THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.* No one acquainted with the chequered
course of the Secession war will be surprised that the Battle of Gettysburg should still attract the attention of soldiers and literary men. It was the only action, except Antietam, fought on Northern soil. It was a striking, if not decisive Confederate defeat. Occurring simul- taneously with Grant's success at Vicksburg, it has rightly come to be regarded as the turning-point in the vast struggle, so far as that was waged on the Northern theatre of operations. Mr. Lincoln's speech at the dedication of the Cemetery set apart for the corpses of those who gave there "the last full measure of devotion" to the cause they. had espoused, alone would serve to render Gettysburg memorable. And for those to whom the success or failure of free institutions is indifferent, the battle, unless they should be also insensible to military exploits, presents characteristics which have not escaped the sharp glance of Colonel Hamley, nor the discriminating pen of his painstaking rival, Colonel Charles Chesney. Across the Atlantic the whole war excites naturally a deeper interest than its ebb and flow can possibly arouse in European countries, covered with battle-fields whose names are historical landmarks which stretch backward into a remote antiquity. Nevertheless, no issue was ever raised and submitted to the arbitrament of war greater than that which led to the Gettysburg struggle, and no victory in Europe could be more momentous to any one people or com- bination of peoples concerned, than the defeat inflicted by General Meade upon General Lee was to the American nation. The battle saved the Union ; nay, it did far more—it ratified and secured the abolition of Slavery. Hence, "a battle which, for influence on a great war, and individual interest," to use the words of Colonel Chesney, "deserves as close a study as many of those famed in European annals," naturally inspires native historians, and to these complex feelings the book of Professor Bates must be ascribed. He has produced a careful, unpretending, and readable story, part of a larger work intended to record the share of Pennsylvania in the conflict; and if we cannot always agree with his conclusions, we must recognise his honesty of purpose, diligence in research, and fairness towards those powerful and courageous antagonists who fought so stoutly and skilfully to split up a continent into separate andprobably warring States, and to perpetuate for selfish purposes a great national crime. The cause was bad, but it was redeemed from utter vileness by men of noble character like Lee and Jackson, Longstreet and Alexander Stephens. Mr. Bates has also en- livened his narrative by citations showing how. the invaded people behaved under the novel conditions which beset them ; and on the whole, he has written an entertaining book on a series of perennially interesting events.
The Gettysburg campaign dates from the defeat of General Hooker on the Rappahannock in May, 1863. High military authority has condemned on theoretical grounds the plan of that officer, but a close investigation of the facts shows that Hooker failed, not because his scheme violated correct principles, but because his resolution gave way at a critical moment, because subor- dinate commanders were unequal to the task imposed on them, and because there were no maps of the immediate scene of operations. But if Fortune favoured Lee at Chancellorsville, the fact does not detract from the merits of a General ever ready to make the most of her favours, and not less prompt in warding off the possible consequences of her slights. Moreover, it is written, and truly, that all Generals are indebted to a capricious goddess, who is apt to injure least those who take the greatest pains to be inde- pendent of her smiles. Hooker, as a beaten General, necessarily lost confidence and suffered from calumny, but he was by no means the least able among those who, on both sides, figured in the war. When his offensive campaign failed, the Confederate Government initiated or sanctioned a grand scheme for carry- ing the war over the Potomac ; and General Lee at once prepared
27w Battle at Gettysburg. By Professor Samuel P. Bates. Pennsylvania.
to put his plans in execution. Leaving a force near Fredericks- burg to deceive Hooker, Lee directed his columns by a wide flank movement upon the Shenandoah Valley, surprised the incompetent Milroy at Winchester, 'and proceeded to cross the Potomac. Hooker was not deceived ; he detected the movement, arrived speedily at the conclusion that Lee intended to invade Pennsylvania or get between himself and Washington, and proposed, at one time, to strike the force left before Fredericksburg, and at another to march boldly upon Rich- mond. Neither General Halleck—who was supreme commander, a sort of Aulic Council in himself—nor President Lincoln would allow Hooker to adopt either course. Indeed, at this time, the National cause suffered materially from what we may call divided councils. We may illustrate the position by saying that Hooker accepted his post on the understanding that Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Stanton would stand between him and Halleck, an arrange- ment disclosing the vicious condition of affairs. Nor was this all. He had to purge the army of men whose loyalty to the Union had been shaken by the Emancipation Pro- clamation; he had to contend against imperfect co-operation on the part of his chief subordinates, an evil from which Pope suffered so seriously, and which was not removed until, in the following year, General Grant, becoming sole com- mander, let all whom it might concern know that he was and would be master. "While the National chiefs were debating, General Lee reached the Potomac, and Hooker, on the shorter line, brought his corps up to the same river, and crossing it, marched on Frederick. Here fresh dissensions arose. Hooker desired to call up 11,000 men occupying Harper's Ferry, or rather the Maryland heights above the town, alleging, which was true, that they were useless at that point ; but its occupation was a pet notion of Halleck, who refused his General's demand. Hooker thereupon resigned, his resignation was accepted, and Mr. Lincoln was induced to violate his own precept that it was not wise to "swop horses in crossing a stream." When General Meade, on the 28th of June, was suddenly lifted to supreme command, he obtained at once authority to dispose of the Harper's Ferry troops, and gave up the post, much to Halleck's indignation. The explanation of the questionable change of commanders is that in Washington the long-nourished distrust of Hooker had reached a climax, and it was thought expedient to risk anything rather than leave him in command.
Thus General Meade, suddenly invested with immense responsi- bilities, had little time to study the situation and make up his mind., The Confederate troops filled the Cumberland Valley, and even touched the Susquehanna. A body of their horse, -under Stuart, had actually ridden northward on a line between Meade and Washington. Lee was known to be at Chambersburg, and when Meade assumed command was engaged in preparing for the march of his columns towards York and Carlisle, then occupied by Ewell. The first thought to strike Meade was that Lee must give up his move towards Harrisburg, because the National forces were close to his line of retreat ; and the first thought of Lee, when he heard from a scout that the Nationals were at Frederick, was that he must concentrate at once, and hold himself in readi- ness to fight or manceuvre. But we are bound to admit that Lee's measures at the outset in this new phase of the campaign were the more decided. He looked on the map, and saw Gettys- burg, a small town where many roads met, and he fixed on that spot as his point of concentration. Meade also sent a force to Gettysburg, but not his whole army. Desirous of securing for once the advantages of fighting a defensive battle, Meade was studying a line behind Pipe Creek, where he would cover Washington and Baltimore. Partly for this reason, partly because he did not know the country near Gettysburg, and partly because he was not sure that Lee would respond so quickly to the threat of a movement on his communi- cations, General Meade had spread out his corps on a wide front. There was his principal error. The peril lay on his left, yet although he had three corps there, the most remote on the other flank was six and thirty miles distant. Had Meade on the 29th directed his whole army, in as compact an order as the roads would permit, towards Gettysburg, he would most probably have been so strong on July 1 as to have defeated in detail the separated wings of Lee's army, converging on that town. As it was, even when Lee, before all his force could arrive, was stronger at the point of collision on the 1st, General Slocum held two corps within five miles of the Confederate left rear, yet, from over- caution, forebore to push them speedily on to the field. Pro- fessor Bates brings out very well indeed the character of the first day's fighting, and shows Slocum's shortcomings. But if Meade
was somewhat timid at the beginning, so soon as Hancock had reported that the hills above Gettysburg were a position, his chief showed no further hesitation. He called up all his forces, and although placed in great peril by the error of Sickles, he overcame it, and foiled Lee for the first time since that General succeeded Johnston in command. Professor Bates endeavours to exonerate Sickles from blame for his want of real military insight, but no ease can be made out for him ; the blunder is patent, and it was his blunder ; if the National left had been crushed and the line rolled up, the misuse which Sickles made of his corps would have been the cause of disaster. The promptitude with which Long- street seized his advantage is the best evidence of the error com- mitted by a brave but unprofessional soldier. It is absurd to hold Meade responsible because he did not superintend person- ally the disposition of the 3rd Corps, since there is no use in having corps' commanders, if they require constant dry- nursing. With this exception, the battle was well conducted, and affords an example of a defensive combat accepted in a sin- gularly strong position and skilfully fought out. it was held by some military critics at the time that the Federal right was in danger, not merely from the attacks directed against Cemetery Hill itself, but from a lodgment which Bushrod Johnson effected on the west bank of Rock Creek. The opinion, however, was based on an erroneous conception of the ground. The Con- federates who crossed the stream, and occupied an outer line of breastworks, found the rugged country-side impracticable for guns, and could make no way. General Meade knew the fact, and may be assumed to have weakened his right to strengthen his left, the critical point, because the right was guarded by natural obstacles.
Lee's conduct of the campaign has laid him open to severe -criticism, even from his admirers. Yet up to the 29th of June nothing, with one exception, could be better than the movements he directed. At that date he found himself compelled to con- centrate and march towards an adversary whose influence he felt, and whose nearness to his line of communications he dreaded. On the 1st of July a part of his army, much superior in numbers to the Union troops available, struck and over- threw them ; but seeing the hills above Gettysburg occupied and entrenched, he paused, and deferred the fight until the next day. He feared that the rough, ground might conceal larger forces, and he desired. time for the arrival of absent infantry and cavalry brigades. The effect of his one error now became very apparent. He had allowed Stuart's cavalry to escape from his control, and consequently was without information which he would otherwise have bad. In short, on the 1st of July neither commander had his troops in hand, but undoubtedly Lee, partly because his corps were kept in makes some thirty thousand strong, had more men on the ground at the decisive point. The next day he fought a battle, and thanks to the error of Sickles, won some glory, but no solid advantage ; and on the 3rd, fully con- centrated, he repeated the same experiment, with disastrous results to his army. Why did he fight? Because the arrogance of his soldiers, a feeling which sprang from contempt for mere "Yankees," would not allow him to retreat or manceuvre. He was forced to en- gage in an offensive battle, to assail strong positions, entrenched and well supplied with cannon. He had to repeat Fredericksburg, on the Pennsylvanian hills ; and then his over-confident Generals and troops found that it was one thing to defend, another to attack entrenchments. The famous Southern soldiery fared no better than the infantry of Burnside whom they despised ; and they and their Generals were justly punished, because they held in contempt a foe who, except as regards discipline, was just as formidable as themselves. Meade frustrated Lee just as completely as Lee had frustrated Burnside and Hooker, but whereas even military critics are unrelenting when they treat of Northern failures, they abound in apologies for the Southern hero. No one would pretend that Meade was Lee's equal as a soldier, but he is entitled to the credit of having, under very great disadvantages, so acted as to force the better General to fight, and to share the lot of many Union Generals,—defeat. But he could not do more. Lee regained his ascendancy as soon as he touched the earth ; he was master from July 4th onwards—even when a swollen river ran in his rear, and when he was obliged to ,entrench on Mine Run—until Grant came from the West, and the Army of the Potomac discovered suddenly that it had a leader who would fight, and a master who
l
would be obeyed. Gett- sburg, however, paved the way for Five c
Forks and Appomattox ourt House, and as a cardinal point in a great war, well deserves he attention which Professor Bates has bestowed upon its movin4 incidents.
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