Setback in Indo-China
What has gone wrong in Indo-China ? The situation is probably not quite so serious as the communiques imply, for these are couched in terms of formal optimism which are calcu- lated to spread nothing but gloom. One of the lessons of the last war, which we have by now all surely learned, is that a retreat is a retreat and not a consolidation or the abandonment of useless outposts. When General de Lattre de Tassigny took over the supreme military and civil commands in Indo-China a year ago his first task was to prevent the Communist forces from sweeping down the Red River valley and capturing Haiphong. He managed to succeed in this task; and today it tends to look much easier than it really was simply because he was successful. But the most valuable contribution made by the General to the Indo-Chinese scene was his aggressive certainty that the arms of France and her allies were destined for victory. It was always to be feared that, if his forceful personality was removed, this spirit would atrophy. The aban- donment of the outpost town of Hoa-Binh, even though it was accomplished with few casualties, can only have a depressing effect among those whose state of mind is most important— the French and Viet-Namese troops actually fighting in Indo- China. Under General de Lattre their ambition was at least to recover the posts along the Chinese frontier which had been abandoned in September, 1950. Now they are being offered the perhaps more reasonable but less glorious prospect of a negotiated peace. There has always been a strong body of opinion, including many of the present Government's sup- porters, who have been in favour of this course. A cease-fire, the exchange of hostages, and elections under U.N. auspices were urged by a prominent group of non-Communists in December, 1949. This approach offers even less hope of peace with honour than it did two years ago, but the number of Frenchmen who hanker after it has probably increased.
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