TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUMANIA AND VERDUN.
THAT the military situation in Rumania is a cause of deep disappointment and of no little anxiety must be admitted, even by such hardy optimists as ourselves. On the north and north-western side of Rumania—along the Car- pathians—the German attack is being pushed with the utmost vigour. The waves of the advancing tide are leaping against the mountain barrier, and in several of the inlets have pene- trated beyond it. How our enemies will fare when the snows come and winter gets its full grasp of the passes remains to be seen, but at any rate for the moment Rumania is in danger here of a devastating invasion. A hasty glance at the map would seem to show that the invasion is destined to be a double one. The fact that the Rumanians have had to abandon their fortified line in the narrowest part of the Dobrudja, and to evacuate not only the important port of Constanza but the bridge-head of the great bridge which crosses the Danube at Czernavoda, is no doubt very serious. It does not, however, follow that Rumania is enveloped, or that the two points of the pincers, one acting from the Car- pathians and the other from the Dobrudja, will be able to close upon and break our Allies. Rumania is too big a country, for such tactics to succeed, unless the Germans are masters of far bigger armies in Transylvania and the Balkans than we believe they actually command. As we said last week, the analogy from Serbia must not be pressed. Serbia was a country with only one-fourth of the population of Rumania, and when she was overwhelmed was already exhausted by a year and a half of strenuous war. It would be a truer reading of the strategic situation to say that, instead of the Germans being in a position to crack Rumania between the forceps—to join the forceps so as to divide our Allies' dominions--the German forces are dangerously split. The Army in the Dobrudja —the marshy plain of the Danube—might indeed very easily find themselves in great peril. On one side they have the Black Sea, which is dominated by Russian sea power, and on the other the wide valley of the Danube, a huge river over a mile broad and surrounded by marshy ground. It is true that it is crossed by a bridge, but we shall be very much surprised to hear that that bridge has not been broken down, and that all that Germany now holds is the bridge-head at Czerna- voda. Between holding that and the power to throw her army rapidly and safely across the Danube there is a very wide difference. No doubt the Germans will continue to show their accustomed energy in attack, but unless they can very quickly get out of the Dobrudja they may find that to winter there, exposed to Russian and Rumanian attacks is a very costly business. If it is argued that it would only be costly to the Turks and Bulgars who supply the bulk of the troops, the answer is that with German and Austrian man- power as low as it undoubtedly is, Turkish and Bulgarian soldiers have become as precious as Pomeranian grenadiers. The Germans are not in a position to say now, as they could say a year ago, that the loss of a few Turkish or Bulgarian divisions matters little or nothing. But while we altogether refuse to despair of the local Rumanian situation, and consider it much more likely that the Rumanians, with the aid of Russia, will in the course of the next month or two pull themselves together and turn the tables upon the invaders, we can by no means admit that even if the worst were to happen, and Rumania were entirely overrun, the Germans would have done anything which could be regarded as a real step towards winning the war. It is far more arguable that a victory in Rumania may prove one of those fatal triumphs which in reality bring defeat more near. Remember that what Germany is doing now is imposing enormous burdens upon herself and her allies, and weakening her efforts not only on the Western but on her true Eastern front—the front from. Riga to the Bukovina. The strength which she is putting forth in Transylvania and the Dobrudja means strength deducted from other parts of the theatre of war. We are reaping the fruits of her wild onslaught against Rumania in what has happened at Verdun, and is happening and going to happen on the Somme. It is not too much to say that the French could not have gained the splendid, and in a sense the easy, victory they have gained at Verdun, with the capture of close on five thousand German prisoners and the placing of probably more than double that number of Germans hors de combat at a comparatively slight loss to themselves, if the Germans had not deliberately weak- ened themselves, on the West in order to have power to make their -spring in the East. What we have just said as to the connexion between Verdun and Rumania points to the remedy which must be adopted in face of the Rumanian reverses. We must save Rumania. That must be done, if necessary, by the actual reconquest of her soil, but we believe that it will be soonest done by vigorous action in the West. That is the surest way to help our Rumanian Allies, for we fully admit that help for them has become a sacred obligation on the part of Britain and France. Germany by her gambler's throw in Rumania has given us an opportunity which we shall be mad if we do not press to the utmost. By vigorous action in the West not only shall we relieve Rumania, but we shall greatly facilitate our original policy in Picardy and Flanders. Not only has the need for increasing the vigour of our push doubled or quadrupled, but the chances of making it successful have increased in equal proportion. The weather is our only obstacle. But though no doubt bad weather handicaps the attackers more than the defenders, and will impose great hardships upon our troops, we feel confident that if Sir Douglas Haig calls upon them for extra exertions in order to help Rumania and to seize the chance that is ours, they will respond, as nobly as they have always done, to the call. Our new soldiers, like our old " Contemptibles," are not going to grumble because they have to fight in November. Besides, who knows but that St. Luke may be favourable, and may make his summer longer and brighter than usual ? But one thing is necessary for taking full advantage of the oppor- tunity which the German rush at Rumania has given us. That is the maintenance of our man-power. We have got to sweep every available man into the Army, and to stand on no punctilios in the matter. By this we do not mean that we are to act in a foolish, panicky, or unreasonable spirit, as, for example, we should be acting if, in order to secure a few more men for the line, we were to limit our supply of munitions. Cannon-power and shell-power are as important as man-power.
But though we must be sure that we are not going to rob Peter in order to meet the demands of Paul, we are certain that a very great deal can be done to get more men without injury to our supply of munitions or our revenue, and without destroying the essential business of the country. Besides " combing out," we have potential reserves to fall back on. Either voluntarily or compulsorily, Ireland may be made to do her part. We may still, we believe, draw a great many men for various purposes from India, from our other Oriental dependencies, and from the Crown Colonies. Lastly, we believe that we may seek man-power where our forefathers sought it at the end of the Napoleonic wars, by using our material resources to enlist and equip the adventurous youth of the neutral countries who would like to fight for the Allies, and we may do this without any breach either of the spirit or the letter of international law. Pitt and Pitt's successors raised considerable bodies of troops in the Levant and elsewhere besides the Spanish and Portuguese contingents, and Mr. Lincoln and his War Secretary during the Civil War drew largely upon foreign sources. If our own men had failed to come forward, there would have been the greatest moral objections to depending upon what might be called mercenary forces. At present there could be no objection whatever to our raising a Foreign Legion of a couple of hundred thousand men.
Previous page
