CIVILIAN RESPONSIBILITY AND CONTROL.
[TO THE EDITOR OP THE "SPECTATOR."]
SIE,—It is with a feeling little short of amazement that I see you instancing Lincoln (Spectator, October 26th) as a man who learnt that "it was quite as necessary to supply his generals with a sound military policy as with guns and ammunition and soldiers." Your view is surely in direct opposition to the facts. Lincoln began the war with every desire to control its policy; he hampered his generals by constant interference ; his appointments to command were at first political, and were rescinded in the face of the enemy; and the three years during which he retained military responsibility were years of almost unbroken failure. As a strategist he failed to realise that a vigorous attack may be the best defence, and it was on his fears for the safety of his capital that Lee and Jackson securely played. Remade the mistake, as disastrous in military as Captain Mahan has proved it in naval affairs, of preferring the capture or retention of positions to the chance of striking a decisive blow. In 1864 he realised his mistake. He threw aside the books on military tactics which he had conscientiously endeavoured to master, and abdicated his military functions in favour of Grant, with results to which history bears witness. In appointing him he said, "I neither ask nor desire to know anything of your plans. Take the responsi- bility and act, and call on me for assistance,"—a strange utterance for one who was "realising" his duty to supply his generals with a policy.—I am, Sir, &c., [We of course claim no right to say absolutely what was Mr. Lincoln's attitude towards his generals, but we think that a perusal of the best available source of information, Mr Nicolay and Colonel Hay's official Life of Lincoln, will shoe
that there were three periods in Mr. Lincoln's conduct of the war. In the first, he declared himself to have no kriowledge of war, and put himself blindly into the hands of the military experts, telling them to have a free hand and that he would support them through thick and thin. The result of the free band was disaster, and Mr. Lincoln found that, having the supreme responsibility, he must go into matters of military policy himself. Then same the second stage, in which he to a large extent dictated the military policy. During this time he discovered and brought to the front Grant, and Sherman, and Sheridan, and the other Northern leaders. Then followed the third period of the war, in which he found it possible to withdraw from active interference, and was able to leave Grant and his great lieutenants to conduct the war, sure • that they would follow out a sound military policy. Mx. Lincoln no doubt disliked the duty of advising on matters of military policy, but he did not abandon giving such advice because he failed in it, but because it had become unnecessary. —ED. Spectator.]
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