Good German
Anthony Nicholls
People and Politics: The Years 1960 1976 Willy Brandt (Collins £8.95).
Memoirs of post-war German politicians are not noted for their sensational character. They tend to be guarded even defensive in tone, and lightness of touch is rare. Willy Brandt does not try to start any new fashion with his latest volume, which deals mainly with foreign affairs and his role in them, first as Mayor of West Berlin, then as Foreign Minister in Bonn and finally as Federal German Chancellor. His introduction includes the ominous claim: 'I have told the truth without being indiscreet'. Five hundred pages of truthful discretion are scarcely calculated to rivet the reader to his seat. He should persevere, however. This is a book which deserves attention, and for a number of reasons.
Firstly its author is an unusually distinguished person in an age when political leaders do not always merit such a description. An anti-Nazi exile from Germany in his youth; Mayor of West Berlin in some of its most difficult years; the architect of Germany's new Ostpolitik which has largely normalised relations with her Eastern neighbours, Brandt became only the fourth German to receive the Nobel Peace Prize (the others being Stresemann, Ossietsky and that admirable pacifist, Ludwig Q uidde). Secondly, his account is illuminating about West German politics, not so much for any revelations it contains but for the way in which he sets out to justify his policies against carping critics at home. Ill particular, he is careful to document approval for his actions from foreign statesmen whose reputations are well established with the German public and whose anti-Communism cannot be denied. Predictably enough he begins with John F. Kennedy, whom he describes as an modern conservative' rather than a liberal let alone a 'socialistic' statesman. Brandt contrasts Kennedy's support for his own firm but flexible policies in Berlin with the niggling obstructionism of Adenauer's government in Bonn. The fact that KennedY himself seemed in the early 1960s to be trying to replace confrontation with the Soviet Union by a negotiated peace which, should be 'the rational end of rational men, can be seen as helping to justify Brandt s own efforts in the same direction. Kennedy is not the only American statesman cited Eisenhower and Dulles also receive favonrable mentions and there is an linPlied suggestion that they too would have approved of Brandt's pragmatism. Perhaps more remarkable is the author's patent desire to demonstrate his intimacY with President de Gaulle. He stresses that as Foreign Minister and as Chancellor he tbs.' tercd the close ties between Bonn and Paris established by his predecessors. In Par: ncular, he is at pains to present a picture 01 harmony between the two governmen.ts. over the question of his own controversial Ostpolitik. Doubtless this is designed confound his more rabid opponents in Germany who opposed any concessionsto, the East with their own peculiarly absurd type of German 'Gaullism'. Nevertheless, Brandt does seem to have enjoyed a warm and constructive relationship with his French colleagues and it is this which brings us to the third reason for paying attention to his book. Throughout this account, which covers some of the most important international events in the last two decades, the role played in his story bY Britain is remarkable for its insignificance. There were, after all, three Western Allied occupying forces in Berlin and three Allies with troops stationed in Germany. Yet when Brandt describes his reactions t° Soviet pressure or his work for detente, the governments from which he normally secTs to seek advice or concessions are those in
Washington, Paris and Moscow. On the rare occasions when the British intrude they are often importunate or unconstructive. Brandt's commitment to discretion pre vents any very clear statements about this, but at one point — having duly touched his cap to our worldwide experience and par liamentary traditions — he allows himself to Comment that `with all due respect, I found that the British are not easy partners. The loss of their role as a world power came hard to them., Of course one major cause of dif
ficulty was Britain's awkward position ViSa-ViS the Common Market. That embarrassed the Germans because they were
expected to champion the British cause even though this might damage their own carefully constructed relationship with
France. Things were not helped by the patr.°Msing attitude towards the EEC adopted
in Britain even by those who were regarded
as 'Pro-European'. It is easy to appreciate Brandt's feelings about this when one reads
his description of being received by George l'ciwn in December 1977 with the words, Willy you must get us in so we can take the lead'.
The fact is that in the 1960s too many in Britain took German goodwill for granted, as 'fit were something the British had a right to expect without having to work particularly hard to obtain it. It is striking that, although Brandt's period in office as German Foreign Minister coincided with a Labour administration in Britain, he still seems to have found it easier to work with the French rather than the British. Of course, he is very polite about it all, and refers to a network of contacts and friendships that linked him to this country. He Praises Gaitskell's efforts to create collaboration between Europe's two largest Social Democratic parties. Yet the absence of any effective 'special relationship' between Labour and the SPD remains all too 9bvious. Brandt records his unfavourable impression when he was introduced by 9aitskell at one London gathering as 'our friend from overseas', and the parochialism of British Labour was reflected again in subsequent Common Market debates. Apart from a predictable but brief plaudit for `the admirable Roy Jenkins' Brandt's °My convincingly warm comments on a British statesman are reserved for Edward Heath. He at least was a clearly committed Europ,---an who seemed to know where he was going. One hopes that British political attitudes to Germany have changed in the last few Years, and that we are now less self Portant and less patronising. If so, Brandt himself should take some of the credit; he Was certainly the most popular German Chancellor as far as the British public was Concerned. Yet when one surveys the two major parties in this country, with their continuing disinterest in Europe and their !recurrent nostalgia for superannuated Issues, one wonders whether future German memoirs will give Britain even as much space as this volume does.