HOME-RULE IN AUSTRIA. T HERE is one result of that bastard
federalism which we just now call Home-rule that almost escapes public attention. So far from relieving the statesmen who have to administer it, it overtaxes their intellects till they become irresolute, and dread doing anything lest it should produce some unexpected but most dangerous result. Just look at what is going on in the Austrian Monarchy now. The experiment of Home-rule is being tried there under unusually favourable conditions. The Emperor is liked and trusted throughout his dominions, and is allowed to exercise powers as Universal Referee which are wholly inconsistent with any constitutional theory of his position. Moreover, his authority, though conceded to him by opinion, is backed in the last resort by the possession of force, for his Army would obey him under all circumstances ; and if the Empire were in danger, he could for months, or even years at a time, govern his dominions by decree. Again, the governing classes in his Empire—Germans, Magyars, and South Slays— possess much political capacity, and are aware that, however jealous of each other, separation would involve for each of them absorption in some neighbouring nationality. The Catholic Germans do not wish to be governed by Hohenzollerns ; or the Magyars to be crushed by their own Slav subjects ; or the South Slays to be drowned in the endless Russian morass. As to the Czechs, they are so few and so isolated by geography, that inde- pendence would mean for them immediate and probably violent subjugation. Nevertheless, with all these advan- tages, and this other one, that the union of the jarring Kingdoms in some form or other has endured for centuries, the difficulties of the Imperial Government are almost heartbreaking, they are so aggravated by the absence of unity among the component States of the Monarchy. Within the past three months, there have been no less than three dangerous discussions. The Bohemians have again, for instance, demanded that their King, the Emperor, shall be crowned in Prague,—that is, that instead of being governed by the common " Austrian " Parliament, they should be governed by their own Diet and a Ministry responsible to themselves alone. So strong was the pressure, that the Emperor was inclined to yield, he perceiving, like the old diplomatist he is, that the existence of many Parliaments, which jar and bicker and quarrel, but cannot separate, tends to aggrandise the authority of the common arbiter on the throne. The moment, however, that the Hungarians understood that concession was possible, their leaders protested, really from dread of the rise of a new Slav Kingdom, but declaring in public that Dualism was a compromise between Hungary and the " Cis-Leithan Monarchy " as a whole, and not between Hungary and a group of States. The project was therefore abandoned for the minute, to be revived, of course, on the next opportunity, and whenever revived, to throw the Empire into a political crucible once more. Then suddenly Hungary blazed up. The Emperor had visited a provincial town, and during his visit the Hapsbnrg colours were displayed above his temporary residence. But those colours are also " Austrian ' colours, and all Hungary took fire because her King on her own soil had elevated " foreign " colours above his house. This move- ment, which actually produced small insurrections, was quieted after a fashion by an appeal to the loyalty felt towards the Emperor's person, and then a new one began. The Army, which is the true nexus of 'the Austrian Empire, has since 1867 always been denominated the Imperial Royal Army (kaiserlich-koniglich), and the Hungarians now object to this as not expressing the main fact of Dualism,—that there is a Hungary as well as an Austria within the Empire. So excited became public feeling over this point of etiquette, that M. Tisza, who for fifteen years has governed Hungary acceptably both to the people and the Court, found that he must give way or resign, and accordingly persuaded the Emperor to make a concession which will at once be made the basis of attacks on the unity of the Army. That great brotherhood is henceforward to be described in all General Orders and on all insignia as the Imperial and Royal Army, and the Emperor himself as his Imperial and Royal Majesty. The new description, however, was hardly accepted when M. Tisza's position was again endangered by another Home-rnle cry,—certain, we may add, to be raised in the case of Ireland. The Emperor and King has a civil list from "Austria"— that is, his Cis-Leithan dominions—and from Hungary, but he spends both in Vienna, which Hungarians by no means regard as their capital. This is an injury to Hungary, and the patriots demanded that the Court should reside and spend money for half the year in Buda-Pest. The demand was rejected, and M. Tisza was able to defend himself, chiefly, we imagine, because the majority felt that the question came too near to interference with their King's private life ; but it marks exactly the operation of Home- rule upon public policy. The interest of the Empire can only be consulted when it does not clash with the interests or the national pride or the provincial jealousies of its component parts, which, if irritated, would if they could fly asunder, and as they cannot, conspire to make steady government difficult or impossible.
The consequence of this state of affairs is, that the Austrian governing men sink from statesmen into diplo- matists, and are of all the powerful men in Europe, the most timid in risking any serious action. But for the per- sonal ascendency of the Emperor, for example, a cohere.* foreign policy would become impossible. That policy, as now arranged, is to maintain an alliance with Germany, to resist Russia, and to favour the development of the Balkan states into a federation of which the ruler of Bosnia—that is, the Emperor himself—will ultimately be the military Protector. That policy, under the personal sanction of the Emperor, is being carried out in a way ; but Count Kalnoky neither can nor will be truly energetic in pushing it on. How is he to be ? The Hungarians like the struggle with Russia, but.do not cordially approve the strict alliance with Germany, and detest the acquisition of Bosnia, which, being full of Serbs, adds to the Slav weight within the Monarchy. The Germans approve generally the policy accepted, but are doubtful about Bosnia, afraid of a Protectorate in the Balkans, and not nearly so well disposed to run the risk of attacking or provoking Russia as the Hungarians are. Russia cannot swallow up them. The -Bohemians, on the other hand, who have to work with the Germans, dislike the German alliance, are averse to any struggle with Russia, " the natural protector of all Slays," and would accept the annexation of any number of Slav provinces -with indifference or pleasure. The unhappy Chancellor, before he writes a despatch—say about Servia—has to remember all these proclivities, and to shape his policy so as not to offend past bearing two Parliaments and half-a-dozen Diets, all with means more or less effective of giving effect_ to their annoyance. He therefore postpones decisions as long
as he can, minimises the outward appearance of every action, and in Servia, for example, will hardly allow his
policy to be perceived. Indeed, but for the special right of decision accorded to the Emperor, and his power, practical as well as constitutional, of saying to the,Arniy, " March," and to his Ambassadors, " Sign, the Hapaburg Monarchy would not have a policy at all. The Emperor is, in fact, the only Foreign Minister in Austria who is free, and his position is not so completely due to his crown that it will be transferred intact to his successor. The difficulty is, we believe, even greater in finance, for in that department not only convictions and prejudices, but pecuniary interests come into collision, with the result that a fixed policy as to Customs, or as to a common paper currency, or as to the borrowing of money, is nearly an impossibility,—indeed, if the Empire were richer, and the financiers therefore less influential, would be outside the range of political discussion. The effect of such friction upon the prosperity of the country is very grave, and so also it is upon the character of statesmen. Nobody being free but the Emperor, nobody can become really great except as a diplomatist, and an "epoch-making statesman" is as un- likely to arise in Austria as in Switzerland ; while the men who do arise are worn out with difficulties other than the difficulties of governing. If we could in this country imagine a Cabinet containing three English Conservatives, three rabid Parnellites, three strong Colonists, and three natives of India, all of whom must be conciliated before anything could be done, we should have some idea of the position of the Austrian Chancellor, and of the kind of statesman that the Austrian Chancellor must always be. It is a position in which a Bismarck could not manage foreign policy, and Mr. Gladstone could not take off taxes, yet keep the Treasury full. That, in spite of all, the Empire goes on, we admit, but without the Emperor it would stop ; and even as it is, astounding abuses, directly inimical to its grandeur and prosperity, are allowed to continue because no human life is long enough for the preliminary reconciliation of so many jarring human wills.
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