BOOKS.

SIR ROBERT WILSON'S NARRATIVE OP THE CAMPAIGN OE 1812.*

THE broad outline of the invasion of Russia by the Emperor Napoleon and of the retreat of the French in the winter of 1812 has been made familiar to the general reader by a host of writers ; but nowhere will a more complete narrative be found than in the velume before us. Other histories of this great event in military annals may be more picturesque, but none will be found so valuable to the soldier and the student of history. General Sir Robert Wil- son enjoyed advantages possessed by few. Although he had only joined. the Russian army when it had been driven back as far as Smolensk, yet from that period he only quitted the camp to visit the Emperor at St. Petersburg until the Russian columns were again on the frontiers of the empire. Moreover, he was in the confidence of many men on both sides, and he supplied the de- ficiencies of his own personal experience from the very best sources. And, by keeping and testing his materials for twelve years, he was able in 1824 to arrange them in due order, and produce the work now first given to the world, thirty-six years after it was composed. It is greatly to the credit of Sir Robert that he would not make a market of his experience, and that he refused a handsome offer for his papers immediately after the campaign came to an end. As his book deals frankly with per- sons as well as events, it was a wise resolution to forego its pub- lication during his life.

The invasion of Russia by Napoleon was an unjustifiable act, but it was a necessary consequence of his overbearing and ac- quisitive-policy. Master of Europe he had only one declared enemy, England ; and only one probable enemy, Russia. Eng- land he could neither bend nor break, but he hoped, if not to bend, certainly to break Russia. Those of his neighbours whose territory he did not annex, he expected to bow to his will, and shape their internal and external policy by his own. Russia, only half-beaten at Eylau and Friedland, proved restive under dictation, and resentful under annexation. Whatever Alexander might have been disposed to do in accord with Napoleon touching the partition of kingdoms' it may be safely assumed that the Russian nobility would not have seconded him in any course that involved the idea of subserviency to Franco and rejection of com- merce with England. Moreover, Napoleon feared. Russia, as a power that at a critical moment might step in and frustrate his ambitious designs. And, perhaps, it was the rapid recovery of that power from her losses in 1807, which induced Napoleon to determine to strangle the rising giant, even while he was en- gaged in a costly war in Spain. Sir Robert Wilson's view of Napoleon's position at this period is very just and sagacious :— " It is true, there was always a propelling impulse to war, acting on and commanding the subjection of Napoleon to its instigatious—an impulse not owing its incentives to his own temperament and habits, but distinctly to the very source and conservative principle of his throne. He felt, and all the world now acknowledges, that he could not reign in peace. Peace was incompatible with his political existence—it was the destroyer of his power, gained by the sword, and which the sword only could maintain. Under his chieftainship, the martial spirit of the French nation had been excited to the highest and wildest degree. France, always martially disposed, had become a military camp and community ; her social as well as her civil sys- tem was framed upon a belligerent basis ; war was the sole tie between the sovereign and the people; allegiance was demanded and rendered under no other tenure. There was no other shield against the hostility of the Bour- bonists, the intrignes of Doctrinaires, and the insurrection of the Republi- cans, to whom peace would have given active and irresistible animation. There was no other check on the ever changefultrestless spirit of the French nation. Still Napoleon, although thus unremittingly urged to he always seeking some new battle-field, would not have selected Russia as an adver- sary, whilst the Spanish war was on his hands, but for the reasons and under the considerations stated."

Determined to compel submission, Napoleon made his prepa- rations on a scale corresponding with the magnitude of the en- terprise, and collected upwards of 600,000 men, one-half the vast force at his disposal throughout his empire, and brought 400,000 into simultaneous operation in Russia. But it was a motley army, composed of the soldiers of every state subject to the sway of the Emperor, and therefore less under command, and less effi- cient than the small French armies with which he won his first, and most brilliant as well as most solid victories. The _Russians had the great advantage of being all soldiers of one nation ; of being animated by two of the most powerful stimulants that exist in this world—religion and love of country. But they were far inferior in numbers, still more inferior in generals. The whole regular force of the Russian empire was 518,000 men ; Napoleon had 1,187,000. The disposable Russian army was only 254,000 strong ; but there were 50,000 in Moldavia, destined to act with terrible effect at a later stage of the campaign. Thus all Europe, except England and Sweden had sent soldiers to conquer Russia.A comparison of generals really is ludicrous. On one side was Napoleon, with chiefs like Ney, Prince Eugene, Davonst, Murat ; on the other, Barclay de Telly, with better men under him, such as Benningsen and Wittgenstein Bagration and Miloradowiteh. Except Bagration, they were all inferior to the best Marshals of the Empire. Napoleon opened the campaign in June with that vigour which characterizes all his finest operations. He broke in upon -the

• Narrative of Rrents during the Invasion of Russia by Napoleon Bonaparte and the Retreat of the French Army, 1812. By General Sir Robert Wilson. British Commissioner at the Headquarters of the Russian Army. 1.4. ited by hts Nephew, the Reverend Herbert Randolph. Published by Murray.

widely scattered Russian corps, and swept them back, cutting off for the moment Bagration and. 48,000 men, and nearly separating Doatorof, with 24,000 men from the main body. The first stroke of Napoleon was splendid, and the game seemed his own. Doc- torof, indeed, laved himself by clever manceuvres, and joined Barclay; the marching of the Russian soldiers was most admirable ; but Bagration had been driven far to the right, and Napoleon had established himself on the flank of the Russian line of retreat to Moscow. It was at this early stage of the campaign that he began to feel its vast difficulties and committed his first mistake. The

Russians had selected Drissa on the Dwina as the site for an en- trenched camp, covering the direct route to St. Petersburg, and having a flank communication with Moscow. But they had placed the camp on the left bank of the river, and had provided only one bridge whereby to retreat in case of a reverse. Had Napoleon rapidly followed Barclay's retiring divisions he would have been able to compel the Russians to fight or fall back on the St. Petersburg road over their one bridge, and would thus have

out them off from all the rich provinces of central Russia. But although the Marilee hung on the Russian rear and extended to their right so as to bar the cross roads to Bagration and threaten the Moscow road, Napoleon lingered eighteen days at Wihia, and the army could not act without him. How different from his fine conduct in 1796 when he never lost an hour, much less three weeks ! The consequence was that when Barclay found it impossible to hold Drissa and highly advisable to retreat at once on Moscow, Napoleon was not actually present with the advance of his army, and, therefore, not in a position to seize the advantage presented by his enemy. This was really the commencement of his misfor- tunes the first failure. Barclay got well away towards Moscow, by POlotzk, before the French were fairly on his traces. It was not with any intention of drawing Napoleon away from his re- sources that Barclay took this step. That is a fanciful notion. He took it because he could not help taking it, if he hoped to pre- serve an army for the defence of Russia, and extricate it from a position of great periL Having failed to close with his enemy, Napoleon pressed for- ward diagonally upon the Moscow road, but he could have had little hope of reaching any point before the Russians. Davonst, who was farthest to the right, was too much engaged with Bagration to lend any aid ; and Barclay, who had halted at Polotzk, soon re- sumed his march, covering one hundred and sixty miles in six days, and gaining Witepsk on the 23d of July. Here he halted for some days, hoping that Bagration would be able to escape Davonst, and effect a junction with the main body, by Mohilev and Orcha ; but Bagration was anticipated by the French chief at Motilev, and after a bloody encounter, was forced to -make a circuit in order to join Barclay at Smolensk. Learning this de- termination, Barclay lost no time in withdrawing the troops he had sent out to aid Bagration, and marched his whole army to- wards Smolensk, but not before the French had encountered the Russians, and had found them as sturdy in defending positionsin re- treat, as they had proved to be when in line of battle. Indeed, the Russians esoaped from Witepsk without leaving a trace behind, and Napoleon was compelled to send Ney in one direction, and Murat in another to ascertain their line of retreat. It should here be remarked that the war had assumed an internecine cha- racter. In spite of Napoleon's efforts to prevent violence and pillage, his soldiers committed every excess, and the peasantry of Russia began to inflict those reprisals 'which reached such a hor- rible height during the retreat. Finding eventually that the Russians had fallen back on Smolensk, Napoleon halted. at Witepsk, and gave his army a few days rest, of which it stood in need.

The aspect of the campaign in the last days of July was pecu- liar. Napoleon, as we have seen, had halted at Witepsk, leaving Barclay to fall back upon Smolensk at leisure. Bagration, an- ticipated by Davoust at Mohilev, had, in obedience to orders, en- deavoured to force his way, and had fought, a fierce battle, re- sulting in great loss to both sides. Then he had retired, and crossing the Dnieper lower down, had on the day after Napoleon entered Witepsk, arrived at Mstislaw; thus securing his com- munication with Smolensk, and frustrating one of the objects of Napoleon's mancenvres. At the same time, Tormanssow occupied the attention of the Salon troops on the frontiers of Poland ; Wittgenstein made head against Oudinot and compelled him to keep olose in Polotzk ; Essen in Riga managed to drive off Mac- donald. In the meantime the Moldavian army under Admiral Tchicagow was still on the Dniester, not yet in motion for the Beresina.

But the main tide of the war still set towards Moscow. Deeper and deeper Napoleon penetrated into a country kindling into wrath, and exacting even from its Emperor a resolute fulfil- ment of his pledge, not to sheath the sword so long as a French- man remained in arms within the Russian frontier.

The next great phase of the campaign may be embraced in the words : Smolensk, Borodino, Moscow. Barclay reached Smo- lensk on the 1st of August, and Bagration joined him on the 3d. Thus reinforced, for a moment he contemplated an offensive move- ment, and Napoleon quick to perceive danger, called up all his divisions, and by a splendid display of tactical combinations brought 250,000 men into line. It was now mid August. Bar- clay, a feeble chief, was easily frightened, and when Napoleon collected his masses, he hastily fell back to Smolensk. At this

time, the Russians were burning to engage the enemy, and, al- though compelled to retreat, those corps which encountered him

displayed surpassing courage and hardihood. - The Russian army stoutly defended Smolensk, a "holy city," and voluntarily with- drew from it on the morning of the 18th of August, leaving be- hind them burning ruins. Here two extraordinary incidents in war occurred. The first was the conduct of Barclay, the second the conduct of the Russian„generals. After quitting Smolensk, Barclay took post above the town and offered battle. The French declined the combat, and then Barclay had to retreat under the most perilous circumstances. Prevented, as he believed, from marching by the main road, he determined to carry his force by a cross road to Loubino where it joined the main causeway. This determination actually gave the French the advantage of six miles in point of distance, and a good road to boot. The question was, who should be first at Loubino ? That the French were not

there first is inexplicable' for Junot was within a few miles. Had the French done nothing but march to the head of the defile at the point of junction, they must have destroyed Barolay's army.

As it happened, they made some mistakes. Napoleon was not like the victor of Arcola and Rivoli ; a small force of Cossacks, successively reinforced, by a display of the most devoted. bravery, held the position commanding the point of junction, and thus the whole army was saved. It was truly a miraculous escape.

The conduct of the Russian officers was most unusual. Dis- gusted with the leading of Barclay, they entrusted to General

Wilson the duty of demanding a "new chief" from the Empe- ror, and instructed him to tell Alexander that if any order came from St. Petersburg to suspend hostilities they would not obey

it, but would believe it had been extracted from him by false

statements. Wilson was further required to intimate to Alex- ander that the removal of Count Romanzow from the imperial councils would give satisfaction to the army. The English gene- ral actually transacted this mission with success, prevailing by dint of his personal character and sheer frankness and loyalty of speech. Kutusof was appointed to supersede Barclay, but Ro- manzow was not dismissed—Alexander remarking, "he is almost the only one who never asked me for anything on his own ac- count." Wilson went back to the army with distinct authority to interfere if he saw any attempt on the part of Kutusof or an- other to frustrate the fulfilment of the Emperor's pledge not to make peace or suspend hostilities while an armed Frenchman re- mained in Russia. This part of the narrative deserves great at- tention.

Barclay continued his retreat towards Moscow while Napoleon discussed the prudence of any further advance. He had been compelled to detach St. Cyr to assist Oudinot in keeping Witt- genstein in check ; he now called up Victor from the Niemen to Smolensk, ordered Angereau to replace Victor, and provided garrisons for posts on his line of communication ; finally, he de- termined to make the fatal march to Moscow. He had lost 105,000 men ; he still mustered 140,000. Kutusof, who had as- sumed the command, agreed to indulge the army in its desiie for a battle, and the resort was the drawn fight at Borodino. No more sanguinary combat has taken place in modern times; but, for the details, very clearly and carefully arrayed by General Wilson we must refer our readers to his volume. Kutusof re- tired through Moscow. He had promised the high-minded Go- vernor, Rostopchin, to give him three clear days' notice of his intention to retreat. He failed in his word, and Rostopchin never forgave him. It was the intention of the Governor to fire the

city in all parts before the French entered, so that it might have been completely and carefully consumed. As it was, he was only able to effect its partial destruction after Napoleon had fixed his

head-quarters in the Kremlin. The people of Moscow quitted

their homes with the army. Out of 200,000 souls only 20,000 remained. This is one of the sublime scenes of souls, war, and

marks the determined spirit of the Russian people. "The army, indeed," says our author, an eye-witness, had, since the first day's retreat from Smolensk, been accompanied by a wandering nation."

Master of Moscow, though in flaming ruins, Napoleon antici- pated overtures for peace. He had penetrated into the heart of Russia, he had captured the sacred city; to do so, he had sacrificed one-third of his vast army. He was in a perilous strait. Ruin must await him, unless he instantly withdrew to Smolensk or

Witepsk, or made peace. But he could hardly sue for peace at a moment when he looked out as a conqueror from the windows of the Kremlin, although he looked out over a city destroyed by fire. To this we must attribute that long, that fatal delay in Moscow. Kutusof purposed a retreat upon Riaza.n, but Benningsen's able advice prevailed, and the Russian army turned to its right, and interposing between the French and Kalouga, occupied a position, at once covering the rich and unexhausted provinces of the South, and threatening the flank of the French line of communications. It is the one bright movement of the Russian army during the campaign. But even this did not awaken Napoleon from the delusive dream that Alexander would sue for peace. Winter was coming ; provisions were scarce ; the cavalry horses grew weak and died for want of forage ; the infantry were worn with severe marches and half-naked. The Russian army was an increasing, Napoleon's a decreasing force. Yet Napoleon did not stir from Moscow. He did nothing except follow the enemy with a strong advanced guard, and endeavour, through Lauriston, to affect an arrangement with Kutusof. Wilson prevented any flagrant mis- chief; but, in our opinion Lauriston and Kutusof came to a tacit or expressed understanding, that if Napoleon retreated. he sliould not be too fiercely pursued. For Lauristen and /Causal

had a private interview in the camp, and Kutusof's subsequent conduct shows that he did not wish to destroy Napoleon's army at one blow, and that least of all did he desire to capture that poten- tate, and thus end the war. Kutusof was a Frenchified Russian. The Tartar may have been very visible beneath the skin, but the skin was undoubtedly French. Nor are we sure that Alexander himself did not connive at the weakness of the old soldier, and half sanction those dilatory operations which enabled Napoleon to escape from Russia and fly from the wreck of his army. Certain it is that the credit of preventing a peace which might have saved Napoleon is far more due to the stern resolution of the Russian generals, than to Alexander, for we can easily conceive how Kutusof and the Emperor might have been influenced by Na- poleon, whereas he could not have moved men like the civilian Rostopchin, or the soldiers, Miloradowitth and Benningsen. Kutusof kept his army idle :at Taroutino until Napoleon had really made up his mind to retreat. It may have been quite by chance, but so it was, that Kutusof did not yield to the demands of his generals to attack Murat, carelessly posted at Winkowo until orders had been given by Napoleon to send the sick, wounded, baggage spare artillery, and trophies td Smolensk. Two days after the defeat of Murat, a defeat lessened in its severity by the connivance or paltry jealousy of the Russian commander, Napoleon with the Old Guard evacuated Mos- cow; and on the 23d of October Merrier blew up the Kremlin. Napoleon's design was to reach Smolensk by a new route leading through Malo-jaroslavetz to Elnia. The possession of the former was of the last importance to him, and he hastened forward impatient to arrive there. But the Russian Doctorof, having Wilson with him, had been detached to cut off a French corps supposed to be isolated at Borousk. Doctorof found that it was the advance-guard of the French army making for Malo-jaroslavetz ; he saw the importance of anticipating the enemy, and, sending word to Kutusof at once, marched himself all night by the most direct road—across country. Thus the French army and the small corps of Doctorof were racing in nearly parallel lines towards one goal, but Kutusof, who was nearer to that goal than his active and earnest subordinate, did not move. Doctorof reached Malo-jaroshivetz in time to dispute with Prince Eugene for its possession, and to prolong a most san- guinary conflict throughout the day, -until Kutusof arrived in the evening on one side and Napoleon on the other. In this action, mainly fought by Eugene, the Italian troops were deeply engaged, and General Wilson records an opinion which is of peculiar in- terest just now :— • •

" The Italian army had displayed qualities which entitled it evermore to take rank amongst the bravest troops of Europe. It had confronted and sustained in the earlier period of the day a superior and concentrated weight of artillery that might have daunted and subdued the firmness of the most resobite veterans, and throughout the whole action, and under all its vietssitudea, had evinced an elasticity and energy that never drooped or relaxed."

It was here that Kutusof gave one of the most flagrant proofs of his irresolution, or, as we think, of his determination to favour Na- poleon. After the battle, he professed a determination to bar the road at the cost of his life if necessary ; but before daybreak the next morning he changed his mind, and gave orders for a retreat. Wilson objected, advancing sound military reasons in support of his views. But Kutusof said to him :—

" ' I don't care for your objections. I prefer giving my enemy a pont d'or,' as you call it, to receiving a 'coup de collier : ' besides I will say again, as I have told you before, that I sin by no means sure that the total destruction of the Emperor Napoleon and his army would be such a benefit to the world ; his succession would not fall to Russia or any other continen- tal power, but to that which already commands the sea, and whose domina- tion would then be intolerable,'"

We cannot suppose that Alexander appointed this man to com- mand his army without knowing that he shared the Emperor's own Napoleonic sympathies, and we cannot but regard Alexander's public professions of implacable hostility to the invaders as qualified by some private understanding with Kutusof. It is singular that Napoleon and Kutusof should have both re- linquished their designs at the same time. When the Russian marshal determined to. retire behind the Koricza, and build a golden bridge, as he said, for the French, Napoleon had also de- termined to retrace his steps and not fight a battle for a right of way. Each army acted under a delusion. Napoleon thought Kutusof would fight ; Kutusof thought Napoleon would fight and got out of his way as rapidly as possible. While the Russian rear-guard was nerving itself to a desperate resistance, the French rear-guard was making a show of fight, and both to cover a re- treat. • The measure taken by Napoleon, to regain the road from Moscow to Smolensk by which he had advanced actually defeated the charitable intentions of Kutusof to build that bridge of gold ; nevertheless, the shameless veteran, resolutely persevered in his policy, and refused to seize all the grand opportunities of destroying the French army, and of capturing Napoleon which were continually offered to him. We cannot follow Napoleon in Ins flight, but the reader will find from the exact detail of the movements of Kutusof and of the French army, how the Russian general saved Napoleon over and over again from ignoble de- struction." What Kntusof would not do" the winter and the gallant Russian generals did; but the cost to the Russian army of their general's conduct was enormous, for they lost in their ad- vance nearly a hundred thousand men whereas had Kutusof i

done h duty to Europe and his country, the enemy of his

country and of Europe might have been captured or annihilated long before he reached the Beresina. On this point, we entirely concur in the views of Sir Robert Wilson. Let us close this somewhat lengthy notice by warmly recom- mending the volume to the military student. In its pages he will find constant and varied instruction set forth in a modest and soldierlike fashion. We can only regret that a larger map and ad- ditional plans were not appended to a volume, as valuable in a military as in a historical point of view.