DISSOLUTION AND CABINET RECONSTRUCTION.
WHERE has been a great deal too much exaggeration , in all the recent talk about the period at which the Government should or should not dissolve Parliament. A Cabinet naturally enough dissolves Parliament at the time it believes most favourable to itself, for Ministers, if they are in earnest, think themselves better able to serve the country than their opponents, and so want to get a new lease of power. But Ministers know also that there is nothing that the country hates so much as being taken advantage of in any attempt to get its favour. They know, that is; as we have several times urged in these columns, that to try to make electioneering capital out of a national success is always liable to be resented by the electors, and that, therefore, they must avoid using a victory on the field in order to get a new lease of power. But though it would be damaging to the Govern- ment to use the valour of our soldiers as an election cry, the Cabinet cannot, of course, be precluded from dis- solving at what is otherwise a reasonable moment merely because the war had come to an end. All that is demanded is that there should be no unworthy attempt to exploit victory for party and electoral purposes. In other words, provided they do not use Lord Roberts and his army as an item in the party programme, we do not see why the Government should not employ the liberty accorded to all Governments, and choose what they consider the most convenient moment for dissolution.
What will be the best moment we shall not attempt to decide, but the arguments in favour of an early appeal to the constituents on the grounds of public convenience ought not to be ignored merely because there has been an outcry against a war Dissolution. Next spring is practi- cally the latest date at which a General Election could take place. But it may fairly be argued that if a General Election is postponed till then there will be a great waste of public time and energy. In the period between the meeting of Parliament next February and a Dissolution in the spring, nothing but formal business could be done, and after a Dissolution, say in April, no legislation would be possible, for the new Parliament could hardly get to work till the beginning of July. If, however, the work of the present Session were to be concluded, and, then a Dissolution were to take place, say, at the beginning of August, no time would be wasted, and the new Parliament would be ready to take up at the beginning of next year the most important, nay, absolutely necessary, work of reconstituting the Army and of instituting a system of Imperial defence based on a clear and com- prehensive view of the needs of the Empire. That work is one which cannot be postponed, but also one which ought not to be undertaken by a stale Parliament. There is yet another reason, based on public policy, in favour of an early appeal to the electors. One of the chief duties of the Government during the coming autumn and the following spring will be the settlement of the two Boer States, and what is even more important and more difficult, the settlement of the rebellious districts in Cape Colony. Now it is absolutely essential that whatever is done then shall be known to be firmly fixed and determined, and not liable to be upset in a few months. But the Dutch Afrikanders are essentially politicians, and we may be sure that if the settlement is made before the General Election, both the Boers and the Afrikander Bond will engage in calculations as to the best way of tiding over their final submission till after the new Elections. Everywhere it will be preached and taught that the Dutch have only got to hold out, or to lie low, or to avoid a final decision for another nine months and till the next General Election, and then there will be a complete reaction and the return to power of a Cabinet as squeezable as that of Mr. Gladstone. If, that is, the Dutch leaders know that they are dealing with a Ministry which has just obtained its mandate, they will know that they must make a final choice. If they know that they are dealing with a Ministry which may be upset in a few months —and they will be told by their enthusiastic friends here that it is quite safe to be upset and that" the great heart of the nation is in reality with the Boers "—how can they be expected to come to a final settlement ? Naturally then, from their point of view, the Dutch party will try to spin things out till the General Election has decided with whom will rest the duty of giving the last word on the whole subject. If, then, the Government is careful to avoid dissolving in a spirit of electioneering and political advertising, and clearly checks any attempt to exploit the war for party purposes, we cannot see any reason for objecting if, on a view of the general situation, they should decide that the public interest would be best served by getting the General Election over before the final settlement is made in South Africa, and by allowing a new, and it is to be hoped vigorous, Parliament to take up the work of Army reform next January.
That the Unionists will obtain a majority at the next General Election seems most probable. If there were a. good alternative Cabinet possible, we do not doubt that this would not be the case, and that the Opposition would triumph, for the elector's natural impulse is to feel that the present Cabinet is stale, and that it would be a great thing to have a change in the bowling. But unfortunately it is impossible to assert that there is an alternative Cabinet. No doubt a Cabinet composed of men like Lord Rosebery, Sir Henry Fowler, Lord Kimberley, Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Lord Spencer would manage public affairs very well, but then, unfortu- nately, such a Cabinet as that would command no great following in the House of Commons. The Irish wing of the Home-rule party would not support it, nor would the Little Englanders, who certainly are half the Opposi- tion. Practically, an alternative Ministry, such as could be safely entrusted with the Imperial trusteeship, could not live, and therefore, however much the country would like to give the present Ministry a rest, the thing cannot be done. For the present, and till the Liberal party be- comes again a real party, and not an organised brawl between political Montague and Capulets, there is nothing for it but to go on with a Unionist Cabinet. But if we cannot have government by another and a fresher team, we can obtain some of the advantages of a change by a thorough reconstruction of the Ministri. That such reconstruction is absolutely necessary if the Government is to do really good and sound work at home and abroad, we do not doubt. The chief tasks before the Government are :—(1) the settlement of South Africa, (2) the new modelling of the armed forces of the nation on a sound and adequate basis, (3) the reconstitution of our fiscal system after the strain of the war, (4) the regu- lation of our foreign relations so as to reassure the world aed to prove the absurdity of the suggestion that we are either a pirate State, or entertain any foolish visions of a monopoly of Empire. These are great tasks, and if they are to be carried out successfully, they must be undertaken by a smaller, more homogeneous, and more vigorous body than the present Cabinet. The strength of a Cabinet is its weakest link, and therefore the older and less competent members of the Ministry must be got rid of and the Government left a corporate entity with a strong grasp on all the great Departments of State, and not embarrassed by weak or unnecessary members. But the task of weeding out is one so difficult and so disagreeable that no Premier could be expected to under- take it light-heartedly or without good and sufficient excuse. A Dissolution will give that excuse. After the Dissolution the whole of the present Cabinet should resign, and the Sovereign should then place the recon- struction in the hands of her most trusted servant. That servant would naturally be Lord Salisbury. But it Lord Salisbury is wise he would not take back also the Secretaryship of Foreign Affairs, but would become what he has not been during the last few years,—a real Prime Minister, able, because he has no Department, to overlook the work of all his colleagues. We do not by any means say that no man can be Foreign Minister and Premier at the same time, but we do think that the combined posts should not be held by any man over seventy. If Lord Salisbury leaves the Foreign Office Mr. Balfour should without any question succeed him, for he has shown himself to possess the type of mind exactly fitted to give confidence in the conduct of international affairs. He is firm without being fussy, conciliatory without any dangerous excess of good nature. The Am- bassadors have already learnt to work with him and to know him, and the Foreign Office recognises in him a man who can be master and yet give due weight to official opinion. Mr. Chamberlain has done such good work at the Colonial Office that it may seem strange to suggest a, change of office for him, but in our opinion his splendid administrative gifts, his energy, and his fearlessness are imperatively mad for at the War Office. He has the rt quisite energy, authority, and prestige, and also capacity for mastering details, to give us a good Army, and we doubt whether any other member of the Ministry has. The task of making the House of Commons and the nation submit to the disagreeable process of dismissing incom- petent men wholesale, and also of making large pecuniary sacrifices, is a difficult one, but Mr. Chamberlain could, we believe, accomplish it. While at the War Office we do not see why Mr. Chamberlain should not also lead the House of Commons,—assuming that the tenure of the Foreign Office was considered to be incompatible with the discharge of the duties of Leader. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach would naturally continue Chancellor of the Exchequer, for no man has done better fiscal work than he. He saved us from a great financial disaster by rejecting all temptations to tread the flowery path of Protection in order to supply war funds, and the task of dealing with the rearrangement of our finances after the war, and the provision for the new expenditure on the Army, could not be in better hands. But we must not trespass further on the jealously guarded mystery of Cabinet-making. Indeed, we are not sure that we have not already said too much, and that the Tapers and Tadpoles of the party will not be furious at a newspaper daring to consider so sacred a matter as the reconstruction of the Cabinet. But be that as it may, we adhere to our main points, which are : (1) that there are so many sound reasons for baking the opinion of the electors this year that we abet not feel called upon to object if the Government take OA t course, —provided always that they make no attempt lo beat the big drum or to use our victories for ,-lectioneering purposes ; (2) that a thorough reeore.tructiou of the Cabinet must follow the Dissolution.
We have only one word to add. It must not be for a moment supposed from our hypothetical echeme for recon- struction that we consider Lord Salisbury to have proved a bad Foreign Secretary. We think just the reverse ; but we hold that he cannot ask his present colleagues to make great changes and sacrifices unless he is prepared to make them himself, and that nothing fundamental can be done unless Lord Salisbury first resigns and then reconstitutes. Besides, as Prime Minister he will have ample opportunity to overlook and control the larger workings of foreign affairs. Again, if Mr. Balfour conducts our foreign affairs under Lord Salisbury, the former will be able to secure a continuity of policy and to imbibe a great tradition. No reasonable man wishes to banish Lord Salisbury's influence from foreign affairs, but as long as he retains the Premiership and Mr. Balfour is Foreign Secretary that influence is fully preserved.
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