THE FUTURE IN EUROPE
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
[Correspondents are requested to keep their letters as brief as is reasonably possible. Signed letters are given a preference over those bearing a pseudonym, and the latter must be accompanied by the name and address of the author, which will be treated as confidential.—Ed. THE SPECTATOR] [To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR] SIR,—The immediate emotional effects of the crisis have worn off. We have a breathing-space to reconsider our position. Most people believe that the Munich " Agree- ment " is the most important diplomatic event since the War ; the difference of opinion lies in its effects.
In this country it means that we have returned to secret diplomacy : our intentions must be hidden from our enemies, and this entails hiding them from the electorate at home. We seem to be more successful in hoodwinking our own people than the enemy. Nobody, except apparently von Ribbentrop, knew that we were prepared to allow large portions of Czech territory to be handed over to Germany. It would never have been accepted by public opinion in this country except in the form of a fait accompli and obscured by the relief at having avoided war. This was the price which Mr. Chamberlain had to pay for the " four man con- ference," which he and Signor Mussolini so earnestly desired.
It is a little early to see exactly what the balance-sheet of Munich denotes. But it clearly means that Germany has become the dominant power on the mainland of Europe. Italy has lost what hope she had of rivalling Germany on the Danube, France has lost at a blow the whole of her system of alliances designed to protect herself from German ambitions. We must be weakened by the weakness of France; that this is apparent to the Government is clear from the immediate call for more and more armaments. The increase in the strength of the potential war-maker is a danger to all, for peace in Europe is indivisible. We have lost prestige, we shall lose trade in Eastern Europe. Against this we set peace and another of Hitler's promises. The Opposition say, as do the Czechs, that there would have been no war if we had been more determined, and used the language which the Nazis understand, Mr. Chamberlain refused to take the risk. He has another, and he believes a better, method. He trusts that the Drang nach osten will absorb all Germany's energies and ambitions, and that it may eventually entangle her with Soviet Russia ; and what could suit his book better than a long and mutually weakening war between Germany and Russia ? Possibly, too, the internal policy of Germany may change. The army, which does not like the Austrian corporal but realises that his methods have been beneficial to them as well as unbelievably successful, may consider that the time has come to overthrow him. Army control and a return to a less spectacular foreign policy would probably mean a rather longer interval of peace during which the army chiefs would make the army completely invincible. But there is no reason to suppose that the ambition of the German military caste is less dangerous than Hitler's. The Brest Litovsk Treaty gives an idea of what those ambi- tions are.
How likely is Germany to fight a war with Russia rather than attack France ? Mein Kampf has only one fault as a guide-book : it has no time-table attached. It don not say whether France is to be smashed before, or after, taking the Ukraine from Russia. He will presumably do all in his power to separate Russia and France, playing for all he is worth on Bolshevik-phobia in France and England. He will then decide which of his two enemies is the weaker. If he had Italian aid, or even neutrality, he could overwhelm France before Great Britain or the United States could help effectively. Mussolini is therefore the key to this problem. A defensive alliance between Italy, France and England might induce Hitler to bash his head against Russia.
Mussolini is therefore in an extraordinarily fine blackmailing position. Hitler and both France and England appear to need his help. A policy of blackmail is unlikely to work with Hitler, but it has apparently unlimited possibilities where the Western democracies are concerned. If allowed to, he will raise the price of his friendship after each concession, and when our ability, or inclination, to give away_ other peoples', territory is at an end, he is no more likely to help us against Germany, unless we are certain of winning, than he is now. It is not therefore a solution of the problem to allow Mussolini a free hand in Spain. He may use it to help Germany against France. The effective way to ensure that Spain is anti-Nazi is to allow the Government to win by supplying them with arms. A victory for democracy in Spain would be the first real check which Fascism has received, and might have far-. reaching consequences. Similarly the most effective way to obtain Mussolini's friendship is to accentuate his differences with Germany and show him that we really mean business.
Even with Spain hostile and Italy neutral, as she must be to begin with, the balance of probabilities seems to point to a German attack on France rather than Russia. But suppose we formed a Franco-Anglo-Russian defensive alliance, would Hitler even now risk a war against this coalition ? Of course this is power politics, but since the League system has been broken down we must perforce return to it. True, it would be a precarious peace based on a balance of power, with alternatives of German bankruptcy and revolution or war. To refuse to accept these realities and to sacrifice our potential allies while weakening our only actual one seems to be the present policy. Its only basis is the ignominious hope that the scattered and to a great extent defenceless British Empire will not be attacked by any of the three robber Powers as long as we are polite to them and while there are other and weaker countries about. Unfortunately their supply is limited, and while this policy may produce " peace " in Mr. Chamberlain's lifetime, it must almost inevitably produce a peculiarly bloody war in the not too distant future. If young men appear to be " ungrateful " to Mr. Chamberlain, as vast numbers of them are, it is because they believe he has sacrificed their ideals for the shadow of an unreal peace.—Yours, &c.,
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