HEEREN'S HISTORICAL TREATISES
CONTAIN the pith of an extensive knowledge of history, and ex- hibit considerable power of dealing with those leading points which make distinctive epochs iii the annals of nations, without the sacrifice of breadth on the one hand or exactness on the other. They also treat of events whose influences still remaining, come more home to us than do the subjects of several of the Professor's other works; and they have as it were more of fulness and of flesh. At the same time, they are better fitted for the politician or the historical studeut than the general reader. In such an extensive and rapid survey, the author of course assumes much historical knowledge on the part of his reader, and merely men- tions an event as a proof of his conclusions. These conclusions, too, must sometimes be received with considerable latitude; and require to be examined with care by minds accustomed to weigh opinions and detect the misapplication of past truths to present practices. The opinions of the author on Monarchical Government and the British Constitution are instances of this. In his essay on Poli- tical Theories, he speaks disapprovingly of the idea of a republic with kingly forms, and proceeds to lay down the powers essential to a monarch. The first of these involves hereditary succession by right, the inviolability of the monarch, and that " in all affairs of state nothing shall be done either without or contrary to the will of the sovereign." In " constitutional monarchies," the po- pular power may be represented in chambers; two of which, the Professor holds, are better than one, as affording greater security against parties and factions. The respective relations in which they stand to each other are thus laid down— The rights of the prince in his relation with the chambers, as far as these proceed from the definition of sovereignty, may be reduced into three classes— viz. those which have reference to outward form, those which have reference to the subject matter on which his power is to be exerted, and those which re- gard the share which the prince is to take in the councils of the nation, and the influence which he is to exercise over them.
As regards the outward forms, the idea of sovereignty- requires that the chambers should be in strict subjection to the prince. These outward forms are the harriers which are to protect the crown from the inroads of the cham- bers. They should be determined by the charter of the constitution, and it should be incumbent on the prince to maintain them in full force. The chambers are nut to assemble without, or in opposition to, the will of the sovereign They are to be opened by him, to be prorogued, and to be closed by him ; and lie must at all times possess the right of dissolving- the existing chamber, and of calling for a new election of its members. When chambers assemble, prorogue, adjourn, and dissolve of their own authority, the assembly takes place at once wit 'out the will of the prince, and will very soon be held in opposition to it. Again, a chamber which cannot be dissolved by the prince, ia independent, and superior to him. He has no means of escaping from its tyranny if it should form itself into a faction, and no opportunity of discovering whether it represents the wishes of its constituents or stands in direct opposition to them. It is only by a new election that this can be certainly determined. It is requisite, therefore, not only for the interests of the prince, but for those of the people also, that he should have the power of dissolving the chamber of repre-entatives. In regard to the suljects whirl, are to be discussed by the chambers, we may remark at once, that all the foreign affairs of the state are to be beyond their ju- risdiction, and appropriated to the prince. In treating with other states, the prince must be considered as the representative of his own, otherwise they can- not deal with him with any safety : should it be done only "sub spe rati," they will no longer consider him as sovereign, but as the delegate of a superior power. The maintenance of the monarchical principle requires, therefore, according to our views, that not only all treaties of commerce and alliance, but that all de- clarations of war anti con, lusions of peace should be absolutely in the hands of the prince. This, however, does not by any means exclude the chambers from debating upon foreign policy, and from giving their opinion either in praise or blame of the nuasures which the government may have adopted. How far such proceedings may be advisable, is a question alai which we have nothing to do, as it does not bear upon the maintenance of the monarchical principle. The sphere of the chambers, then, as a body, sharing the power of ultimate decision with the prince, is confined to the internal affairs of legislation and taxation. In these there is no third party concerned : but in the dealangs be- tween the two, the monarchical principle is sustained by the veto, which must be allowed unconditionally to the prince. In compliance with the favourite notion of the sovereignty of the people, frequent attempts have of late been made to restrict the veto, by determining that the prince may refuse his approval once, or even twice, but that after this the law shall be valid without it. These rules are mostly taken, as the author subsequently avows, from the practice of the British Constitution ; or rather from its practices at various times, for, such is its extraordinary adaptability, that it will furnish any theorist with any theory. But work out these monarchal notions to their legitimate ends, and we must land either in a despotic autocracy or in the sove- reign power of the people. The prince has the power of declaring war, and uses it; but the chamber refuses supplies. What then? Why, the prince must submit to the superior power of the people.
The prince alone can conclude peace : be makes a disgraceful or injurious one. If the chamber can punish his instruments, there Is a sovereign power over the sovereign : if it cannot, the king may not only sacrifice the interests of the state, but dismember it—banding over his subjects, it may he, to a tyranny which he would not exercise himself. And we need not go further than CHARLES the Second to show that this is possible. The power of the veto, if a king could exercise it, would be a passive tyranny— an incubus repressing national improvement : if he cannot ven- ture to use the right, we "put a barren sceptre in his gripe "— there must exist a power above the throne greater than the throne itself. The privilege of dissolution cuts both ways : its exercise may free the king from a faction, or may more firmly subdue him to the national will. The opening, proroguing, and closing, are mere forms, analogous to the Speaker of the House of Commons, the Chairman of Committees, or even to Mr. LEY'S situation of Clerk. If the period for assembling the legislative body is de- filed, with the power of rendering somebody responsible for delay, the monatch is a summoning officer : if it rests upon his pleasure, then be may become absolute, like Cuaeses the Second, unless money-matters compel him to submit to the sovereign people.
It seems to have been an ancient opinion, that a mixed govern- ment was a chimera ; and modern experience is tending towards the same conclusion. The instances adduced in favour of the theory of BLACKSTONE,DF. LOLME, and others, do not exhibit a mixture, but a succession of powers. At one time the king was supreme: he could exercise his veto, suspend the law, and make laws by proclamation. At another, though the instances were rare, the people were excited to the exercise of their might. But within these last two centuries, an extended oligarchy generally ruled under the fiction of King and Commons. But if Mr. RICE'S 'coequal " of last spring, or his ." coordinate " of this present autumn, ever had existence, they exist no longer. After many changes, the "Glorious Constitution " has become an aristocracy ; and an aristocracy with all the faults but none of the redeeming qualities of a nobility trained to govern. Whilst they are inso- lent, profuse, and foul-mouthed, they have neither coin tesy, policy, nor skill. Talk of Venice !—whatever the nobility might do, they were guarded in their sayings. "The Three" wonld soon have silenced any such public displays as those of the leader of our haute noblesse.
Turning from the investigation of a part to the consideration of the whole, the first treatise, on the Political Consequences of the Reformation, endeavours to trace the effects which that great event produced in the different nations of Europe, not only as regards the wars to which it gave rise, but io its influences on the social system, the kingly power, and the foreign politics of the countries, as well as in the cheracter of the clergy and on freedom of thought. The second essay, on the Rise, Progress, and Prac- tical Influence of Political Theories, embraces a brief and descrip- tively critical account of the leading works on Government, from BODIN and GROTIUS ICI ROUSSEAU ; and is prefaced by an investi- gation of the national circumstances necessary to give rise to political speculations, and closed by a disquisition on Monarchies and Republics, or rather on the essential qualifications of a monarch, from which we he se already quoted. The last treatise, on the Rise and Growth of the Continental Interests of Great Britain, is a rapid and masterly historical precis of our foreign connexions, from the age of HENRY the Eighth to the termina- tion of the last war ; in which HEEREN defends our interference in Continental matters, on the principle that a state which isolates itself from all connexion with the quarrels of others will inevitably decline, (though the instances which he adduces in support of his theory seem more like effects than causes,) and in the main de- fends the course which our Government has generally taken, on the grounds of justice, expediency, and the preservation of the balance of power.
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