NO ONE WINS.
IF a settlement is reached on the common-sense lines which we have discussed above, it will undoubtedly be a neutral-tinted settlement. Nobody will have got what he wanted. Everyone will have been disappointed except in the one essential matter—the avoidance of civil war. English and Scottish Unionists, as Mr. Balfour showed clearly in his pathetic speech, will be the most deeply dis- appointed of all—will be the heaviest losers. We have always held, and we still hold, that the incorporating Union provides the only sound and permanent settlement of the Irish problem, the only settlement which will secure true prosperity to Ireland. The Union has already brought to Ireland more social welfare than she ever attained before in her whole history. At this moment Southern Ireland is one of the really prosperous parts of the Empire. Agricul- ture is something of a tragic industry in most countries, but in Ireland it actually flourishes. The possibility that a state of things so admirable may be destroyed, as we fear it may be, by Home Rule cannot but fill Unionists like ourselves with an acute sense of sorrow. We are bound, however, to recognize facts, and to say that, disquieting as the prospect is, it is at any rate better than civil war. We need not dwell upon the feelings of the Ulstermen of the six counties. They will naturally experience a sense of something deeper and more bitter than disappoint- ment at. the idea of being forced, as they will be inclined to think, to forsake the Protestant Covenanters of the three Roman Catholic counties of Ulster. Their acquiescence in the settlement is bound, therefore, to be embittered. They must remember, however, that civil war would be infinitely worse' for the Protestants in the three counties of Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal, and also for the Protestants throughout the South and West of Ireland, than what they now look upon as something approaching desertion. By accepting Exclusion they are really doing what is best for the Protestants of the rest of Ireland as well as for themselves, and this the Protestants of the South and West are beginning to see. No doubt they would have much preferred, as we should have pre- ferred, the Union and the status quo, but the issue of the maintenance of the Union has been swallowed up in the larger issue of trying to avoid civil war. For the Liberal Party as a whole the settlement, if it is achieved; will bring much less disappointnient. They wanted, no doubt, to satisfy the Nationalists to the fall, but- the great bulk of them have never been strong Home Rulers on the merits. A very large number,-- indeed,- will in secret be exceedingly. relievhd at not hiving" to attempt' the hdrrible teak of coercing
the Protestants of the North. In truth, though they may not think it politic to proclaim the fact, the Liberals are the people who will have most cause to rejoice in an Exclusion settlement.
A word must also be said about the Nationalists. They will, no doubt, profess themselves deeply chagrined at the breaking up of the unity of Ireland, but the wiser heads among them may well be content to escape the appalling difficulties presented by any attempt to govern the North against its will. Even if we are able to conceive coercion by the Imperial Parliament as ultimately successful, it could only be so after the North had been drenched in blood and thousands of its population killed or driven out of the island. The sullen and ruined inhabitants of North-East Ulster, however strongly coerced, and however much at the mercy of the Dublin Parliament, would not be pleasant bedfellows. But if a common-sense settlement is to prevail, the Nationalists who really believe in their cause may indulge the feeling that within a very few years they will have established so brilliant a record for good government in the South and West that they will have the Ulster people actually knocking at their doors and admitting that they do things far better in Dublin than in London, and that therefore the proper kind of union for them is a union with the rest of Ireland. For ourselves, we venture to predict that such a state of things will never be attained, but then we are not Home Rulers. The Nationalist, on the contrary, if he is sincere, and if he does not want Ulster included merely to pay off old grudges and to humble and oppress the Ulstermen, is bound to hold that he will be able to woo and win the people of. the North. If common-sense is to preside over the settle- ment, it must be admitted that the Liberals, and still more the Nationalists, will be the chief practical beneficiaries.
Two points still remain to be noticed. We have already shown in these columns what are the consequential amendments which will be required if the six counties are excluded, and need say no more on that head, except that we—and here we believe we speak for all Unionists—shall not attempt to haggle over the financial adjustment. The other point is as to the best way of making the Exclusion amendments. On the whole, we think the best plan, and the plan which is least likely to lead to friction, will be to allow the Bill in its present form to go through under the Parliament Act, but to pass pari passu an ordinary Bill containing the Exclusion clauses and the consequential amendments. That, no doubt, seems a clumsy plan, but it will have this advantage. The Nationalists will be able to save their face with their supporters in America by point- ing out that they have not assented to the Exclusion of the six counties, and that therefore they have incurred no responsibility for that settlement. This plan will also enable the neo-Federalists to give the Exclusion of Ulster that Federalist complexion to which they attach so much importance. They might, for example, insert a preamble in the amending Act setting forth that, till Parliament shall make provision for a Federal system for the whole of the United Kingdom, it is advisable to exclude the six counties, and to make certain consequential amendments in the Home Rule Bill. The Home Rule Bill and the amending Bill could then receive the Royal Assent on the same day—the Home Rule Bill having the priority by a few hours. There may be arguments against this suggestion which have not occurred to us, but, as at present advised, it seems to us the beat way of managing the business.
All we need say in conclusion is to express the hope that the "conversations," which we presume have already begun, will be conducted to a successful issue. But if this desirable end is to be reached, the parties to the conversations must keep the supreme object always before their eyes. They must remember that what they are engaged upon is not the formation of an ideal government for Ireland, but the avoidance of civil war. That is the supreme aim. Everything must be sacrificed to it. If they leave in the Bill any bond-fide ground for a resort to arms by the Ulstermen, they will have failed, even if they have alio produced what is per as an ideal system of Home Rule. Better a ragged Bill and no risk of civil war • than • a well:made Bill and a --loophole for coercion' and for an appeal to aims:
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