A BIGGER NAVY WHY ?
SPEAKING on the same platform as Mr. Baldwin last Saturday, Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, made a somewhat disconcerting speech, pointing to a proposed increase in naval strength. The speech is naturally read as a commentary on a report which comes from New York (uneontradicted in Whitehall} that,' in the recent talks in London with American representatives on the subject of next year's Naval Con- ference, the British have given an increased estimate of their naval requirements. When the present agreement lapses, it is added, the British Government will consider it necessary to increase the number of cruisers up to 70 for the security of Empire sea routes—a demand, it will be remembered, which was put forward at the ill-conducted and abortive Three-Power Conference at Geneva in 1927, and waived at the successful London Naval Conference three years later.
What is the cause for this suggested increase in naval expenditure, which will need much explaining both in this country and abroad ? Sir Bolton Eyres-Monsell dismissed all the efforts that have been expended at Geneva as " an international dream of disarmament," and proceeded to give some figures which are certainly impressive, and certainly show that this country has set an example of disarmament not f011owed by other countries, but which do not seem to be in the least relevant to his plea for a bigger navy. It is a fact worth stressing that Britain in the last eight years has been the only Power to show a decrease in armaments—one of 16 per cent.—in contrast with which Italy shows an increase of 9} per cent., the United States 10 per cent., Germany 12, Japan 80, France 100 and Russia 197 per cent. Failing any general movement towards disarmament, these figures give undoubted support to an argument for strengthening that part of our defences in which we are at a disadvantage. The Air Force is the obvious example: In that arm France and America each outnumbers us by two to one, and we are behind Japan, Italy and Russia. With these facts in mind the Government some time ago made it perfectly clear that if Continental coun- tries could not be induced to agree to a diminution of armaments, this country would have no alternative but to remove the disparity in air strength ; and it is common knowledge that preparations have already been made to that end.
That is a measure to which the figures quoted by Sir BoltOn Eyres-Monsell are undoubtedly relevant. We are vulnerable from the air, and in that sphere our defence craft are much outnumbered. But the huge hind and air forces of the Continent do not in any way threaten the supremacy of our fleet--which is approxi- mately equal,' under the terms of the London Agreement, to that of the United States ; is at present stronger than Japan's ; and is far stronger than that of any European Power. For what military purpose, then, and in accordance with what general policy, does the First Lord of the Admiralty declare our need for a stronger navy—for the talks with the American representatives showed that something more is intended than an expansion of programmes within the present treaty limits—?
An early explanation of these plans of expansion is called for. We do not use ships for an expeditionary force to the Rhineland nor employ battleships for pro- tecting our commerce against Chinese pirates. A naval policy and a plan of ship-building are designed to secure us against possible enemies of a known possible strength. Is this suggested increment of strength made necessary by any added danger from the. sea-forces of Europe, or is it due to the demands of Japan for parity with Britain and the United . States ? The Italian Government has decided to lay down two new 35,000 ton battleships, which will affect the relative strengths of France and Italy in the Mediterranean, whereas the French maintain that the pocket-battleships of Germany make a new demand upon her naval strength in the north. But. even if France should decide to increase her strength, states- manship is not at present called upon to imagine a combination in Europe which would expose us to danger of invasion by sea from any Continental Power. The only serious extra provision that might be needed so far as European risks are concerned is a means of countering submarine activity.
Are we, then, to look for the explanation in the attitude of Japan, and her resolve to ask for parity at the Naval Conference of next year—if there is a conference—or to adopt it on her own initiative when the London agreement expires ? The position of Japan undoubtedly presents a new problem. The Imperialist party is in the ascendant there. She is outside the. League of Nations ; she has defied the opinion of the world in Manchuria and China ; and aspires to further expansion and hegemony in the Far East. If, then, we ask for more cruisers to protect our commerce on the high seas, are we thinking of protection against a possibly aggressive Japan, and assuming that the United States Government, disturbed by her attitude, will no longer object, as it did most strenuously in 1927, against the cruiser demands of our naval experts ?
. Messages from New York indicate that America is by no means inclined to take so complaisant an attitude, or to lend herself to a policy of bluff. And supposing we assume the worst about Japan, and supposing we accept all the possibilities of danger from that direction, is a policy of competitive building the best way of dealing with it ? The supreme object of British naval policy at present should be to ensure the holding of the Naval Conference . next year, and to ensure agreement at it. What will matter at that Conference will be, not so much the size of the fleets agreed on, but their relative strengths. Bluff at this stage can do nothing but harm. If Japan is bent upon parity, no consideration of the expense that may be involved by building up to our expanded programme will deflect her. - If she is content with some other ratio, the relative strength will be the same whatever the absolute strength of each Power may be. Far the most promising way of inducing Japan to approach the Conference in a reasonable spirit and of carrying the good will of America with us is to frame our naval demands in just that spirit which we hoped to intro- duce into the Disarmament Conference at Geneva: We have reproached France for putting her demands for security in Europe too high. Are we to lay ourselves open to precisely the same charge that we are putting too high our demand for security on our sea routes ? The failure of the Disarmament Conference is essentially a European failure and need not in any way affect our capacity, without any undue risk, to continue to set an example to the world by our moderate naval programmes. That is what the people of this country expect the Government to do. That also is the policy which will enlist for us the good will of the United States, whose sea-power is not a hindrance but a support to us in maintaining the security of the high seas.
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