The special correspondent of the Times at the French manceuvres,
writing in Tuesday's issue, condemns in no un- certain language the methods adopted by generals and umpires alike. "In spite of South Africa and its lessons, the idea is prevalent in the French Army, and rules its training, that there is only one factor in warfare. That is infantry advance." And again : "The success of an opera- tion seemed to be decided in favour of the officer who could hurl the largest mass to destruction in the shortest time." In other words, the French Colonels habitually marched their battalions in mass to the attack at a range of 1,200 yards. In brief, he notes perfunctory scouting, disinclination to take cover, and the refusal to admit the effectiveness of long- range rifle fire amongst the weak points of the manceuvres. To judge from the medimval methods adopted, even the sorely criticised Salisbury Plain manceuvres would not suffer by comparison with taose recently held by the French. It is evident that the French, the excellence of whose ordnance was so conclusively proved in South Africa, are in no humour to profit in their turn from the tactical lessons they might have learned from the Boers.