THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN SPAIN.
WE see but one reason for regretting the -accession of Alphonso XII. to the throne of Spain, and none for being very sanguine as to its results. Our reason for regret is the frightful waste of life, energy, and treasure caused by a revolution which has accomplished nothing. If King Alphonse enters Madrid, Spain will be at best in the position in which she might have been on September 29, 1868. There was no earthly reason on that day why Prim, Serrano, and Topete, having dismissed Queen Isabella as insupportable, should not have proclaimed the Prince of the Asturias King of Spain, have sent him to London to be educated, or have bred him up wisely at home, and have conducted the Regency in his name. Sound statesmen who preferred, as all three avowedly did, the monarchical principle to any other, would have done that, and in doing it have secured this remarkable advantage—that the ad interim Government would have been beyond the risk of assassination. Nobody would have killed Prim, when kill- ing him would have altered nothing even in name. As it is, they have among them added a hundred millions to the Debt, sacri- ficed a hundred thousand lives, and suspended political life in Spain for six years without securing any such improvement in the Government as might in the course of years have justified
revolution. Alphonse XII. ascends the throne to-day as he might have ascended it six years ago, a nominal sovereign in the hands of Generals and politicians who have a constitu- tion and an a,drainstration yet to frame. Six years have been wasted, and worse. Apart from this lamentable waste, however—waste as if a field had been sown for years but never reaped, and at last burned clean again—there is no reason for objecting to the Counter-revolution. From the day when Castelar renounced the idea of Federation as endangering the very existence of Spain, it became clear that time must elapse before the country could become fit for any Republic whatever, and the interval had much better be passed under a Monarchy than under a series of incompetent and swiftly changing Military Dictators. A Monarch always tries to keep order for his own sake, and can generally be trusted not to enter into collusive arrangements with his own contractors. Material prosperity can grow up under him, and he has generally some sort of shame at national discredit. If, again, Monarchy was advisable, Alphonse, as the movement itself shows, was the best candidate obtainable. Spaniards will not endure a foreigner as King, or elevate a Spaniard to the throne who is not of royal blood ; and among the Spanish Bourbons, Alphonse was probably the best choice. Carlos, whatever his character—and no character among Pretenders is so little clear —must have come in as a conqueror; Montpensier has his father's meaner qualities, without his experience or capacity ; Donna Luisa, the ex-Queen's sister and Montpensier's wife, was not individual enough ; the ex-Queen would not give herself a chance of recall ; and Alphonse the elder, be- sides his position towards his brother Carlos, has excited passionate antipathies in Spain. Alphonse XII. is a boy who may succeed ; he is not an addition to the list of Pretenders, but deducts one from their number ; he con- tinues the old, and on Spanish principles of succession the only legitimate line, being eldest grandson of Ferdinand VII., whose title was undisputed ; and he has supporters enough in the Army to ascend without civil war. Whether the nation is with him, as Ayala, while still Serrano's Minister for the Colonies, declared in Parliament that it was, remains to be seen, but it is certain that a large and very powerful section of it is. The Army, the Fleet, the Civil Service, the land- owners, and, it would seem, the people of Madrid, have become disgusted with a Republic which had no Republicanism in it, which failed to evolve great men, which did not suppress the Carlists, which could not abolish either slavery or anarchy in Cuba, which ruined the public credit, which paid nobody his salary, which assailed all fortunes, however small, by in- cessant "conscriptions," sanctioned to extort exemption-money ; and which gave in return nothing, not even glory, or a free Press, or safety for property and life. Alphonso's raids in Valencia did everything for the cause of his brother's rival.
It was natural that the Alphonsists should take advantage of such a condition of national sentiment, and by the first stroke of good-fortune which the Bourbons have en- joyed since 1815 the Alphonsists appear to have had among them a man or woman with some brains. Who organised the plot we do not yet know, but whoever it was has had energy, discretion, and judgment of men ; has overcome deadly feuds among the Spanish Bourbons them- selves, keeping Isabella quiet, and inducing Montpensier to efface himself; has won the Army, without dividing it; has secured the silence of thousands of confidants, has conciliated Serrano, who knew the whole plan, and must have published that strange order detailing the strength of the Army of the North to warn the Republicans against resistance ; and has, finally, shown his hand precisely at the right hour. If the new Premier, S. Antonio Canovas del Castillo, has done all this, he is a strong man, and there is some evidence that he has done it. The King declares he has trusted him with "his powers" as well as his designs, and he has had the sense to reject all names discredited during the Revolution, and to form a Ministry of men as capable as Spain can supply. Salavezzia, the Finance Minister, is an honest man, raised Spanish Bonds to the highest level they have ever reached, and found, we believe, the funds for the only successful war Spain has waged of late years, that with Morocco. Jovellar, the Minister of War, is trusted by the Army and feared by the Carlists. Ayala, the Minister of the Colonies, is an acute, outspoken Man, with Parliamentary ability ; and though Robledo, Minister of the Interior, is, we fear, a despot, for Narvaez trusted him, Alessandro Castro, Minister of Foreign Affairs, is believed
to be a Liberal. Del Castillo has, at all events, his government ready, he has had the sense and moderation to confirm all Captains-General, and his success so far is proof at least that the King had in him the organiser required, and that Alphonse was the easiest candidate for the throne.
But while, as the Republic is of necessity postponed, Liberals need not regret that Alphonse is the successul Pre- tender, there is no ground as yet to be sanguine about Spain. The Alphonsists may have ascertained that with the accession of their King, the Carlists, who are terribly tried by their long campaign, will retire to their homes ; but as yet that is only a conjecture, the mountaineers having fought against Isabella as bitterly as against Serrano. If they still resist, the war, no doubt, will be prosecuted with more energy, for Alphonso's Ministers are men of decision, with every motive for seeking immediate success • but still the war in the North may last on long, while the Counter-revolution does nothing whatever to prevent the endless outflow of men and treasure to perform an impossibility in Cuba. King Alphonse will have no more power over the insurgents in that island, or the Volun- teers, or the Planters' Club than Serrano had, and no more ability to bend Spanish pride to the inevitable compromise, while the United States will be more hostile to him than to a Republic. Salaverria is honest and able, but there is no proof that the new Government will be strong enough to tax Spain, or to make an acceptable arrangement with her creditors either at home or abroad, or to float a paper currency, or to pass a land law, or to do any of the really great acts which are indispensable if the Treasury of Madrid is to be re- stored to a safe position. Castro may be a Liberal, and also acceptable at the Vatican, but there is no evidence that a Royal Government can meet the religious difficulty of Spain, the deep chasm between the faith of the townsfolk and the faith of the peasantry, a chasm which no statesmanship can bridge. It is true the Vatican is friendly to Alphonso, but no Pope will yield any- thing, and unless the Pope will yield much—accept a separation of Church and State, for example—the ecclesiastical difficulty must remain as great as ever, or be aggravated by the struggle of the parties to possess themselves of the King. And finally, there is no proof that the people are prepared to welcome the new arrangement. The great cities Madrid excepted, will certainly not like it, and may revolt, and of peasant opinion no one out of Spain, or for that matter, in Spain, knows much. The peasants certainly showed no enthusiasm for the Republic, but they have shown no enthusiasm for any other form of government, while they are almost sure to be impatient of the inevitable taxation. No doubt the Pope's approval of the King will go far with them, and no doubt it is remarkable that the able managers of the move- ment should have waited till the last conscripts had reached the ranks, thus showing that they had no fear of political collision between officers and men such as broke up the Artil- lery ; but there is no proof in all this that the peasantry will make sacrifices for anybody, such as will have to be made before a stable government exists in Spain. And finally, there is no proof that Alphonse himself is a man either able to rule or to suffer Ministers who can to govern the State. Though, as his friends told him on the 17th November, he has "providentially" been exiled, he is still a Spanish
Bourbon,—the son, that is, of a race which has never been able to cease from loving despotism or to cease from fear-
ing priests. He may prove an exception, or be all that his friends believe, a strong and self-willed, but clear and independent mind ; but all that is conjecture, conjecture not only with the public, but with his intimates, for the throne changes all men. He has not been chosen because of his qualities, whatever they are, but because he is his mother's son, and there is no one else. In the existing situation of Spain, we do not grudge him, Bourbon though he be, his chance of the hardest place in the most intractable of European countries ; but we are wholly unable to see that as yet it is more than a chance.
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