2 JUNE 1917, Page 6

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

ON Wednesday the Austrian Reichsrath met, and thus what not long ago seemed to be an imposSible event has happened. Moreover, it met without what are known as the " German Guarantees." These two facts seem to be evidence that the Prussian hold upon the affairs of Austria-Hungary is being deliberately loosened. But of course there always remains the possibility that the hold is being loosened of set purpose--theatrically—in order to create impressions abroad that. arc convenient to the policy of the Central Powers. If the stage is indeed being set in Austria-Hungary to deceive Russia by representing the German Austrians and the Magyars as good democrats in the making who desire nothing more than to be political brothers of the Russians, then " things arc not what they seem " in Austria, and the Prussian hold is not !wing really loosened. It is made to seem looser in order to become tighter. But on the whole we believe that recent ten- dencies in Austria-Hungary have not been pro-Prussian in character, and the proof of this seems to be that the Prussians have not been pleased at what has happened. If the ern- layonie movements towards suffrage reform and federalism— which would give the Slav peoples something approaching an equality of power with the Magyar ascendancy in Hungary— related themselves only to the Russian Revolution, and had been inspired solely by that great portent, we should be very much on our guard. We should regard everything that is now occurring as a trick. But it has to be remembered that when the Emperor Charles succeeded to the throne he at once began doing things which were not particularly pleasing to Germany. He dismissed, or at all events gladly parted with, his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Burian, and put Count Czernin in his place. That was before the Revolution in Russia. Count Burian had been up to the eyes in the Prussian policy, but Count Czcrnin quickly advocated a peace " without annexation and indemnities," and horrified the Pan-Germans so much that their Press resounded with the thunder of their protests.

We do not feel sure enough of the circumstances to dogmatize, but we cannot escape from the impressive facts that Germany did not want the Reichsrath to meet ; that the late Hungarian Premier, Count Tisza, the chief henchman of Prussia, declared that it must not meet during the war ; and that, after all, it is meeting. More than that, it is meeting with the Polish and Bohemian Deputies in their places. Under the " German Guarantees " the Poles and Czechs were to have given up their seats in exchange for a shadowy promise of autonomy. The schemes of Tisza have thus far broken down. His masterful proroguing of the Hungarian Parliament in April did not avail him very much. That stem, narrow, revengeful, but tremendously powerful personality no longer dominates the scene. Yet it would be rash to assume that his probable successor in the Hungarian Premiership, Count Andrassy, will be in any satisfying sense anti-Prussian. His aims have always been very much those of Tisza, and if they have seemed to be different, it was because his character is utterly different. He is a smooth man to deal with, full of finesse, a tactician able to keep his friends in circum- stances in which Tisza would have estranged everybody. .Andrassy may have appeared to be more friendly than Tisza to suffrage reform, but the balance of friendliness was not more than can be explained by his talent for political coqucting. He is no Liberal. He inherits the spirit of his father, who notoriously co-operated with Bismarck and helped to deprive Bohemia of the status of a kingdom which she had been solemnly promised. It cannot airily be hoped that Andrassy may yet be introduced to the advantages of governing through the principle of nationality, for he has studied the arguments for that plan of political justice and has rejected them seriatim. In effect, he has proclaimed himself a Prussian at heart who believes that a superior race has a mission to force subject-races into a common mould. Only false hopes can be founded on the fact that Andrassy in form opposed Tisza. But the wishes of the Emperor Charles, and the indeter- ininate extent of popular chafing under the Prussian direction, have yet to be reckoned with. The Emperor is said to be inclined towards federalism, as well as towards electoral reform in Hungary. It also seems that he joyfully sanctioned Count Czernin's attempt to create an atmosphere favourable to peace. It will be remembered that the murdered Archduke was popularly believed to be a federalist, and was for that reason distrusted and hated by the Magyars and German Austrians. It was even said that he advocated the creation of a new Slav kingdom under the Hapsburgs. In other words, he wished to expand the dualism of Austria-Hungary into trialism. To prevent the spread of such ideas was one of the first objects of the Prussian-Magyar combination. That was one of the chief reasons why they plunged the world into war. There was to be no such thing as a Jugo-Slav State. Serbia must be crushed because morally and geo- graphically she stood in the way of a general imposition upon the Slav peoples of the Prussian will. What an irony it would be if, after all, the plans of the murdered Archduke were adopted by the young Emperor who so unexpectedly came to the throne ! What an irony if the war encouraged the Emperor Charles to try to secure what the authors of the war set out to destroy ! But this is looking too far ahead. Even if the Emperor Charles holds the opinions attributed to him, he can expect little help from Count Andrassy. The latter may play with tiny plan laid before him, and appear to be open-minded after his manner, but he is not the man to bring about a defiant break-away from Germany. If a break with Germany comes, it is not likely to happen before the Magyars are further disciplined and disillusioned by adversity, and the Andrassy Government are succeeded by a Coalition Government containing such men as Count Apponyi and Count Karolyi. Some observers think that such a Coalition is bound to arrive before long. After making every allowance for scheming, we think that some signs of grace are fairly recognizable in the temper of Austria-Hungary. But the problem how a new frame of mind can be encouraged, as one would like to encourage it, without defeating the solemn duties of the Allies defies solution. How- ever much the Emperor Charles may want to federalize his people, he does not want to see his House reduced to a mere shade of its former self. He does not want to lose for the Hapsburgs position, dignity, and power. Yet such a loss seems inevitable if justice is to be done to the Slav elements in Austria-Hungary, and such justice of course will and must be done. Up to the time—nine years ago—when Austria- Hungary tore up the public law of Europe we should have said that she was a State to be trusted implicitly. Englishmen felt something like affection for her, and never associated her with the hectoring arrogance of Prussia in relation to other Powers, in spite of the dastardly record of the Magyars in dealing with their subject-races. Bad companionship has led her down a steep moral slope. The list of her crimes against Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, and others during the war has becoms very Iong and terrible. After all, the penalty of crime must be paid. We may be naturally inclined to treat the Hapsburgs with an indulgence which is never inspired by the offensive methods and manners of the Hohenzollerns, but our first duty is to the small nationalities. The simple truth is that nations cannot be sacrificed to Kings. If the Hapsburgs have to shrink back into the small mountainous principality from which they emerged, it must be so if in that way only can the longsuffering of the Poles, Czechs, and South Slays be ended and rewarded.