COLONEL HARWOOD'S ADVICE.

FOR some reason which is not very apparent people are surprised to come upon an old statement of political or military difficulties which perplexed their ancestors and to recognize that the difficulties are the same that perplex their own age. The reason for their surprise, we say, is not very apparent, because this experience is the rule rather than the excepticn. The same difficulties recur in principle again and again. It is always instructive to read an old analysis of what is a modern problem ; and there is something, we think, very grateful in the knowledge that our ancestors were beset by

our own troubles—the knowledge gives one a sense of com- panionship with the past and an appreciation of the perfect continuity of history. A very entertaining statement of the German challenge to our command of the sea and of the need for National Service—we state the problem in terms of our own day—may be found in the Discourse which Colonel Harwood addressed to Charles I.

Not very much is known of Sir Edward Harwood, and the Discourse from which we shall quote is his chief title to remembrance. He was born in 1586 ; was one of the four standing colonels in the Low Countries; and was killed at the siege of Maestricht in 1632. It is recorded of him that he kept guard on horseback thirty whole nights and " never in that time came to bed." He had the misfortune to kill a man in a quarrel, and in remorse " put a period to all his carnal mirth "—a verbal variation of the classical phrase, "never smiled again." Hugh Peters says of him that he was "neither above nor below his calling, but very adequate and true unto it; so sad, serious, and skilful in his way, he was a good man, a good soldier, a good Christian, and is now wear- ing his crown." The discourse of this sad, serious, and skilful man on the naval and military needs of his country was published by his brother, George Harwood, a London merchant. It is reprinted in the Harleian Miscellany.

Harwood begins with the challenge to British sea-power which came in those days, not, of course, from the Germans, but the French.

"The particulars of his [the French King's] preparations not being certainely knowne, there is no certain judgement to be made of them : I will therefore only take the case, as I suppose it will be granted. That the French King endeavours to make himself strong at sea, and that by two meanes, one encouraging his subjects to trade at sea, giving his Merchants great priviledges, and immunities, another of his owns proper Cost, buying, and building many great and good ships, and ordaining a yearely brave proportion out of his

i

revenue, for the increasing and maintaining his Navie, as some say 300 thousand 1. sterling, others but 300 thousands Crownes, one or other, are considerable, and may prove of danger to this State. For this disposition of his argues, that hee intends either to enter into a new war with his Majostie, or at least, to put himselfe into such a condition, as when he shall thinke fit, bee may doe so, without his disadvantage. That this his Arming at sea, must be intended, in emulation of His Majesties Lordship of the narrow Seas, to °quail, ore-top him at sea is probable. For against whom else Not against the Hollanders, they are his obsequious friends, desirous of his friendship, fearefull of his displeasure, not against the King of Spain for he can more easily invade him by land, when hoe will, as Spain can him; Besides the French King shewes no disposition to enter into open warro with him, for having taken on him the protection of Mantua, and not well dealt with by him in the last treaty for Italy, making a peace in show, and yet after taking his advantage, renuing the warre in the Emperour's name, yet doth he not enter into open warre with him, but will only be an assistant, else had it not beeno more facile for him to have invaded Flanders or Artois, and so by diversion aided the Duke of Mantua, then by sending an Army into Italy in the winter ; therefore this preparation of the French King, for the sea, hath his chiefs ayme, in present, or future at His Majestie. I suppose, not to invade England, or it may be none of His Majesties Hands, though that is more then we can be assured of ; some of his ships of warre were this winter on His Majesties Coast, went from Harbour to Harbour, doubtlesse to dis- cover them, and not for any good to His Majestic): besides, who can tell, since the Hands of Garnesey and Jersey, are the only remainders of the large Dominions His Majesties Predecessors formerly havo possessed in France, if hee have not an itching to joyne them to Francs again, or if not them, nor Wight; yet to share the dominion of the narrow Seas with His Majestie, and that is to take it from him, if he can ; to which hitherto hee hath not pre- tended, as not being able to match His Majestie at Sea, but if he eontinue these His preparations, and that His Majestie out of hand prepare not also against it, lice will in short time, undoubtedly effect it."

That, surely, is an excellent piece of common sense. "For against whom else ? " is a question that encompasses the whole situation. We might paraphrase it for our own day, and say of the German Emperor's naval policy that it must be a challenge to ourselves. "For against whom else P Not against the Austrians, they are his obsequious friends ; not against the Italians, they are fearful of his displeasure; not against Russia or France, for he can more easily invade either by land. Therefore this preparation hath its chief aim against Britain." We suppose, like Colonel Harwood, that the aim is not to invade England. But the ships are not built for amusement or to put in a museum. They are intended for service, and the Germans, with their strong practical nature, would be the first to be affronted at the suggestion that they were foolishly building ships to no purpose. Set aside all question of invasion. Men-of-war are an instrument of policy. When the next international dispute arises the

argument will be conducted with confidence or hesitation by Germany in proportion to her estimate of her naval strength. We need not look further than that. It is far enough. Nor is Germany ever offended by our looking so far as that along her line of policy. The experience of the last few years has proved that she understands and appreciates the candour of a Harwood, but mistrusts amiable proposals for a naval arrange- ment, which she suspects mask some perfidious design or at least an insulting intention to stereotype her inferiority.

Just as the German naval challenge has replaced that of France in recent years, so the French naval challenge in Harwood's time had replaced that of Spain. Harwood did not allow that the French Navy would offer no menace to England till it " ore-topped" the British Navy. France would be a " fearful neighbour "—a cause of constant anxiety—if her Navy only equalled that of Britain.

"Now, if the French King should come to be as powerfull, or more, then his Majestie at Sea, he will be a more dangerous and fearfull neighbour to England then Spaine, whom hitherto this Kingdom have of latter yeares onely had cause to fears, for that against Spaine, the Low Countries will ever bee a good Bulwarck; who if the King of Spaine at any time make any great prepara- tions at Sea, and so ever armo against him, and be alwaies ready to joyne with, and to assist his Majestie 'gainst Spaine, which may bee doubted, they will not so readily doe against France, with whom they are in league, and not jealous off. Besides the King of Spaine hath not so populous a Country, as hee can easily prepare, either a great Fleet, or Land Army, and much lesse both, without long time, and so his Majestie may have the more warning thereof. Then Spaine is further from England, and so the journey is the longer, and from thence cannot come any Horse, which are the forces most to be feared in England. Whereas France being so neero us, and so full of Souldiers, both Horse and Foot, if it once come to be able to equall England at Sea, by sudden and quicke preparations, stealing opportunities, he may oretop England at Sea, and then transport such an Army of Horse and Foot as we might justly be afraid of : For old Souldiers both Horse and Foot, France abounds in, and the French have a vertue proper to them, that not a Gentleman thinkes himself anything, untill ho have scene the Warres, learned at least, good and perfect use of his Armes, and naturally they are all good Horse- men ; their Land affords Horses fit for service, and every man almost knows to use Pistoll and Carabin : Whereas in England, sinless° those, which have beene Souldiers, few or none can use their Armes, and of those which have bin Souldiers, it may be not all, can well use their Armes, especially the Musquet, which is of most offence, which our Nation are not naturally so prompt to learns, the use of, as the French are ; and for Horse, this Kingdom is so deficient, as it is a question, whether or not, the whole Kingdome could make 2,000 good Horse, that might equall 2,000 French."

Harwood comes to his proposed remedies. And here let us deprecate in advance the criticism that Harwood's fears were all proved by events to be unjustified. True, England came safely through her dangers, and eventually beat France by sea and land, but the danger was not relaxed till Pitt had undertaken the terribly precarious task of rescuing Europe from the tyrant and had built up the colossal debt which has burdened his successors. To laugh at dangers on the strength of unjustified fears in the past is as easy as it is foolish. Harwood declares the Navy to be the first line of defence, and points out that it is worth paying for generously —again an excellent piece of common sense. What we cannot understand is the point of view of those who are willing to spend a good many millions on the Navy so long as there is a strong chance of its being beaten. We understand the logic of "No Navy," but we cannot understand the logic of an indifferent Navy. Harwood says :—

"First, and principally, I would advise that his Majestie would arme at Sea, for that is the surest defence, for we can never be hurt by a forraigne enemy, by land, till we be first beaten at Sea, and therein I cannot give better advise, than to doe what the French King doth, as to repairs and increase his own Royal! Navie, which is the greatest and best assured strength of England, and to that end, to set apart some certain large proportion of his revenue, that His Seamen may have good pay, and well paid, and if there be good and strict courses taken, that there be no abuses in the Musters, victualling, consumption of Ammunition (which without good payment cannot well be executed) His Majesty will be a Gainer thereby, in matter of profit, besides, the reputation and advantage of his service, and it is my opinion, that no Prince nor State, but had better give 40 in the hundred, for monies to pay his Militia well, then not to pay well : Then to encourage his Merchants, and other Subjects to trade, and in making new plantations."

Although Harwood insists on a powerful Navy, he does not care to run the risk of assuming that no foreigner will be able to pass through the naval line. Such an assumption can never be more than an assumption, and the prudent householder insures against all calculable risks. His recommendation for Home Defence is as follows

:- "For his land-forces, that His Majestie would take order, that the numbers of trayned men were increased, or rather that tho whole Kingdoms from 18 or 20 to 35 or 40, as many men as were able of bodies were armed, one third with pikes and armours, another with muskets, and the third with calivers, that there were powder, bullets, and match through the whole Kingdoms, magazines thereof in sundry places of the Kingdoms in such a quantity, MS if it were invaded in one, or divers parts, there be no want of Ammunition in any place : for it would be then too late to fetch it elsewhere, and much worse, then to make it, or send over Seas for it. That there were Care taken, that these men then armed might be well exercised, and to that end, that there be in every hundreth, or wapentake, some old souldier, Sergeant, or other inferior Officer, had out of the Low Countries well chosen, that might teach men the use of their Armes, and that there be certaine dayes set and appointed, for the showing of their Armes, and exercising them : and if the Statutes which were formerly for sporting in the long bow were revived, or converted (with delibera- tion) for the musket and Caliver, to practice by shooting at markes on ordinary Holy-days, and such like times, and at some time some small prize for them, that shoot nearest ; under correction, I think it were much for the strength of the Kingdome. Then that there were good choyse made of the Musket-masters, none to be but such as had borne office in some actuall warre of reputation ; for better there were none, and their allowances divided into sundry inferior men, then for one to draw a great pay, that neither knowes not to doe, or doth not anything for it : and because there is, or may be such as have borne office in the warres, and yet discontinue so long as they have forgotten their trade, or that the fashion of the Warres and exercising bee changed, since hee was last a Souldiour, that every Mustermaster, shall not only at his first entrance, bee approved by such as are able to judge him, to bee fit for that charge, but to the end he may continue so, bee hee injoyned once, in 4 or 5 years, to goe personally for the Sommer time into some actuall Warre abroad, it may bee, to retains and renew his knowledge, that tho Captains of the Trained bands, bee injoyned themselves to passe the Seas, to learne the duties of their places, or at least, to keepe of his owne charge, one that can discharge his place, and if neither to quite their commands to such, as will doe the one or other. By this means his Majesty may have an Army of foot on a sodaine in any part of England to answer all occasions, without drawing his forces much farree out of their proper countries ; for an Enemy may make shew of landing in one place, and having drawen the greatest strength of the Kingdome thither (windes serving for it) sodainly transport himself to another, before that Army can by land come there."

In other words, Harwood demanded a nation in arms, and, so to say, the institution of rifle clubs all over the eonntry. He also required that the officers shall be well trained at manoeuvres—in those days manoeuvres were supplied by simply " going personally for the summer into some actual war abroad."

Harwood next examines the lack of good horses and horse- men, and incidentally lays it down that "personal honours" should be bestowed by the King only on those who " did conform themselves to do his Majesty and country service."

Restate that condition in democratic terms, and it amounts to this, that the privilege of citizenship and the obligation of service ought to be indissolubly associated. Harwood refines upon this point as follows, and every word may be applied to the objections raised to National Service:— "It may bee said, these advises will bee found not practiquable, or very difficult ; so are all great workes at first, but I conceive, if his Majesty would take it to heart, and give incouragements of honour and preferrements, to such as conforms themselves to his pleasure herein, and make this the way of advancement it would bee difficult, but if without this way honour and advancement may bee had; well may they thinke, why should they take such pain, or be at such charge, for that which may more easily bee had: And here I cannot but blame our Nation in the generall, (for I believe, the most gloriousest of our neighbours, will grant, it as valiant a Nation as is on the earth) that they should not bee more addicted to Armies, but give themselves for the most, to expensefull pleasures, altogether unserviceable for King and Countrey : whereas there is not a French Gentleman, that so soon as hee begins to write man, but learnes to ride, to use his armes on foot and horseback, and whether younger or elder brother, puts himself into some actual warre for sometime, to learns the trade of a Souldier though ho never intend to make it his profession."

Harwood's concluding words are memorable: "If . . . advancements of honour may bee had better cheape, by staying at home and following their pleasures, then will but few ever take the paines and labour, . . . all men being led either by honour, or profit, or both."