THE NATIVE ARMY Or BENGAL
WE do not quite see the object of parading long columns of statistics as to the strength of the Armies still maintained by the Native Princes of India. It is quite true that the 120 or so great Mussulman and Hindoo nobles —whom we call Princes, because they retain, as the Duke of Argyll once did, territorial jurisdiction — do maintain among them 350,000 soldiers, though they leave to us the work of external defence both by sea and land ; that they have endless cannon of sorts ; that they have very excel- lent cavalry, and that they could, if in revolt, multiply their armies by three. And it is also true that the fighting races of India number fifty millions; that they are all fairly brave, and some as brave as Europeans ; that they are accustomed to arms ; and that all, if thoroughly united and earnest in the cause, could expel or slaughter the British rulers in a single campaign. But when was not this as true as it is now ? We conquered India in spite of all these things, and we must retain it in spite of all these things, or consent quietly to depart. To talk as if it were possible to provide against a universal uprising of the Princes and warrior races of India, determined to thrust us into the sea, is to waste breath, to squander brain, to paralyse not to develop energy. We could do no more against such an uprising than we could do against the Atlantic if it rose 100 feet in a night, and it is folly even to think of such precaution. No conscription would give us the men, no taxa- tion the treasure, and no possible cause a moral justification for engaging in such a slaughter of millions. What we can
do and must do is, to keep up a force sufficient to meet any usual combination of Indian enemies, any army such as any leader not accepted as Avatar or Imam could, in the best judgment of statesmen, bring to bear against us. According to historians, experts in warfare, and experienced Indians, the force we have is amply sufficient if thoroughly organised for this work, and the single point to be ascertained is whether it possesses the needful organisation.
As regards the White Army in India, we believe it does. We spend on that army somewhat too much, mainly to gratify the Horse Guards. We have composed it too exclusively of general service regiments, mainly to soothe a regrettable, though natural panic, which arose suddenly in high places. We have not provided sufficiently for its hygiene, mainly because we have not learned what the Natives learned long ago,—how to house soldiers in the tropics under the healthiest conditions. But nevertheless the White Army is a good army, sufficiently strong, well commanded, and only too eager to be led against any rebel who may need putting down. or any invader who may require driving out. Whether the auxiliary army of Native soldiers is equally good—as partly from climatic con- siderations, and partly from the danger which any disorder in our own ranks must always involve, it ought to be—is equally well organised, is the point to be decided, and we greatly fear, decided in the negative. There is much exaggeration, no doubt, in some of the statements on the subject, some trace of panic, and a faint desire, for a reason which we feel sure could be justified, to make the worst of things, but still a large body of evidence points to these two facts. The Native soldier, particularly in the Bengal Army, is insufficiently paid. Prices have risen on him, and wages around him, till the Sepoy, from being the best-paid artisan in India, is paid about 30 per cent, less than his non-military brother. Being a mercenary, or as that word has too invidious a meaning, being a soldier who serves for pay, he is naturally discontented, looks round for better service, is disposed to be querulous about privileges, and does not heartily care to see the system wcrk well. That is not a good condition of mind in any army, and least of all in that of Bengal, where the soldier is to all intents and purposes a free man, who enlists because he chooses, stays at his own discretion, and in peace time goes home with as little trouble as a domestic servant. He can, in fact, strike, though he cannot combine to strike ; and if his wages are below current rates, equally valuable men may not be forthcoming to fill his place. Moreover, this man thus discontented is not very efficiently officered. His White officers are seven per thousand, too few to do the actual daily work, as Prussian officers, for example, do it, and too many to allow Native officers to rise to responsible positions. Moreover, these officers are appointed on a system which has by nearly universal consent broken down,—that is, they are selected from a huge body of officers employed on most miscellaneous duties, from governing provinces to weighing rice in a famine, and called the "Bengal Staff Corps." That corps, originally founded to utilise the unemployed officers of the Army which mutinied, is so con- structed that young men dislike to enter it, that part of it is never employed, and that at least half the remainder are unsuited, either by too much rank, or fixed habits, or discontent, for the positions they fill. The whole corps is enormously costly ; its cost, as its 1,100 members grow older, becomes every year heavier, and it does not provide any youngsters to profit by its experience. The Native Army of Bengal consists in fact, to speak broadly, of 100,000 under-paid men, governed by 600 officers, who are over-paid for being through no fault of their own out of place.
Clearly this state of affairs, if accurately described—and we can hardly doubt the substantial accuracy of the accounts—must be remedied, but how ? Certainly not by the adoption of any cut-and-dry scheme improvised by a Member of Parliament or an English politician, or a military or other journalist. We maintain —and that is one reason why we have avoided details—that the remedy can be found only in trusting the Viceroy and his Council with power to carry through a complete reform, with as little control from Parliament or "opinion," as it is possible to secure. Nobody except the Head of the Indian Government has the knowledge, or the authority, or the means to carry out the plan, which, to succeed at all, must first of all secure his hearty assent. The Commander-in-Chief would be too professional, the Military Member of Council has not the authority, the " Army " itself is too inorganic,—nobody but the Viceroy has all the needful requisites, and the assistance also of his very few possible competitors. He alone - is in a position to know what the immediate dangers are, what
the Army will stand, and what the Treasury can endure, and he alone has a complete, undivided, and personal responsibility for all three. Even if the Viceroy were only a politician, the task would have to devolve on him, for real power in India can belong to no one else ; but as it happens, Lord North- brook is well fitted for the emergency. If he knows anything thoroughly, it is the organisation of an army; if he cares about anything heartily, it is to carry out reforms in as thrifty a way as possible ; if he is anxious about anything, it is to illustrate his Administration by founding something which shall stand the test of time. It is the very opportunity for the very man, and he ought, as we conceive, to be allowed to take advantage of it. At all events, if he is not, the work will never get itself done. It is as impossi- ble for Lord Salisbury to do it, as for one painter to tell another in letters how to produce a magnificent portrait of a man whom the first painter has only heard described ; it is as impossible for the Cabinet to do it, as for a Cabinet to govern a man-of-war; it is as impossible for Parliament to do it, as for a mass-meeting to carve a statue out of marble. It must be done by a single man, on the spot, with many counsellors and no masters, and able to pursue a plan of which he himself is proud ; and there is only one man in that position in India, and that is the Viceroy. How he is to do it, how he is to get rid of that Staff Corps without crushing the Treasury, or cleave it in two, and remodel the lower half into a sufficient framework for the Army, we honestly admit ourselves unable to conceive. It seems to us that under Colonel Sykes's pro- viso, which is law, reform will cost as much as the aboli- tion of Purchase, and still leave the Native Army imperfectly officered, but there is no reason why we should see a practi- cable plan. The broad facts are that a plan must be found, that no one but the Viceroy can find one, and that when found no one can make it useful but the same man. The remedy for the disease of the Bengal Army is to order it to be cured, and make the Viceroy the doctor. The patient may die even then, but he certainly will die if his cure is left to quacks.
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