Nazi and gentleman
Maurice Buckmaster
Canaris Andre Brissaud (Weidenfeld and Nicholson E4.95)
Revival of interest in the arcana of the second world war, manifest in the crop of new historical studies and evaluations—some of them fair, many of them biased by the advantage of hindsight — leads one to the conclusion that the post-war generation seeks to profit by the errors of the past in dealing with the perils of today. I can't help detecting a certain naivety in the mass of war-time memories and this same naivety can be detected in Brissaud's highly complimentary appreciation of his hero.
The life of Admiral Canaris has evidently been meticulously researched by the author. To the older generation his history is perhaps particularly interesting in the further light that it throws on the well-known schism between the Abwehr (the official German secret service) and the Schutz-SE-affel, or SS, military police, together with the Gestapo. Even if one mistrusts his complete accuracy in reporting conversations, the authors of which are no longer alive to substantiate them, it appears incontrovertible that Canaris was engaged in fighting a slow but inevitably losing battle against Hitler and his Nazi circle. To me, the astonishing aspect of this is the very slowness With which Hitler and his close friends reacted to the Canaris campaign. Andre Brissaud hints that Himmler hesitated to strike because of information in Canaris's possession which would have gravely• incriminated him — in other words, that Canaris was blackmailing Hitler's right-hand man. Of this there is no definite proof, but in war-time Germany any suspicion that a man in Hitler's confidence was of Jewish blood was a potentially powerful weapon. Canaris was adroit enough to stake everything on this fact.
It is certain that Canaris and his Abwehr associates, mostly men of very good family and connections, sought — sometimes unavailingly but more often effectively — to shield men of his Service and other contacts from the brutality of the SS. Brissaud is at pains to emphasise that Canaris was at all times inspired by pure patriotism for his country, which he thought Hitler was leading to destruction — as indeed was the case. Brissaud's arguments are logically set out and he takes trouble to adduce proof, or what appears as proof, of this theory. It all seems a bit too good to be true. Certainly Canaris upheld the ideals of chivalry in combat, even to the extent of protecting his contacts, who might seem to be guilty of treason to the FUhrer. In occupied France the race was always between the Abwehr and the Gestapo to seize /killed agents. Our British agents knew well that if they were apprehended by the Abwehr they would at least be treated with humanity, whereas capture by the Gestapo involved almost certain torture, degradation and death.
Hitler expressed the ambition that the German secret police should be at least as efficient as the British and insisted that Canaris should 'make it so. Canaris, on his side, thought that "the Intelligence Service is the domain of gentlemen and amateurs."
Many of the intrigues, both on the part of Canaris and of his detractors, remind one irresistibly of the Watergate affair. Files and tapes were conveniently "lost" — incriminating documents locked in safe deposits in neutral countries — strident declarations of loyalty rather too shrill to be credible — all these have undertones — in some cases overtones — of the current American imbroglio. "In the Abwehr offices Admiral Canaris had intimate friends and confidential friends"• • writes Brissaud. The intimate friends knew of the Admiral's peccadilloes, and -kept them to themselves; the confidential friends only knew that Canaris and Himmler were at loggerheads and took care not to know why. "His intellect angl personality were complicated.. . . he was not a simple man." Indeed Canaris was devious to a degree and the picture of him which one derives from this book is of a man haunted by conscience, hating Hitler, hating his personality, his system, his methods, but dodging from one predicament to another, aided by his quick wits and subtlety. At the outset of the war 'and for several years before that, Canaris was concerned with protecting his own service against the Gestapo. When he faced the reality of Gestapo brutality he found himself in the position of having to resign his office, leaving it to Himmler or Heydrick's mercy, or to soldier on, temporising and playing his trump cards with masterly reserve. It must have been galling for him to find that, owing to the mistrust and lack of communication between the Abwehr and the generals, his warnings, based on intelligence gleaned by his many agents, were generally neglected. The German High Command, however, was not the only one which spurned its secret service's advice. Canaris, having given warning of the Allied invasion of North Africa and having had his premonitions set aside as nonsensical, was in no position to say "I told you so" after the landings had taken place. Canaris was a gifted actor — he had to be if he was to remain in his post as long as he did. When finally, at a desperate moment in Germany's history, he realised that the game was up, he went to his death 'bravelybefitted a sailor and a gentleman.
In assessing Canaris's character from what we read of him in this book,1 am continually amazed by the contrasts that stand out. His loyalty to his staff .(and theirs to him), his patience, his humanity, even his love of animals, are balanced by his inward reserves (which his enemies might term duplicity). He was essentially a lonely man, without warmth of personality, without charisma, but his close associates clearly loved him and regarded him as their heroic champion and defender. Was Canaris a secret agent of the Allies? It is a question that has frequently been asked.
Were his successful efforts to discourage Franco's Spain from entering the war dictated by directives from London? It was quite clear from Brissaud's account that Canaris thought he was acting in the long-term interests of his country in taking this stand. One can guess that Hitler's insistence that Franco should fight with the Axis powers was a futher incentive to Canaris to take the opposite line. In the case of Spain, Canaris won the argument, helped by many clandestine meetings with Franco and his circle; but in urging the German High Command not to engage in war with Russia, Canaris was overruled. For him it was the beginning of the end. The undeclared war between him and Hitler, publicly disavowed by both, but still very apparent, could only have one outcome. Although he steadfastly refused to be drawn into any plot to kill the Fuhrer — he claimed to regard murder as an unforgivable sin — he was well aware of the several unsuccessful attempts made on Hitler's life, but could never be inculpated personally. It is strange that this small white-haired naval officer should have made such a impact on history; it is still stranger that in a totalitarian state he should have been permitted to do so.
Colonel Buckmaster was in command of the French section of SOE, from 1941 to 1945.
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