either in substance or in fact, differs from views expressed by other members of the great partnership. In the affairs of nations, as of individuals, frankness combined with courtesy is an essential element of good fellowship. For this reason it is most desirable that the newspaper Press and the public men of Great Britain should make clear without delay that in no circumstances can an island Power, which is also the centre of a sea-linked Empire, consent to what is called " the freedom of the seas " if that term carries the meaning which has usually been attached to it in this country One of President Wilson's often-quoted conditions of peace reads as follows :— "Absolu,te freedom of navigation upon the seas outside terri- torial waters alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforce- ment of international covenants."
Itmay well be that President Wilson reads some meaning into the phrase which is quite different from ours. All we want to do is to state what the British people most firmly hold and believe on this vital matter of naval security. English- men, by the essential conditions of their national life, are compelled to keep the problem of sea-power ever in their minds, and they cannot permit this question to be even for a moment forgotten by their own statesmen. Happily, there is no reason to believe that it has been forgotten by any responsible person. As far back as 1916 Mr. Balfour dealt with this critical phrase " the freedom of the seas " in an interview given to the American Press.* He here clearly shows how the possession of sea-power is essential to Great Britain for her own defence, and he further shows how in practice she has used the power not for herself alone but for the liberty of the world. From the ending of the Napoleonic Wars far on into the nineteenth century Great Britain was without a rival upon the sea. " During this period," writes Mr. Balfour, " Belgium became a State, Greece secured her independence, the unity of Italy was achieved, the South American Republics were established, and the Monroe Doctrine came into being." Such a record of events during the period when British sea-power was absolute and unchallenged is a sufficient proof that we recog- nized the obligations of honour which the possession of power imposed upon us. It is important to add that as a corollary to our sea-power we steadily refused to build up great land armies. We took the risk of being in a position of inferiority upon land because we relied upon our superiority at sea. We arc therefore entitled to the credit of having done nothing during the long period of our unquestioned naval supremacy to encourage the growth of militarism, the special evil which President Wilson has nobly set himself to root out of the world. More than this, as long as our naval supremacy remained unchallenged, we did not trouble ourselves to emphasize it. There was on our part no constant rattling of the sword, no wanton multiplication of battleships. We were content to remain moderately strong until Germany decided to challenge our strength. Then we set to work to make the balance of power in our favour indisputable.
This recital of facts is necessary because until the present war' not many Americans took any keen interest in Euro- pean politics. The average American had no exact per- ception of what British sea-power meant. Undoubtedly American trade did suffer from British sea-power during the Napoleonic Wars, just as the trade of neutral Powers has in some respects suffered during the present war. It may be also that cases of abuse occurred, especially in view of the difficulty experienced by our naval officers in distinguishing between American citizens and British subjects who wished to desert. That these past events should have bred in the American people a dislike of sea-power, and that this dislike should have rendered the phrase " the freedom of the seas " popular as a political motto, is natural enough, but no great nation which sets out to seek justice can allow itself to be guided by a phrase capable of both misinterpretation and misapplication. Let us see then what would be the consequences of the " freedom of the seas " that we have always repudiated. President Wilson demands " absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war." Now, in peace there already is absolute freedom of navigation. Therefore what President Wilson must mean is '" in war as well as in peace." That is the real issue. The President of the United States apparently.proposes that when two nations are at war, they shall only fight on land, or within their own territorial waters. No reason is advanced for this limitation of the area of warfare. War at sea is in no respect more cruel than war on land : in some respects it is less cruel. The idea underlying this proposal is that the seas outside territorial waters are the common possession of the whole world, and what is common to all should not be used as a battlefield by some. That is certainly an attractive idea, but will it bear examination ? The sea is not merely a vacant space : it is also a highway. The effect of President Wilson's proposal, strictly interpreted, would be that a belligerent could use the sea as a safe highway for his troops up to the three-mile line which is the boundary of territorial waters. The Germans, for example, would be at liberty to organize a gigantic fleet of transports loaded with men and munitions, and these transports might move up and down the coasts of England and Scotland seeking a safe landing-place, and as long as they kept outside the three-mile limit they would be immune from attack. Merely to set forth such a proposition is sufficient to condemn it in the minds of islanders who know, whether from history or from island instinct, that their long freedom from invasion
• Since published as a pamphlet by Sir Joseph Causton and Sons.
is due to the fact that their fleets have ever been ready in war to hunt down the enemy upon the high seas and beat him back to his own coastline. To expect Great Britain to look on with her arms folded while enemy transports were bearing down upon her coasts is to ask a great nation to commit suicide.
Nor is " freedom of the seas " in the sense in which we understand it defensible even from a purely American point of view. To take an illustration given by Mr. Balfour in the pamphlet already referred to. Suppose that Germany decided to challenge America's Monroe Doctrine in Brazil. According to the literal meaning of President Wilson's proposal, the Germans would be free to send their ships loaded with soldiers and guns and all the necessaries of land warfare right across the Atlantic, and the American Navy would not be allowed to interfere until these ships were within three miles of the Brazilian coast. In practice it would mean that the fighting would be postponed till after the Germans had landed, and therefore the United States, if she wished to give effective help to the Brazilians, would have to organize a large army and convey it to Brazil. As Mr. Balfour well says, " not along this path are peace and liberty to be obtained. To paralyse naval power and leave military power uncontrolled is surely the worst injury which international law can inflict upon mankind."
Very likely when President Wilson laid down his proposition he was not thinking of warships or of transports, but only of peaceful merchantmen. On that basis his proposal might be feasible if we could agree on what is meant by the word " peaceful." But we think that is impossible. Clearly the conveyance of munitions of war to an enemy is not a peaceful act, even if the vessel conveying the munitions is flying a neutral flag , and conveying in addition harmless cargo and non-combatant passengers. The old law of the sea rightly permits in such a case the capture of the vessel, to be followed by the condemnation of ship or cargo or both, according to the circumstances of the case as proved before a Prize Court. That is an absolutely humane method of warfare, and so far as it diminishes the munitions reaching one or the other of the belligerents it reduces the sum total of human suffering. But if ships are to be prevented from carrying munitions of war to one of the belligerents, it is necessary that the naval forces of the opposing Power should have the right to examine all ships about whose cargo any suspicion arises, and to this extent the freedom of the seas must be restricted for all ships in time of war. The defi- nition of munitions of war must be a very wide one. To keep an army in the field supplied with food is as important as to keep it supplied with cartridges and shells. If it is legitimate to bomb the enemy's supply trains, why should it be illegiti- mate to capture his supply ships ? Nor, in practice, is it possible to draw a distinction between goods destined for the fighting man and food destined for civilians. That distinction has never been attempted in the case of beleaguered cities, and if a seaport town were invested by land by an enemy who also had command of the sea no one would dream of expecting the besieger to permit supplies to be carried through to the city by water while forbidding their passage by land. Exactly the same argument applies to a beleaguered country. Railway and road transit is interrupted in war as a matter of course ; why not also sea transit ?
These questions are sufficient to show that in practice it is impossible to have the same freedom of the seas in war as in peace, for human nature rebels against the unfairness that would ensue. The plausible theory above referred to, that the sea being common to all should not be a battleground for some, fails the moment that it is tested by practical considerations. But we may go further, and ask whether this theory is sound even in the highest realms of ethics. No doubt it is profitable for neutral nations to be able to carry on their trade in comfort and security while other members of the human family are killing one another with every instrument that science can devise and skill fashion. But is there anything ideal or anything that makes for peace in such an organization of the world's society ? Surely it is better that neutrals should feel some small part of the pinch of war so that they may have a direct motive for using all their influence on the side of peace. What neutrals as well as belligerents are entitled to demand is that the operations of war shall be carried on in accordance with the established principles of international law, and in order to secure this end it ;s rapidly becoming agreed that all peace-loving nations should combine to create some international organization possessing both the will and the power to enforce the law. Until the new order " has changed all the present conditions it is impossible for Great Britain on any consideration -to surrender those attributes of sea-power which are essential to her safety and to the safety of her Empire.
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