HUMANITY ON THE OCEAN.
ACASE of a rather unusual character was tried in the Central Criminal Court early this week, which is worthy of notice not only on account of the remarkable nature of the charge that was made against the chief person concerned in it, but also because it is to be feared that his position, that of a sea-captain, and the responsibilities that it entails, are hardly sufficiently appreciated by the general public. The defendant in question was the master of a sailing-ship, the British Peer,' and was called upon to answer an indictment charging him with having failed to render assistance to the crew of the steamship 'Roxburgh Castle,' with which vessel he had been in collision. As far as the collision was con- cerned, it would appear that both ships were equally to blame, so that it only rested for the jury to decide as to whether the captain of the surviving ship had shown a want of humanity and wilful neglect in not lowering his boats and attempting to save the crew of the vessel which had fared the worse. The collision between the two ships took place late in the evening ; and within a few minutes the steamship was seen to be settling down, and did actually sink, carrying her boats with her. The captain of this ill-fated ship, being himself a very expert swimmer, managed to extricate himself from the wreck, and on coming to the surface and seeing the lights of the other ship, struck out for them, and was eventually hauled on board. He states that he immediately went up to the captain of the sailing-vessel, and implored him, "For God's sake, Captain, save my crew !" To this prayer, although it was enforced by the cries of the drowning men in the water, the latter turned a deaf ear. According to the rescued man, he answered that he must think of his own crew first ; and according to the evidence of his own mate, he is said to have remarked that "charity begins at home." At any rate, he made no effort to lower his boats ; and the utmost that he did to help the unfortunate men Who were struggling in the water, was to throw out lines in case any of them should succeed in reaching his vessel. One other sailor alone was rescued ; the whole of the rest of the crew of the 'Roxburgh Castle' were drowned, some twenty-two hands in all. This was the evi- dence, chiefly supplied by the captain of the sunken ship, but supported in the main by some of the defendant's own crew,
upon which the master of the sailing-vessel was indicted for wilful neglect and inhumanity.
His defence was to the effect that he failed to lower his boats, not because he would not, but because he could not,— because by so doing he would have seriously endangered the lives of his own crew. His own ship was so damaged that it had ultimately to be towed into Falmouth, and there was such a heavy sea running at the time, that the mere operation of lowering the boats could not have been performed without great risk to those who manned them. In this contention he was fully supported by the evidence of the marine surveyor who examined the condition of the sailing-vessel after the collision, and by his second mate, who not only deposed to all hands being fully occupied below in trying to check the flow of water into the hold, but also asserted that had he been called to lower and man the lifeboat in search of the other crew, he should not have expected to have returned alive from such a service. The jury, fortunately, were able to convince themselves of the justice of his plea, and the defendant was discharged. We say fortunately, because if they had not discharged him—even if the case against him had been a great deal stronger than it actually was—we think they would have not only done the defendant himself a very grave injustice, but they would have also established a very dangerous precedent. A captain's opinion, even in a case where he may afterwards be shown to have committed an error of judgment, must be considered final and beyond chal- lenge. Of course we except any case in which a captain of a ship may have been guilty of open and flagrant inhumanity which is beyond all doubt ; but when any reasonable doubt may exist as to the culpability of his decision, we think that his decision should not be subject to future challenge. In this particular case, in spite of the evidence in his favour that there was a heavy sea running, and that the condition of his own vessel prevented him from giving any help to the other, it is just possible that the captain did commit an error of judgment, and that he might have lowered his boats and rescued some portion of the drowning crew, without incurring any very great risk to his own vessel or the men who manned the lifeboat. It is possible, we say, and we are the more willing to admit that possibility, in that we cannot think that another sea-captain would have been instru- mental in bringing such a charge against him, with- out some assurance of its justice, even when prompted by the bitterness of his own immediate loss. But even sup- posing that it were possible, and that the Captain of the British Peer' did commit an error of judgment, it must be remembered on his behalf, under what conditions he com- mitted that error, and also that it was an error on the right side. A collision such as was described in the evidence, would leave the vessel in a state of utter confusion. The master of the vessel, who is directly responsible for its safety and that of his crew, finds himself obliged to come to a swift and im- mediate decision as to whether he must devote his entire energy to their safety, or whether he can afford to postpone it to the more evident necessity of the other crew. He cannot tell the exact amount of damage that his own ship has sus- tained, which, for all he knows, may be fated to settle down as surely as the other if he does not make the most strenuous efforts to stop the leak which is opened in her; and over and above that consideration, he fears that an effort to save the other sailors by lowering his own boats, even if he could spare hands enough for the service, is as likely to end in the loss of those hands as in the rescue of the others. He must decide on his own responsibility, and decide at once. Mani- festly he does well to decide on the side of prudence, and so, if he does err, to err on the right side. In doing so, he will show far more courage than if he yielded to the first dictates of humanity against his better judgment. People hardly appreciate the nerve and cool courage that is required to enable a man to resist such an appeal as was made to the master of the British Peer.' His pity and compassion for the men that are drowning before his eyes, appeal to him far more strongly than do any considerations for his own safety or that of his ship. Moreover, he knows that the same passions are working in his crew, and they, like himself, would be willing to hazard their own lives if only they could make some effort to save those others; he knows, perhaps, that they will not be grateful to him far a decision that ensures their safety at such a cost; that they will remember it against him
afterwards and resent it ; and yet it is a duty to resist his own feelings and their feelings, and forbid the rescue which both are only too eager to attempt. The deliberate course of prudence in such a case is only possible to a really brave man ; and upon such a man it is cruel to cast the slur of inhumanity or cowardice because he has valiantly done violence to his own feelings and wishes in pursuance of what seems to be his duty. Almost equally cruel it would be in a case when the same course is pursued without deliberation by a captain who knows not what he should do, and who in the moment of utter confusion loses his head, and decides hastily on the side of prudence. We do not know under which category the Captain of the British Peer' may be placed, but one thing at least is evident, that there was abundant justification for the course that he did pursue, and that in the face of that evidence it was not only inex- pedient but unjust to the man himself to call his decision into question. Inexpedient, because the authority of a sea-captain in his own ship and his absolute right to control its course is a dangerous matter to meddle with ; and unjust, because, whether he was right or wrong, there was evidently ample reason for his wisdom or his error. • As it was, the jury acquitted him ; but the stigma of a trial of that kind cannot be easily got rid of, and we regret that it should ever have found its way into Court. Happily, the case, as we have said, is a most unusual one, almost without precedent, and we hope that it may never recur again. Most unusual, that is to say, in the Law Courts, for these "cases of conscience" happen only too fre- quently on the high seas, and it is quite bad enough that the captain should be subject to the indignant and hostile criti- cisms of his passengers, or even of his own crew, without suffering the further punishment of being haled into a Law Court on land.
The position of a captain on his own ship is a very delicate matter to interfere with. One factor in our naval supremacy is undoubtedly the common-sense that has made the person and opinion of the man in command of a vessel in a measure sacrosanct. The captain of an English ship is an absolute autocrat in his way, and his authority, when there, should never be called into question. Some writer—Mr. Kinglake, in his " Eothen," we think—has given a very amusing account of a voyage made through the Greek Archipelago in a Greek ship. Every member of its crew had an opinion to offer, and insisted upon that opinion being heard upon every emer- gency that arose. When the wind was favourable, a ple- biscite had to be taken to decide whether they should sail, and what sail they should carry ; when the wind was unfavourable, they spent happy days in harbour actively discussing what was the best course to pursue under the adverse circumstances. The vessel carried a captain and his mates, but their position was merely a temporary one, and they would be deposed from it by a vote of the crew. As it was, the crew formed a very happy and a very talkative family, but the progress of the vessel was small. No doubt if the Captain of the British Peer' could have called his crew into conference, he might have shifted the responsibility off his own shoulders ; but while that conference was being held, the other sailors would have been probably drowned, and his own ship might very pos- sibly have sunk. As it is, the responsibility for the conduct of his ship is rightly put upon his shoulders, and upon his alone, and that being the case, it is unfair to criticise it without very good reason. For sins of commission, it is quite right that he should be brought before the proper authorities, and duly punished if they can be proved against him ; but for sins of omission, unless they are of a very glaring character, it is far better that he should be given the benefit of the doubt, and that they should be passed over in silence. Indignation at inhumanity is very easily aroused, and people are rather too prone to suspect inhumanity without sufficient cause. We do not believe that the man lives who has so callous a nature as to stand still and see his fellow-creatures drowning around him, when a word from himself would help them to safety. Cases have often arisen, unfortunately, when men have stood still and watched others perish without offering them aid ; but in those cases there has been no responsibility resting upon the spectators. The captain of the ship does thoroughly feel that the responsibility of rescue rests with him, and it is rarely credible that he should fail to answer to it through mere wilfulness.
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