SEA-POWER AND THE FUTURE.* THE reader who sees magic in
the phrase " Two-Power Standard" will derive comfort from the earlier portion of Mr. Fiennes' most interesting book. There is shown to be little need for apprehension at present lest the British Navy should fall short of the Two-Power standard. Nevertheless the reader's satisfaction is short-lived. The comfortable feeling has hardly time to assert itself before it is rudely, checked by an attempt to show that our Navy, strong as it is is by no means strong enough. Lord Morley has said that "it is better to bear the burden of impracticableness than to stifle conviction." Mr. Fiennes very evidently agrees. There is no compromise about him. He comes, indeed, to the conclusion that our Imperial requirements demand for our Navy some- thing more like a Four-Power than a Two-Power standard of strength.
The comparative strength of naval forces is not to be gauged by a mere counting of keels. In this book the test of actual battle strengthis applied so far as possible—gun- power, weight of broadside, amount of protection, speed, being closely and fully considered. The results are set out with admirable clearness in a series of tables. On this show- ing the British Home Fleet, with the first, second, and third Cruiser Squadrons, appears twice as strong as the whole German fleet, while the Mediterranean and Atlantic Fleets, with the fourth, fifth, and sixth Cruiser Squadrons, are almost equal to the combined Austrian and Italian navies. So much for the Triple Alliance. Again, the British Navy is shown to have a very large preponderance over the combined German and French fleets, and to have a reasonable—though by no means wide—margin of superiority over the fleets of the United States and of Germany taken together.
The review of our position in relation to Germany is clearly stated. The dangers of invasion and of the "bolt from the blue " are relegated to their due position far down the scale of probabilities. On the other hand, the dangers arising out of Germany's natural desire for free access to the ocean are not minimized. Mr. Fiennes does not anticipate a Franco-German conflict, nor does he attach much weight to the theories of German designs upon Holland or Belgium. " It is through Denmark," he says, " that our danger lies." The absorption of Denmark, by conquest or by treaty, would not only "make of the Baltic a true German mare clausum," but would give to Germany the use of the Faroe Islands and of Iceland, whence she "would turn our flank and free herself from the limitations imposed by the breakwater of the British Islands." This part of the argu- ment is not altogether convincing. Such things as the great German camp at Elaenborn and the military preparations on the railway to and beyond Malmedy cannot be dismissed as being without significance. Moreover, how is Great Britain to uphold Danish independence by force P "In 1864," we read, " we grossly failed in the performance of our duty." Surely the fact is that, being without allies and without adequate force for effective intervention on land, Lord Palmerston's Government was powerless. Are we relatively more powerful now P From European we turn to world politics, with special re- ference to the situation in the Pacific. This part of the subject, which is of vital import to the Empire, is as ably dealt with as it is interesting. It is assumed, indeed—thus proving once more the dangers of prophecy—that the Anglo-
• The Ocean Empire. By Gerard Fiennes. London A. Treherne and Co. [6a. net.] Japanese Alliance must finally lapse in 1915. Yet, despite its renewal, we may find ourselves before long obliged to maintain an Imperial fleet in the Pacific. Mr. Fiennes foresees an eventual conflict between Japan and the United States for the mastery of the Pacific, and he does not anticipate the victory of the Americans. In any case the British Dominions will assuredly not be on the side of Japan, 'whatever be the state of Anglo-Japanese relations. It is one of the gravest of the problems which confront the British Empire that, so far as the politics of the Pacific are concerned, Canadian and Australian sentiment is represented rather by the policy of the United States than by that of Great Britain. As the situation develops, a redistribution of our naval forces would seem almost inevitable; and there is reason to believe that the prospect of a consequent diminution of our strength in European waters already enters into the German calculations.
The conclusion reached is that it will be necessary to main- tain Imperial forces fully able to cope with the Triple Alliance in the " pelagic " sphere, while simultaneously exerting in the "oceanic " sphere an influence proportionate to our Imperial responsibilities. On this basis, and after examining the building programmes of our potential adversaries, Mr. Fiennes demands at least twenty-nine Dreadnoughts and Invincibles in the next three years. This seems indeed a counsel of per- fection. It is suggested that India and the Dominions should bear some of this great burden; but certainly the attitude of the latter in regard to questions of Imperial policy and Imperial defence hardly gives groundfor hope thatthey would respond to an appeal to do more than they have already undertaken. The renewal and modification of the Japanese Treaty introduces a new factor, it is true; though the treatyas it stands will not solve our Imperial difficulties, caused by our lack of representation in the Pacific, if the Dominions should be actively on the side of the United States in the event of a Japanese-American War.
Mr. Fiennes is at his best when discussing the situation as it is. Even if we cannot give unqualified support to his con- clusions, his admirable presentation of the facts upon which those conclusions are based calls for nothing but commenda- tion. All who are interested in Imperial and naval questions will find it well worth while to read and to consider the pro- blems which confront the British Empire as set out in this book.
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