The Effect of Maritime Command on Land Campaigns since Waterloo.
By Major C. E. Callwell, R.A. (W. Blackwood.)— This book furnishes ample food for reflection. We ought, in considering the question of naval power, to concentrate our attention on the ironclad period as much as is possible ; in much the battle of the Nile is as ancient as the battle of Slays, a point often neglected. Looking again at the land forces, we can truly say that only the human body has remained anything like constant. The force which should depend to any great extent on a fleet might no doubt do valu- able service, but would hardly strike the decisive blow. The rapid movement of troops, the commissariat, the means of com- municating intelligence, all point at the present day to the need for a careful revision of the views held as to the relations between land and sea forces. The same may be said of the naval arm. The improvement of coast-defence guns, the practice of mining, the use of the torpedo, may soon make it impossible for a battle-
ship to approach a hostile shore. The very perfection of the man- of-war as a fighting instrument will concentrate the risk and the consequent responsibility. Major Callwell 3as tried to show the lesson which each modern war has taught. The vast area of his subject prevents exhaustive, if not conclusive, detail, but we should have liked him to have gone a stage further, and to have considered, in the light of the experience as a whole, the general question at greater length. To some extent he enables us to generalise, but the generalisation we have been able to make is not very definite ; perhaps the time is hardly come yet for de-R.niteness. Certainly he has clearly traced the effect of sea-command historically, and that is what his task demanded.
Previous page
