NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
Sta,—Will you allow me to express the views of an ordinary French citizen concerning the North-African situation? I- consider that the very simple issues involved have been confused by not keeping in mind the basic principle for which the United Nations are fighting, i.e., the deliverance of the world from the spirit and doctrine of Hitlerism, not- withstanding the status and nationality of the representatives of this spirit and doctrine. Acting on this principle alone several conclusions may be drawn which, in my view, are helpful in placing the North African policy of the United Nations on a sounder foundation than it actually appears to be 1. " Was the American administration right in believing that it could work in co-operation with men who even in Vichy and by methods different from those of the Fighting French were aiming at the common goal? " as Monsieur Maillaud puts it in his article published in your ishet of January 22nd.
I think the answer is no, because this policy led the State Department to compromise with men who, while they may perhaps be willing to fight the German invader, want above all to maintain a political system depriving the French nation of its liberties and freedom. No temporary advantages, military or otherwise, are important enough to justify this abandon of the ideological basis of the struggle of the European peoples for their internal and external freedom.
2. Is General de Gaulle simply a military leader, or is he symbolic of the will of the French nation to regain its liberties by continuing the fight on the side of the Allies? Here I should like to say: General de Gaulle is not a military leader in the accepted sense of the word. On the one hand, when he stated, on June 18th, 194o, his faith in the ultimate outcome of the war and the desire of the French nation to continue the fight, with Great Britain its ally, he made a political and not a military decision. In this way he be- came the political leader of all those Frenchmen and women who could not and would not accept Petain's policy of capitulation in the military and in the ideological sense. On the other hand, General de Gaulle's military contribution was symbolic of this non-acceptance. But the greatest significance must be attached to his political influence, which was one of the 'decisive factors in the attitude of resistance of France to Germany and Vichy. General de Gaulle declared his intention not only of fighting the Germans but also of restoring the constitutional liberties of the French people. On this basis a tacit agreement exists between the French people and de Gaulle by which he is the acknowledged leader of the vast majority of Frenchmen who offer resistance to Germany and to Vichy. No declaration by the Allies that General de Gaulle is merely a general and nought else will change this political reality. 3. Could General de Gaulle be replaced by another military leader of outstanding merits?
The answer is no. In fact, no other leader of any kind has any political influence in France, for the present moment.
4. Should the Allies expect the French nation to fight without being adequately represented by a provisional " trustee " in the Allied councils?
I say no again, because France wants to be certain that her participation in the war is a guarantee that her liberties will be restored and her interests be defended. There seems, moreover, to be no valid reason why the Allies should deny to France the political representation they so liberally granted to the Czechs and the Poles during the last war.
5. Does General Giraud's slogan: " 3e fais la guerre, je ne m'occupe pas de politique" really mean what it seems to say?
Here again the answer is in the negative. War is above all a political act. A war without political background and aims is a " non-sens." Besides, by leaving the Vichy administration in power in North Africa the Allies, and General Giraud, have apparently taken sides with Vichy, contrary to their principles of political freedom. This may not have been their intention, but it is in this way that public opinion in Europe has interpreted their attitude.
6. Finally, can "military expediency" justify even the temporary abandon of the basic principle for which we are fighting?
The answer is no again, because the peoples of Europe are not concerned with military expediency, but with their freedom, and because they will fight only if they feel that their liberties will be restored and maintained. Only clear-cut issues will satisfy them. " Military expediency " may well be a grave handicap for the winning of the. war, and of the peace.—Believe
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