TOPICS OF THE DAY.
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY.
THE National Review for November contains an article on British foreign policy which deserves careful attention. With certain of the details of the policy proposed we cannot agree, but the general tone and outlook of the article we find both sound and prescient. The-writer, or rather committee of writers, for the article (signed "A. B. C., &c.") is evidently by several hands, take as their cardinal fact in international affairs the rise of Germany as a world-Power. Here we are entirely with them. This is the dominant condition in all foreign relations, and unless it is properly understood. and given its just significance we sha.11 never arrive at a proper realisation of how British interests can be best secured in the changes and chances of Continental diplo- macy. If we recognise what the rise of Germany means, we may use that fact to our great advantage. If we ignore it and. its meaning for us and the rest of the world, we may mis- handle our foreign policy as completely as did Cromwell when he ignored the rise of France under Louis XIV. and. its meaning. The rise of Germany as a world-Power means, as the writers in the National Renew note, two things,—i.e., a challenge to our control of the sea by the building of a great German navy, and a challenge to Russia's position in the Near East by the virtual absorption, first commercial and then political, of Asia Minor. The German Emperor (and the active portion of the German people follow him blindly, in this) has set his mind like a vice on getting a great navy, and also on exploiting Asia Minor. He sees that a world-Power without a navy is an absurdity, and he sees also that Asia Minor is by far the most accessible and richest piece of the world that remains undeveloped. To .control and. develop Asia Minor is to get possession of an Empire well worthy of the most far-reaching Imperial ambitions. Two generations ago a German litical philosopher dreamed that the Empire of Asia or was the natural heritage of the Teuton, and the- German Emperor regards it as his destiny to fulfil this 'dream. That sea-power and Asia Minor are the essential aims of German • political ambitions we agree with the writers in the National, and agree also that Germany -wishes for power and influence in the Far East. We think that they should have also taken into account the ambition, vague and more distant, no doubt, but still quite real, to acquire control of a portion of South America, and. to follow the German trader and German immigrant to the temperate provinces of Brazil. However, the immediate policy of Germany is, as we have said, sea- power and Asia Minor.
But since no new political ambitions can be fulfilled in this world without affecting the interests of other States, we must ask who would be adversely affected by the successful carrying, out of Germany's ambitions. The answeris not difficult, —England and Russia. Germanycan- not attain to sea-power without endangering our command. of the sea. Germany cannot control and develop Asia Minor without both directly and indirectly coming into conflict with Russia's most cherished ambitions. If Germany is once firmly seated in Asia.Minor, Russia is not only barred from access to Syria, a region, that is, to which so many of her people look with an intense longing, but will also find herself unable to carry out her secular policy in regard to Constantinople and the Bosphorus. The greater German interests are in Asia Minor the more certain it is that Germany will not assent to any alteration of the status quo in the Balkans or on the Bosphorus which will favour' Russia. It is then England and Russia who must of necessity suffer by the rise of Germany as a world-Power and the satisfaction of the German Emperor's ambitions. That is a fact which cannot be ignored in the shaping of its foreign policy by either State. It does not, of course, indicate that those Timers, either singly or together, should fly at the tbroat of Germany, but it does show that they should very carefully watch the proceedings' of Germany, and that ,they should endeavour as far as possible not to act in such a way towards each other as may help Germany, to profit at their expense. It cannot be wise for them to be antagonistic about trifles under the conditions which are created by
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ti I Germany's endeavours to make her anibitions realities, Yet curiously ' enough up till now both Russia and England, to judge by their diplomacy, have not only been blind to the trend of events, but have actively contributed to the fulfilment of the German aims. They have continued at enmity in spite of the signs of the times, and have allowed Germany to use their enmity as a stepping-stone for her advancement. But is it not now time to reconsider the whole situation, to see whether they really have any solid grounds for quarrelling, and to ask whether it would not be better to assume towards each other relations which would not actively stimulate the rise of Germany ?- Surely Germany has " managed " them both sufficiently long. We do not, of course, advocate anything approaching a league or alliance against Germany. We, merely desire that neither Power should be quite so un. businesslike as to play perpetually into • the hands of Germany. Hitherto antagonism to Russia, or at any rate a desire to hold Russia in check, has been the pivot of our foreign policy. .We have encouraged Germany and German schemes of advancement in China, and even to some extent at Constantinople, in order, as we imagined, to provide a makeweight against Russia. Russia, equally sure that she ought to hold us in check, has been glad to see the advance of German power in the Far East. The increase of German influence in China has, that is, been welcomed. by Russia as a blow to British influence. In fact, both Powers have brought bricks to build 'the German fortress, in the belief that it would. some day keep its supposed rival in order. Meantime, Germany has been quietly determined to use her power for her own good alone.
- What steps ought to be taken to stop the quarrelling between Russia and England and to allow them leisure to watch Germany ? The writers in the National' Review suggest the outlines of a foreign policy which would put an, end to our antagonism with Russia, without in any sense attacking Germany, and would enable us to abandon the foolish policy of aggrandising Germany 'in ordir to keep Russia down. They propose, in fact, that understand- ing with Russia which we have so consistently advocated in these columns. They note, to begin with, that the chief obstacle to an understanding with Russia is the desire of Russia to come down to the Persian Gulf. Though, like most writers on British foreign policy, they are evidently somewhat perturbed at the idea of *giving up our traditional veto on Russia's advance to the open water, they are clearly prepared for the step, for they very -sensibly protest against the folly of regarding Germany's virtual acquisition of a port on the Persian Gulf with composure,' while looking on Russia's acquisition of a port as a easuibelli. Therefore they come to the conclusion that we ought to allow Russia to obtain her outlet on the Persian Gulf prci- vided she gives us a quid pro quo. ' _ We agree, but we cannot help noticing the difficulty of finding the quid pro quo. The fact is, Great Britain and Russia are in essential matters so little in antagonism, and Russia has so little that we want, that it is very difficult to arrive at a bargain. It is usual, then, with our diplomatists, when considering an agreement with Russia, to try to produce a compromise by asking Russia to take less than she wants, not because the whole of her desire would hurt us, but because it will look more like a bargain. But surelythat is a very unbusinesslike way of coming to an understanding. It seems to us that we should give Russia everything she wants which- will not injure us, and nothing more. If there is anything we really want from her in exchange by all means let us ask it, but if there is nothing then let us not make our satiety a reason for giving her less than she asks in regions where we shall incur no injury. In truth, what we want from Russia, and what she wants from us, is good- will, and a truce to a nagging diplomacy. But this general goodwill is not to be produced by cutting down Russia's demands in order to give the effect of a compromise, but by satisfying Russia fully, fairly, and ungrudg,ingly% Goodwill cannot- effectively be put into- a treaty. It can only be produced by the removal of unneces- sary friction. As soon as we make it clear to Russia, by deeds and not merely by words, that we are not the enemy, and that it is not worth her while to encourage the growth of Germany in order to hold England in check, we shall speedily obtain that goodwill at St. Petersburg which the writers 'in the Ifatioual „Review regafd as essential to an understanding. The "active goodwill of the powers that be in St. Petersburg" will soon follow on our making it clear to Russia that in the future she will not, as in the past, whenever and wherever she moves find Britain blocking her path. When the victorious Russian armies on their way to Constantinople topped the hills of San Stefano and came in sight t,.;: the Sea of Marmora they saw, drawn up facing them the British fleet. That fact has not been forgotten, said Russians, official and unofficial, still believe that the British always bar their path. We want to make them realise that this is so no longer, and to allow them to turn their attention to the much more real barriers presented by another Power.
The writers in the National are, wisely, not content with generalities, and. attempt to set forth a specific basis for an understanding with Russia. Shortly, it is as follows. So long as she lets us alone in Egypt, Russia should have, as far as we were concerned, a free hand in the Near East—i.e., in the Balkans and in Asiatic Turkey —and we should also refrain from encouraging German expansion in Asia Minor. Li Persia we should allow Ru.ssia a convenient commercial outlet on the Gulf in return for an undertaking on her part to respect the political status quo in the Gulf. [This seems to us a most mistaken example of giving enZiugh to tantalise and not enough to satisfy. We would give Russia as free a hand in Persia and on the Persian Gulf as she will give us in Egyph.] In the Far East the National Review writers suggest that we should get Russia to agree to Japan having Korea, while Russia should have a free hand in Mongolia and Manchuria. We should at the same time stipulate for a free hand in the Yangtse. We cannot see any objection to this, and subject to what we have just said in regard to the Persian Gulf, we believe that the proposals in the National Review do afford a basis of agreement. But in the case of the Persian Gulf it is essential that there should be no niggling, but a broad and thorough settle- ment. As the National proposal stands, Russia would either reply, " Tbanlz- you for nothing," or else form an unstable agreement. What our aim should be in. the case of Russia is either to give her a free hand wherever we can do so without injury to ourselves, or else to have no diplomatic dealings with her whatever. In our belief, we can .safely give her a free hand in the Persian Gulf. Whether Russia can avail herself of that free hand without doing herself injury, financial and even political, is her affair and not ours. For a half-hearted agree- ment with Russia we feel no enthusiasm. Indeed, we believe it would prove even more dangerous than the status quo of suspicion and veiled enmity. If we are to have an understanding, it must be on the boldest possible lines. It must recognise the fact that Asia is big enough both for Russia and for us, and that where we have not gone and. where we have no intention of going—i.e., in Persia, in Asia Minor, in Mongolia, and in Manchuria—there Russia can have a free hand. In fact, an understanding with Russia should approach very nearly, as far as we and Russia were concerned, a parti- tion of Asia into "spheres of influence." Such a partition would not, of course, bind. or affect other Powers. We should not tell Russia that we should help her to keep her sphere, but merely that she must make her own terms with the rest of the world in regard to it; and she would say the same to us. And here we may note that we should expect Russia to recognise our claims to exclusive influence, not only in the Yangtse, but also in Thibet and Arabia. If and when the Chinese and Turkish Empires break up, those regions must be within our political control. Thibet is too near India to allow of any interference there, and we, as the greatest of Mahommedan Powers, could not allow the Afahommedan Holy Places to be under any other control. But Russia has no desire either for Thibet or Arabia, and therefore such a stipulation need in no way interfere with a, sound understanding with the Empire of the Czar.
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