THE WAR SURVEYED : THE WEST WALL
By STRATEGICUS F there are many questions as to the Allied attempts to 1 create a diversion on the West when Poland was reeling under the first blows of the German armies, if there are even more questions as to what is now happening and not hap- pening in France, if the operations in the east give the terrible impression of war while those looking towards the West Wall convey little more than a suggestion of masterly inactivity, the Allied information service is alone to blame. Sound as well as light has been shut off. All we are allowed to hear is the suggestion of the instruments tuning up and perhaps, here and there, part of the orchestra trying over a bar or two. We are permitted to see nothing.
The French of course are a little better off; but even they have not been allowed to know the scale of operations. That at least might be disclosed. No one expects to be told the exact number of troops engaged and the precise objectives aimed at. But the order of the figures, whether patrols or divisions, we should know, if the people's morale, which is the factor that will decide victory, is not to be frittered away and lost. As it is, a national newspaper is to be found, as I write, informing its readers of a great new offensive against the frontier between Karlsruhe and the Swiss frontier, with the centre of the attack directed against Zweibriicken! Such nonsense has its grave side, and the Government will be wise to realise that the effect of ignorance, whether congenital or through suppression, is much the same. At length the impression grows that we are deliberately misled; and those who have studied the documents concerning the antecedents of the German breakdown in the autumn of 1918 will re- cognise the sequence of events.
The process, of course, has not yet gone far. But there was never any need for it to begin. There is no need to be ashamed of the Allied effort in the first first phase of the war, although the impression of ineffectiveness in face of the amazing gallantry of the Poles moves one's feelings over- poweringly. Even now these invincible men, beaten on paper long ago, still defy the enemy and, where the plane of the struggle has perforce fallen back to the primitive, more than hold their own. It is magnificent; it is appalling; it is terrible. And it seems to throw into higher relief the apparent placidity on the West.
But the Western Front has never been inactive. Nor is it correct to imagine that the activity has only been that of patrols. It is or should be obvious that the tempo of the struggle must be entirely different there. The term West Wall is a tuna a non lucendo. It is not a wall so much as a vast space which in some places reaches to the depth of a day's infantry march. It is, again, not a wall because a wall can be scaled or breached, and this system is devised to prevent either. When this is borne in mind, it can be realised that it is wholly unreasonable to look for spectacular move- ments. The Great War began and ended in open warfare, but there were dreary years of positional struggle in between when the changes could only be seen on maps of the largest scale. Open warfare offers chances of decisive action. Through it alone is it possible to realise the Blitzkrieg; but it was to rule out such possibilities that the Maginot line was constructed, and the West Wall was Hitler's reply when his immediate policy turned towards the east. It was designed to call check to any attack by France; and it is irrational to complain that it has so far fulfilled its purpose.
Between the two positions there is a stretch of land on both sides of the frontier. It is not all fortified or equally fortified, and everywhere its occupation is a matter of care- fully correlated movement. The actual French advance was conditioned not only by the difficulties of the terrain but also by the fact that Germany began the war at her chosen hour, when she was completely ready, whereas the French general mobilisation was not completed until midnight on the zoth. During these day*, when fidelity as well as chivalry urged General Gamelin to attempt a diversion in the West he had, first, methodically to place the mobilised troops in the Maginot line ; and he had to recognise that any action must take place not only under that disadvantage, but also without the help of his ally. These circumstances, no doubt, reinforced his predilection for a movement against the Saar area on his northwest frontier. The Saar is one of the most important industrial areas in Germany It lies nearer the frontier than any other area of equal sensitiveness ; and, from its topography, much less immune against attack, it has a double defensive system. Here lay the best chance of exerting immediate pressure.
A few miles to the west there is a narrow tongue of German territory lying south of the river Saar, widening into a salient containing the forest of Warndt. On the gth the French troops began to pinch off the salient. It was found to be full of traps of all kinds, automatic arms and land mines, and the clearing up took several days. This opera- tion was the work of a considerable body of troops, and a division is stated to have " secured possession of an important position." Two days later Gamelin initiated a movement which has given the key to all subsequent operations on this frontier and has developed into a struggle that has lasted until the present moment.
The scope of the attack has only leaked out piecemeal ; but it seems clear from the energy of the German reaction that it was carried out by considerable forces and secured a sufficient initial success to call forth heavy and repeated counter-attacks. The main advance was on the front between Saarbrucken and Zweibrficken ; and in four days the position of both towns seems to have been shaken. About Hombach the struggle has rarely ceased, and it welled as far east as Pirmasens. It is significant that the Germans waited three days and then, after careful artillery preparation, delivered their counter-attack ; and the fighting has continued even into this week. Attempts had been made to check the French advance by heavy massed attacks on positions seized in the Nied valley, east of the forest of Warndt ; but this movement was coolly and effectively broken, and a counter- attack was also delivered near the Moselle, where the Germans had threatened Sierck. The Germans also attempted a diversion against the sector where the Lauter river covers Alsace ; but the French hold on the fringes of the Saar area still preoccupies the enemy. It was obviously not won, and has not been maintained, without loss ; but it did not compel the great reflux of the Germans from the east, which is only now taking place. It is of importance, however, and if it had been seen against a less exacting com- parison than that of the German campaign in Poland, if it had been permitted really to emerge into the daylight, it might have occasioned, as it merited, some satisfaction. We can bear loss if we see the gain.
There has, at least, been no half-heartedness in the Allied part of the war, not even in the suppression of news. If it has not appeared to have the élan of the German operations, it ought to be recognised that this is largely appearance. Risks could not be taken beyond a certain point ; and if Germany in the east offered every sort of hostage to.fortune she was driven by hard necessity. For there are other aspects of the war in which our successes have been great and imme- diate. When war broke out on September 3rd the Allied navies raised against Germany lines of investment every whit as unbreakable as those which hem in Warsaw. This is so much a commonplace that in this country it is ignored. But the Germans do not ignore it. In the air, too, the Allies have won their successes. The gallant attack on the Kiel Canal and the Elbe ports deserved a better press than it was per_ mitted to receive ; and the air-raids over Germany have not been without their effect. The Germans cannot surely fail to realise that bombs might as easily have been dropped as leaflets ; and some of the German soldiers recently taken prisoner were found to have leaflets in their possession. The Air Force has also assisted the French in their reconnaissance flights over the West Wall, knowledge of which is vital to all future operations. In sum, taking into account the condi- tions obtaining on the western front, it does not seem that General Gamelin has not done all he humanly could. But a really effective censorship is fully equal to concealing all the essential characters of any operations.
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