TWO PHASES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.* THERE is a
closer connection between the two books dealing with the American Civil War, which we have bracketed together, than appears on the surface. In the third volume of his detailed, conscientious, and, it must be allowed, rather dull history of the Civil War in America, the Comte de Paris reaches the crisis of the Confederacy. It gives the history of the events which led 'up to the surrender of Vicksburg and Lee's retreat at Gettysburg, events which, ominously enough, happened on the same day. These two repulses sounded the death-knell of the Confederacy, leaving, as they did, the field open for operations against the South, to Sher- man on the one side and to Grant on the other. The desperate bravery of Lee and his army, indeed, prolonged the struggle be- tween one and two years, but the issue had become plain to all outsiders of even limited foresight. Among these outsiders, none watched the course of events more closely than the Emperor of the French. Mr. Bulloch, the active organiser and now the historian of Confederate armaments in Europe, believes, with most other people—thougli the belief must be admitted to savour a little of wisdom after the event—that even in 1863 Napoleon III, was not even the second-rate man he had been. His physical constitution was irreparably weakened, and he had no longer the courage of his dreams. But there was still left him that selfish cunning which so frequently passes for statecraft, unless it is found out. He had been notoriously desirous that the American Union should be broken up. Even before 1863, he would have recognised the Confederacy, if he could have secured this country as a partner in the responsibili- ties of recognition. He had actually, as Mr. Bulloch shows, given permission for the equipment in France of a whole fleet of Confederate cruisers, in addition to those rams which were transferred to France from the docks of the Messrs. Laird, after it had been definitely ascertained that they would be arrested when they appeared armed in British waters. But when the sur- render of Vicksburg, and Lee's retreat after the repulse in- flicted upon him by Meade, proved conclusively that the game of the Confederacy was up, Napoleon backed out of his promise to go through the form of claiming as French the cruisers when they left his ports. It is very improbable that the fortune of war would have been altered had he still continued the friend of the Confederacy, and a host of priva- teers of the most formidable type had been let loose on the commerce and the coasts of the North. On the contrary, it was, if Mr. Bulloch is correct, only owing to the incredibly bad management of the Naval Department of the -Union Executive that the ` Alabama ' and its rivals and consorts were enabled to do so much mischief as they did. But the success of Mr. Bulloch's enterprise in Europe would at least have given hope to the leaders of the Confederacy, and hope counts for much in such a struggle as the one in which they were engaged. Its failure, on the other hand, filled up the cup of their misfortunes in a quite dramatic manner. Thenceforward they were ats men whom the Furies had marked for their own.
The Comte de Paris is a patiently " slogging " rather than a brilliant writer ; and his translator has certainly not improved his style. The ordinary reader will not be fascinated with the bulky volume in which the Comte relates the incidents of some of the most important battles in the great Civil War, such as Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. He does not even rise to the height of the almost melodramatic crisis of Chancellorsville, the death of the Confederate "tower of strength" Jackson at the hands of his own men, almost at the very moment when the Federal Commander-in-Chief was paralysed and almost killed by a shot. The Comte de Paris's work is essentially a military history—we had - almost said, a com- pilation from the military point of view—and it is in con- sequence not very easy to criticise it, until, at all events, * History of the Civil War in America. By the Comte de Paris. Vol. Philadelphia, U.S.A.: Porter and Coates. 1883.
The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe ; or, How the Confederate Cruisers were Equipped. By James D. Bulloch, Naval Itepres.ntative of the Confederate States in Barope during the Civil War. London : Riciard Bentley and Son. 3883„ it is completed. This third volume may be allowed, how- ever, to prove one or two things, in the sense of explod- ing one or two superstitions. In the first place, it does more than throw doubt on the value of the operations of the cavalry employed on both the Federal and the Confederate side in the war. Deeds of bravery were, indeed; performed by the men under Jackson and Stuart on the oile hand, and after- wards by those under Ewell and Sheridan on the other ; anti in the last chapter of this volume, the. Comte de Paris shows how, by adopting the Confederate tactics, the Federal cavalry commanders began to turn the tables upon their opponents.. But these were not cavalry in the proper sense of the word ; they were only infantrymen in the saddle. Hence, while they did some dashing work, it had but little serious effect upon the course of campaigns. This volume is further not calculated to enhance the reputations of either of the two leading Generals of the war, Lee and Grant. Lee, indeed, gained a crushing victory at Chancelloreville, and his repulse at Gettysburg can hardly be reckoned a defeat, at all events it cannot be claimed as a great victory for the cautious Meade. But nothing, except, of coarse, success, could have justified Lee in doing what the Comte de Paris proves hint to have done, in opposing Hooker's 75,000 men at Chancellors- ville with only one-fifth of that number. It is true he knew his ground, the forests round Chancellorsville, very mach better than Hooker, but he had no reason to believe that his opponent was such a contemptible tactician as he assumed in his strategy against him. As a matter of fact, we should say, after reading the Comte de Paris, that but for the unlucky shot which nearly killed Hooker, and deprived the Federal army of a head for a. fatal number of hours, the result of the battle of Chan- cellorsville might have been the opposite of what it actually was. As for Grant, all that can be claimed for him are persistency and what his countrymen call level-headedness, or capacity for perceiving the salient points of a situa- tion, for grasping the real work to be done in a campaign. He blundered before Vicksburg, as he blundered in the final campaigns against Lee ; and to all appearance the Comte de Paris inclines to the belief that had he been confronted really, and not merely in name, by General Joseph Johnstone, instead of by third-rate commanders like Pemberton and Bragg, the combat in the bayous of the Mississippi might have been in- definitely prolonged. The Federal Government trusted Grant as it trusted no other General ; he insisted that Vicksburg must be assailed mainly on the land side, and in the end "it was dogged as did it." We think the Comte de Paris's account of the operations that ended in the surrender of Vicksburg at once the best and the best-written portion of his third volume. When all deductions are made, his book must be allowed to be a. treasure-house of information for the careful student of the Civil War. Still, the Comte or his editors should give us, if not more light, certainly more maps.
Captain Bulloch's two volumes, like the Comte de Paris's one, call for careful reading rather than minute criticism, although for somewhat different reasons. They tell a rather old story. Captain Bulloch's motive in not publishing his book sooner may easily be appreciated ; but, after all, are we not beginning to forget about "due diligence," and the opinions of such eminent authorities as Lord (then Sir Hugh) Cairns, Lord Selborne (then Sir Roundell Palmer), and Chief Baron Pollock, to the effect that the Messrs. Laird committed no crime against inter- national law in building such a ship as the Alabama,' and that she was not a war-ship, in the proper sense of the word, when she left the shores of this country ? Who wishes to stir the ashes of the controversy occasioned by the Geneva Conference and Award ? It is to the credit of Captain Bulloch, indeed, that he seeks to do nothing of the kind. He fights the battles of the Confederacy on paper, as its leaders fought them in the field, like a fair-minded gentleman. When he was in Europe, engaged in the arduous and only im- perfectly successful enterprise of getting a fleet of cruisers built to aid the Confederate cause, he received many rebuffs. But he testifies to the good-faith and honour of practically every one in England and France with whom he came in contact ; he can hardly be said to have a harsh word to say of anybody, even of Earl Russell. But there is another good reason why Mr. Bulloch's work should not, or rather cannot be fully criti- cised, at least as yet. The main point in it is the theory it contains of the action of the English Government in consenting to new international rules, and to the pagnent of the three millions for 'Alabama' and other depredations on Federal commerce. It was not, it seems, that our Govern- ment were afraid of the Union, or wished to maintain the peace of the world, or even so much that they believed that the fitting-out by one belligerent of a fleet in neutral waters to assail the commerce of another was an outrage to the spirit, if not a violation of the letter, of international mari- time law. It was rather, we are asked to believe, a stroke of fliplomacy. After the Alabama' award, the United States Government will be compelled, in the event of this country being at war, to prevent its commerce being injured by ships built in its dockyards, or coming, even although unarmed, from its ports ; and, moreover, "there can be no doubt that a broad con- struction of belligerent maritime rights would be especially and peculiarly favourable to Great Britain and the other great mari- time Powers of Europe, whenever they may again be engaged in war ; and the course pursued by the United States towards neutral ships during the years 1861-65, and tacitly acquiesced in by the European Powers, will at some future day involve the former Government in a dilemma." Time only can tell whether this opinion is a sound one ; at present, it would serve little purpose to argue either for or against it. Mr. Bulloch's book covers much interesting ground ; and when he tells such a story as that of the duel between the Kearsage 'and the 'Alabama' over again, his impartiality as a historian is clearly and pleasantly indicated. Both the works we have noticed, how- ever, will be found mainly valuable as material for the future historian of the American Civil War to utilise.
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