THE PRUSSO-DANISH QUESTION.
WHEN Parliament assembles, it is, probable that some Member will call for the diplomatic correspondence relating to the quarrel between the Germanic Confederation and the kingdom of Den- mark. Up to the present week, only a few important documents, in a sadly mutilated condition, had found their way into the foreign journals ; but new a daily contemporary has taken the pains to procure and publish what look like true copies of the originals. They are not of later date than December the 8th, and do not inform us whether or not the disputants are on the verge of war ; but they do explain pretty clearly the grounds on which each stands, and the part our own Government has played in the dispute. Denmark, placed in the awkward position of having to discuss with the German Confederation its own rights in Schleswig, ap- pealed to the friendly offices of Great Britain, and begged Lord John Russell to transmit to Berlin a memorandum of propositions, in order to pave the way for a temporary settlement of Holstein, and to inform Prussia of the concessions that would be made in Schleswig. It was a dexterous choice, and served to keep in the background a certain potentate, who is not unnaturally supposed to take a special interest in promising little disputes of this kind. Towards the end of October, Lord Bloomfield, then our Minister at the Court of Berlin, handed the memorandum to Count Schleinitz. This is the first of the published papers, and the base of the new state of things. Premising that the agitation in Holstein is a bar to a definitive settlement, the Danish Government proposes two distinct mea- sures, avowedly as expedients intended to meet existing emer- gencies. First, the consultative" vote of the Estates is to be- come a "deliberative" vote, " so that no law shall have force in Holstein, either in regard to persons or , property, without the ap- probation of the Estates of the Duchy ; ' a concession,that secures to the Holsteiners control over everything except finance. Next, the quota of taxes to be paid by Holstein into the general trea- sury is to be a fixed sum, the average of taxation paid for the last six years; and, should the general government require addi- tional grants, they are not to be levied without the free consent of the Estates. Thus far Holstein. With regard to Schleswig, the Danish Government is careful to mark that all concessions made and to be made are so made of its own free will ; and the sub- .
stance of those concessions is simply reported to the Prussian Go- vernment to show that Denmark is animated by a spirit of conci- liation. The Danish concessions, we confess, ought long ago to have been conceded. They grant the liberty of " confirmation " in either Danish or German ; freedom of private instruction ; a full amnesty for political offences; and freedom of association for non- political purposes between the people of the two Duchies. It was folly on the part of Denmark to permit the social and political op- pressions to which these clauses point, to remain as sources of bit- terness between German and Dane. They ought to have been removed ten years ago. It did not become a constitutional King of Denmark to imitate a despotic Emperor of Austria.
The Danish proposals were intended to conciliate the Prussian Court and German Confederation. They had a contrary effect. On the 8th of November, Count Sehleinitz replied to them in a despatch to Count Bernstorff, the Prussian Minister in London. We are surprised at the tone of this missive ; but it tends to con- firm the assertion that on this subject all Germans, North Ger- mans especially, are not quite of sound mind. Count Schleinitz rates Denmark for delaying so long to settle with Holstein, and then pleading the excitement caused by the non-fulfilment of her promises in bar to instant and definitive action. Further delay? No, it is "urgent that this matter should be brought to a final issue as speedily as possible." The temporary settlement pro- posed is, moreover, unsatisfactory. It deprives Holstein of all control over the finances, except when an increase of taxes is asked for ; and it does not include the abolition of the Danish. Reichsrath—with which, as it appears to us, Germany has about as much to do as she has with the abolition of the British Par- liament. The result is, that neither the Confederation nor Prussia can covenant with Denmark on this basis ; and so the Danish proposals are given to the winds. The remarkable part of the matter is, that Count Schleinitz disposes of these proposi- tions as if they were of British origin, talks indifferently of them as the " memorandum of the London Cabinet," and " the propo- sitions of Denmark," and assumes that, because the Danish Go- vernment expresses a hope that Prussia will support them at Frankfort, therefore Lord John Russell wished Prussia to give them her approval and support. The fact is, our Government did not regard them as definitive in any sense, and only trans- mitted them in the hope that they would lead to a frank negotia- tion; and were induced to do so because they take an interest " in the integrity of the Danish monarchy, and would be sorry to see the force of Denmark, which is not considerable, weakened or impaired."
We have touched so far only on the reply of Count Schleinitz to the Holstein propositions. He is far more emphatic in
to the Schleswig concessions. They are entirely unacceplaTel and why ? " No right of intervention," he says, " in the affairs of Schleswig is thereby granted. to the German Confederation [1.] All concessions to be made to that duchy are exclusively under- stood as emanating from the free will of the Government of Den- mark, and are not interpreted as an admission of the authority of the Confederation in reference to Schleswig. To this the Con- federation will never agree." In short, Schleswig is not a Ger- man Duchy, but the Duke of Schleswig has contracted " inter- national obligations towards the German Confederation in respect of Schleswig, and is bound to fulfil them." This is high lan- guage ; but it is a novelty that a promise to :make concessions authorizes the general right of intervention. Austria or Prussia, to whom the promise of concessions was communicated, may go to war with the Duke of Schleswig for non-fulfilment, but non-fulfil- ment does not give Austria or Prussia, still less the Germanic Confederation, " a right of intervention in the affairs of Schles- wig." Lord John Russell, in his despatch of December 8, reply- ing to Count Schleinitz, puts the matter very distinctly. The diplomatic transaction in 1851-2, between Austria and Prussia on the one side, and Denmark on the other, imposed certain honour- able engagements on Denmark, but, at the same time, expressly excluded Schleswig from Federal jurisdiction. Lord John puts it concisely thus :—" If Schleswig were incorporated with Denmark, if Schleswig were deprived of its separate constitution, Germany might claim a right to interfere. But if the regulation of each church and each school in Schleswig were to be the subject of in- terference by the German Confederation, it is clear that the sove- reign rights of the King of Denmark would exist only in name." Schleswig is a very ancient portion of the kingdom of Denmark, and when Prussia was in the egg as Brandenburg the Danes were on the Eider, and Denmark was a kingdom.
The net result of the efforts of diplomacy appears to be this. Prussia, for Germany, stands fast by her demand that Holstein shall be practically independent of Denmark ; that is, the servant of the Confederation, but the ally or equal of Denmark. Prussia, for Germany likewise, insists on a right of intervention in Schles- wig, with the express object of Germanizing that Duchy, and diminishing the power of the Danish monarchy. England, pointedly stating that she takes an interest in the integrity of Denmark, has counselled moderation to Prussia, and the fulfil- ment of engagements to Denmark, and Denmark has partially, perhaps will wholly, act upon that advice.
The misfortune for Europe is, that Prussia does not see how much she puts in jeopardy, in a wide European sense, by stirring in this question and bringing war so near. She may be the means of furnishing some Powers with pretexts for which they are 1 'rig in wait, and an opportunity for which they are preyared. We trust that Prussia will not be precipitate, nor deal with the
question in a manner that would deprive her of the sympathy of England.
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