NEWS OF THE WEEK.
THE proceedin4s of the lost week in the French Chamber of De- puties are of %cry considerable moment. The Ministry, if it be not in minority in the Chainber, at least possesses no assured ma- jority, and seems to he tottering towards its full. There has been, on the other hand, the mo.rt perfect combination and concert among the various sections of the Opposition—Doctrinaires, Centre Gauche, Gauche, and Extreme Gauche.
For the Presidency of the Chamber, (in France • this appoint- ment is made afresh at the beginning of every session,) the 31i- nistry employed ell their influence to carry the reelection of 31. Dill. E1111`01.1-et: at nannber of the Centre Gauche. sekcted as the cao 1i :or or the Opposition. No candidate
calif be elected unless h.• iii• f;tvour It number of votes en-
eert1ing one-halt" e; 1,•esetit. 'lion ineffectual ballots took place withow;`.Mitt_; this relnired absolute majority to any one. On the third was eli..eted by a number of
votes just sufficient to him the absolute majority, and no
more ; and what is Of sti:i :greater importance, the number or
in ffivour his rival 1. Pussy was scarcely inferior, being
1S.1. This I - more remarkable as an evidence of
;1 rt present eeoet ; .. eig the Opposition.
Ol• tae four Viee-1',.•-.1.:..Its of the Chamber, three are members of the Centre Ganehe. ,e2 1 by considerable majorities in appo. t.) other M1niste,i•.1 candidates : the fourth is a 3linisteeh.l
entire, chosen to the :ection of M. 01)1 7.1;,N 1 Ivaliou, the !er of the Gauche :•• of the Opposition. But the third tnlyen. . • gain...1 by the Opposition is still more ,t. The Comin-: I eiet•1 mbers. appointed to pre-
. 1.1e• addre-s in ivisn....• speech, consist:- of si),, ;:,ptr.1,:on mentligits three Ministceinlists. la firming ofmnission, one liet•e,••• )r is chosen by 7111(1 out or earl( of the Bureaux into Milli :Li Cle Chamber is divided, by lot, at the fee:inning. of every session. It becomes thus certain, that the form of 1)•1(1,e)ss originally pron. ir the atloption of the Chamber will 44.' a decisive ..-knti-:.linsterittleletrecter; and the Ministers will lye not upon the ncressize , amendieg it or causing its rejeetion. the general impression in Paris s. nee, to be, that these events nre!:. the impending till of the Ministry. But both the King :.:. C aunt MoLii are dispnsed to try- their chance on the address; and in a body s dm:it-ening and so open to influenee as the Ft.ench Chamber—. 1). f0 . it is by no means impossible that they may yet proem. .• r arity to repudiate ally address Of obso-
lete censure 11111 ::vent it they should be so tiff sneer,- . ioWnqcr, w.„ • they can carry on• the goycT1,-
Pwnt in their pr. ot s• at weakness, and in the lace of au
exasperated Opp ,it ion e but equal in numbers.
T1,e chief be.ei of • between the various sections of the 1.emonition, cons-us :11 tr. :r common aotivehy to this :Ministry.
er rather to t': sysn m which it ref presents. of the personal
Anipotenee Of !en-e- PPE. During the eight Years which
e elapsed s!e, ;!. ‘Itition of July, the Citizen king itscontrived . • cheat, to alienate,.and to disgreve.
every person of tali. ..; • .oinence whom he has taken into his s-rrice. 'file present 311:1 t.es suit his purpose as pliant instruments. and are only the more ;ter •table to him as they possess no personal weight or ascendancy.. l'1:101' in the Chamber or out of it, inde-
pendent of their position his Cabinet. 1 le is himselfthe Minister, the governing and dgtermining person : the present Cabinet are mere
functionaries of detail, clerks or secretaries for carrying his orders into effect. This is a matter well understood both by Ministerial- ists and members of' the Opposition ; and it is against such over- weening personal interference on the part of the King that the pre-cat combined attack of the Opposition is directed. Whether they will succeed or not, remains to be proved. For our parts, we very much doubt it. It will be found far easier to dislodge the Ministry' of Count Moll, than to transform the over- [LATEST EDITION.] ruling dictation of LocIs l'iniaren into a government of :Ministers, chosen by him, but determining tbr themselves and responsible only to the Cliamber. It will cost the King of the French nothing to dismiss his present Ministers, as soon as he imagines that his posi- tion will be embarrassed by the utliirt to maintain them ; but we arc much mistaken it' he would not as readily resign his throne as consent to abm:gate his habits of personal supremacy and manage- ment. Nor do we expect that be .rill surrender this vital point unless under the terror of some combination much more formida- ble than that which exists in the Chamber at present. It is quite possible that he may be compelled to yield his own opinion tat' certain special points of foreign and donarstie policy.: it is possible that he may be induced to govern with greeter appearance of deference to his 31inisters, so as not to degrade and humiliate them ill a way which men of elnillellt reputation Will not submit to. But we prophesy, that so long as the sceptre remains in his hands, the real farce and authority will remain there also ; and the 31inisters of Louts humeri; will continue to be ill reality. what the Ministers of the English Crown politely profess to be to their King, his adrisers and nothing more.
The Opposition journalists in Paris insist earnestly on the ne-
cessity of realizing the maxims of temstitutional government, and of contining the ling of the French to a range ofpers,ned int rference no greater than that NVilich is exercised by. the Kings of Engiand.. They do not seem to have attentirely weerk the' circumstances which distinguish the two countries. Ill England.. the power of the central Executive Coverament has ahvays (:It least -ince the middle of the seventeenth etmtury) been comparatively small—that oldie aristocracy preponderant anti t,•terwhehri,:,;. It has suited
the parpose of our aristoera...;.• eireumscribe the regal authority
within its present limit... es Inc• avid a09;tice theie own dt,utiuiun. The limitation ia.s :accomplished either by the potpie. or for the people : hut by. „in, arisiom euy. and foe the ;Iris- natl.:icy. :Moreovea . we ti ..:.twiunher even r, wayaiti !ileac been able to amomplisl, iCthey inei oat been fte
eceidental ciretusistaeees E• _lash Crovna n l'it•,I 760, During that period. the :lee 1:J:A (e: • female of ieiV slender capaeit v, and three :1.r:rig:, rs.-- - • d. a man of undoubted ability. bu ; chietiy anxioa: ...1, at • 11;eeign
wartitre ; the tr.-0 firs; (1 1:0.: .;:s. 111(11 neitinr •)• :•1', alai seareel; en tl.e.• • .; _eater of tin. toemetin • *Und.rr ,(1,11 the Cron it letitiriti!y- under tile tutel..gr of the crem;...• and inunagers ; from which Getiata: the Thio....„ em....,elesenient of ids reign, matle it raint elfort to esten.,•. 1 , ::11C111-111 laay L sea n in L\ • -.' • ■,..• ' publisinqi in 17. •1 it the 1,1,11,1:1 N‘ :nry.
reytes ! -rine; a •,./ (h. we ;..1t;.- so ••• of•
call Is.) .-.• :wen :•1
Exectift..- .•., .1.: no ecise.tneti whatever Ill t.a..1, able ;ma.:
to play his own . is this the at ;lint
state of affairs In 11:. i. i ailitirs t.1.1
Frenchmen of all partie ;t ) d -hi 11 in. how-
eyer.they ran "Ibre
desire that t`)eir govere: „ .1 .11 : .,itt they tireinr still
more that it shall be greet-- : at !.11 greater ai aseni- something to talk of. . of. ;le Last is tile feeling- :unto(_ ... 1.......11 •\rho think
the :te of is
at all ;them their g.,,v m
pass.lye aeonicseele.o mere! ee.ree it
is established. II.- mecoiellarny not is Palm arr. ereors not less front his having failed to furnish the nation wi:11 any thing to leitnire. than from Lis 1.... her vilate•I Ill! those liberal promises were made by hineet.,•111111 his spons,e‘ in Aegust
The French Olipositi(91 indulge the that they will be able
to bring 1.11t-is 1'1111A00E into the -ante state of subordirattion iu regard to the French Cliamb,:r th....y add erne With regard to the Crown and the Parliament in England. here. agaIn, we do not think that they have ealculmed the condi:liars of the= prb-. !dem. The French Chamber. as now constituted, can never be made to exercise the same full asem; limey in France as t!:e 'use . of Coli.11toils excecntcs in England. Our House of (!omniolis both; is maw, and always has berm. the creature as well as the org:in of the English aristocracy. It does not re-pre-:Lot the pimp!: at 1ar,g4; it represents sonn:thing greater than the people—that ariseieratical-
colossus under whose huge leis the peopl alctsys been con- demned.to creep. French Chant invimr, no pre-
scriptive claim to the respect of the di y, is as tat' from representing the people a HOW. t' Com- 111005 : it represents a body of lts olcotors,—tlie .althiest persons indeed in the country, but Ittrailag ,scarcelf c least
ascendancy over the remaining pope moreover, tlieintluence
of the Executive Government over the elections is prodigious, and there is no other influence to contend with it.
Were it not for the protection of the ballot, the Executive Go- vernment in France would probably return two-thirds of the Chamber ; and even as it is, the smallness of most of the con- stituencies, unequally distributed as they are, and many of them not comprising more than h50 voters—coupled with the unbounded fund of patronage and promotion, of favour and annoyance, in the hands of the Government—enables them to a great degree to nullify the ballot in practice. If it be intended that the French Chamber should ever become the primary and ruling power in the state, it must first be made to represent the people : for France differs from England in this material respect—that there are no other sources of power except the Executive Government and the people at large. It may of course be asked, If the French Chamber lacks power as against the Executive on account of the badness of the repre- sentative system, may not the system be amended so as to supply this deficiency ? We reply, that it may be amended, and ought to be amended : and if we saw that this was the course taken by the leaders of the French Opposition at present—if we saw that they were anxious to find means of strengthening the Chamber from without—we should have greater hopes of their success in the attempt to render it a match fir the Executive. But we know perfectly well that they will neither propose nor support any such alteration. There is indeed a certain proportion of the Opposition, amounting perhaps to one-fifth of the whole—the Extreme Gauche, and a portion of the Gauche or partisans of M. Outt.t.oN limtao.r- who are ashamed of the present narrow basis and defective arrange- ment of their representative system, and are anxious to enlarge and amend it : and the very considerable success which has attended the petition for electoral reform, now circulating through France, is a proof that the importance of the subject is becoming more and more deeply felt. But the large majority of the present Opposition will be found, we apprehend, decidedly hostile to electoral re- form—at least to electoral reform of any such kind as to pro- duce extensive effects. In the whole Chamber there cannot be found a more thorough enemy of electoral reform than M. Guizor, now one of the chiefs of the Opposition, and the admirer and eulogist of the English aristocracy. N. 'PRIERS, the leader of the Centre Gauche, though less heartily anti-popular titan M. GUIZOT, was a defender of the hereditary peerage in 1831, and is well known to be disinclined towards any serious electoral retUrnt. And if' the choice were offered to the present Opposition in the French Chamber, between a representative Chamber fully and fairly elected by the people on one side, and the personal government of the king on the other—even carried to an extent much beyond what it is at present—we suspect that four-fifths of them would prefer the latter as the less evil of the two. In a country like France, where the very idea of social or civil privileges is abhorred, it is re- markable to observe how the principle of reserving political time- tions as the special privilege of a few is still clung to, and how the dread of interference by the mass of the people, even in the way of election, is still paramount in the minds of professing Liberals. Louts PHILIPPE knows this well ; and one of' the most adroit stratagems of his Machiavelian government has consisted in turning to account the political alarms prevalent around hint. lie will of course be encouraged to cling the more tenaciously to that which he considers as his personal prerogative, from the knowledge that even the majority of the Opposition are averse to the only step which could enable them to wrest it front him.
For the reasons just given, we do not think that the French Opposition will succeed in their design of transforming the Execu- tive of France front a government by the King into a government by the King's Ministers as it is in England. The constitutional doctrine, that the King ought to "reign " but not to " govern," may serve as a rallying-cry fOr the overthrow of the present Minis- try ; but when this minor object shall have been accomplished, as it probably soon will, and when M. GUIZOT and M. TRIERS shall be seated on the Ministerial bench, we apprehend that the importance of the maxim will no longer be extolled by the Doctrinaires and by the Centre Gauche as it is at present. Louis PHILIPPE will still continue the supreme director of affairs ; but the Chamber will have taught him that he must pay them the compliment of choosing as Ministers men of talent and ascendancy among their body ; and he will be obliged to treat these Ministers with a suffi- cient degree of respect and deference to make them contented with their position.
Assuming a change of Ministry to he now impending in France, is it likely to lead to any change of policy, either domestic or foreign ?
In respect to domestic policy, we do not see that any change of consequence is likely to arise from the accession of M. Guizor or M. Tumits, either or both of them, to the Ministry. The measure of both these statesmen has been taken. Both have been Minis- ters, and assuredly neither of them has deserved the gratitude or admiration of France in that capacity. The Ministry of M. GUIZOT was indeed the most tyrannical and repressive which has been known in France for the -last twenty years ; and the severity of the measures proposed was even surpassed by the harshness of the doctrines with which their author defended them at the tribune. In fact, the administration of Count Moil has been a decided
cussion, one of the most odious propositions of the Doctrinaire Ministry, have ceased to find favour in the eyes of' their authors.
Much has been said by the various Opposition journals respect- ing the extreme and exorbitant corruption practised by the Minis- try of Count Moil : and if we could trust the indignant language in which such proceedings are now denounced, we should conclude that a better sera was at hand. But the real circumstances of the case forbid any such confidence. We know that corruption was practised to a prodigious extent during the Ministry both of M. GUIZOT and of M. TRIERS. We are told, indeed, that the quantity of corruption has been increased under that of Count Moil,— though of this no very satisfactory proof has been offered : but admitting the fact that there has been a change for the worse in degree, what chance is there of any amendment in system and principlele ? There will exist under the Ministry which will succeed, as great a fund for corruption and intimidation as exists now : the electoral body will continue unaltered : who will bid us rely on the political purity of M. GlIZOT or M. TRIERS as an efficient anti- septic ? But though we think that any alteration of the French Ministry which is at present likely to ensue, will do nothing to amend the internal government of *France, we cannot but sec the probas bility of an alteration in her external policy. This is a point upon which all the fractions of' the Opposition are unanimous. There is but one voice in denouncing the evacuation of An- cona, the menaces against Switzerland last August, the de- sertion of Belgium on the question of Limburg and Luxemburg, and the general subservience of Louis PHILIPPE towards the Despotic Powers of Europe. Now the matters of Ancona and Switzerland are past, and nothing more can be done except to cen- sure what has been already done by the Ministry. But the policy of France admits of being altered for the future both with respect to Spain and with respect to Belgium ; and the Belgian question, especially, is at this moment approaching to that period of crisis in which the determination of the French Government will make incalculable difference as to the result. The Conference of the Great Powers in London have determined that Limburg and Lux- emburg shall be peremptsrily handed over to the King of Hol- land: the official notification of this their final resolve to the Bel- gian Government appears to have been postponed f'or a short time, at the instance of Louis Puuscrs; but the period for carrying it into execution will very soon arrive. The repugnance both of the population of these two provinces add of the entire Belgian people to this separation, is well known to be most intense ; nor is it pos- sible that the transfer can be effected without a very considerable display, and a partial application at the least, of the Prussian and Germanic military force : even if the French Government conti- nued to hold aloof as it has hitherto done, the entrance of the Prussian troops into the territory of Luxemburg would produce a powerful sympathy and excitation in the frontier departments of France ; but if the Belgian Government is left destitute of any foreign support, its resistance to the decrees of the Conference could not be long protracted. Suppose the French Government disposed to lend assistance to Belgium in the struggle, then the whole complexion of the ease is altered. The decrees of the Con- figence could not then be executed without a war. Suppose even that the French Goverment, feeling itself precluded, by its own previous acts, front any open opposition to the transfer of Limburg and Luxemburg, should merely display sympathy under- hand for the resistance, and encourage its own subjects to aid as volunteers : even this would be quite sufficient to prolong the resistance of the Belgians, and to render the maintenance of peace between France and Prussia precarious. Now in the present temper of the French Opposition and the French public, we doubt whether any new Ministry which is formed at Paris could sit still and permit the Prussian troops to enter Limburg and Luxemburg, to besiege the fortress of Venloo, and to put down the resistance offered by the Belgians. If M. VIZOT and M. THIERS carry the Cabinet by storm, we do not see what other concessions they will be able to make, except in regard to foreign policy, to the sentiments of their present allies of the Gauche and the Extreme Gauche, by whose support they will have been forced into power : for unless these two sections of the coalition entirely abandon their principles, they will be placed in the same state of hostility, on all questions of internal policy to a Ministry of GUIZOT and Tnisns, as they are now to the Ministry of Count Moil. We only hope that they will adhere to their principles on questions of internal policy ; and that the storm- ing of the Cabinet by the united sections of the French Oppo- sition, may not lead to the same consequences in France, as the expulsion of Sir ROBERT PEEL, under somewhat analogous cir- cumstances, has produced in England—the sucking up of all Radi- calism by the Whigs, under pretence of maintaining union among the party ; and the extinction of all real and material difference between the Whigs and the Tories.
We await with much interest the debates on the address in the French Chamber, since it is upon these that the possible continu- ance of the present Ministry for a short time longer, or the nature of the modifications which it must undergo, will in a great measure depend. The present juncture will administer a galling lesson to LOUIS PIIIIIPPE, that he cannot safely alienate from him all the men of talent and influence in the Chamber at one and the same time—that he must take one of them at least into his pay to assist him in combating the remainder.