THE NEW REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL. T HAT the new Revolution in
Brazil should have sent up Brazilian securities, is natural enough. The dis- missed Dictator, Marshal da Fonseca, was not only an incompetent ruler who had created no party for himself even in the Army which proclaimed him, but he was, either from conviction or from his view of his personal interests, in favour of a practically unlimited issue of paper currency, which was already beginning to injure commerce and make the necessaries of life inaccessible to the poor. His successors will, it is believed, restrict the paper issue, and will, moreover, endeavour to govern the country upon more liberal principles, and through the re- presentatives chosen, if not precisely by the people, at least by the directing classes. This is obvious, not only from the instinctive adherence of all the best Brazilians in Europe, but from the decree releasing telegraph bulletins from the censorship, and from the selection of the whole Executive, except the Ministers of War and Marine, from among the Senators or Members of Congress. It follows also from the rumoured adhesion of the Province of Rio Grande do Sul, where the insurgents, who are mainly im- migrants of a very good kind, on hearing of the Marshal's resignation, are said to have laid down their arms and telegraphed their reunion with the central authority. It is probable that the other disaffected provinces will follow suit, and with a reunited State, and a more sensible Government, the prospects of the bondholders have for the time being sensibly improved.
But then, have the prospects of Brazil equally improved ? They may have, for there are some indications in the course of the new movement to show that the respectable classes, having either shaken off their apathy or grown frightened for their property, have taken control of the Government, and may be able to keep it. And in Brazil, as in other South Amerian States, the respectable classes are so de- cidedly superior in civilisation to the populace, that they will probably govern not only with much more modera- tion and common-sense, but also much more effectively, —as, in fact, in the Chian instance, they have done for long periods. The upper classes in Spanish America and Brazil are far from perfect ; but they have at least some culture—in many instances, a good deal of it—and can not only form reasonable political schemes, but adhere to them with the tenacity without which no Constitution can be made to work for more than a few months. More- over, they have with them in Brazil, for the moment, con- siderable physical force, the Navy, which could shatter the capitals, being decidedly on their side, as are also the pro- vincial Volunteers, or armed citizens, who have just been organising insurrections. There is no evidence that the populace is hostile to them, while it is clear that the Army is either divided—which is most probably the case— or finds itself unable to resist the explosion of popular opinion, backed both by the Navy and. the insurgents in the provinces. These are most healthy signs ; but then, there is one terribly ominous sign on the other side to be reckoned up. It is clear from the ease with which both the Emperor Pedro and Marshal da Fonseca were over- thrown, that authority in Brazil has no real foothold, nothing upon which it can depend for defence if attacked by any one in possession of the regular armed force. If the Army revolts, as it did against Dom Pedro, the Imperial Government goes down in a night, without a shot being fired in its defence. If the Navy revolts, as it did against the dictatorship of Marshal da Fonseca, the Republic goes down in its turn, also without a blow. It appears, from accounts which read as if they were trust- worthy, that the Navy, which contains Monarchists and many officers on the " respectable " side, revolted against the dictatorship, and offered the Marshal the alternatives of resignation or civil war. He hesitated for a moment ; but on the Navy proving its sincerity by opening fire on the capital, he began to fear a popular insurrection and the fate of Balmaceda. He doubtless ascertained that the Army would not fight the Fleet on his behalf, and probably knew that he had no means of coercing the revolted or disaffected provinces. He therefore yielded, presumably exacting some promise of personal immunity, and power passed over without bloodshed to the Parlia- mentarians. That is most satisfactory from the point of view of humanity; but what is to prevent it from happening once a twelvemonth? Suppose the Navy, taking offence at General Peixoto's policy, or at some law passed by Congress, or at the imperfect recognition of officers' services in the shape of donatives and promotions, should next November hand in to the regenerated Govern- ment a new ultimatum upsetting the Executive in favour of other persons, what is to prevent its success once more ? The capital obviously cannot resist, for the moment the Navy is resolute enough to use shells, the resistance of a town lying under its guns would only invite destruc- tion. The Army, if the forts are of any strength, might resist, but it would in all probability be divided, and is evidently disinclined to believe itself strong enough to over- come the sister-force, which, again, has only to " adhere " to the Army to give it also the same dominance over the situa- tion. It is true the provinces might protect the central Government by threatening, as a steady policy, to revolt if legality were departed from ; but then, will they do this, or doing it, will they abstain from the secessions to which so many things in the circumstances of Brazil, where a province is often larger than France, must necessarily invite them ? All Governments, and especially all Federal Governments, must occasionally excite grave discontents, and if the dis- contents excite insurrections, and there is no physical power to put them down, the State must lack any character of permanent stability. There is a remedy, of course, in the arming and training of the whole popula- tion; but it is, in the circumstances of Brazil, so dangerous as to be practically out of the question. The population is divided by colours as well as interests, and if all were thoroughly armed, we might see a war of races such as the late Mr. Christie, for so many years our able Minister in Brazil, held to be ultimately almost inevitable.
Of course, if there is a Monarchical party in Brazil strong enough to decree a Restoration under the House of Braganza, or the branch of the Bourbons in which the Brazilian family has merged through the marriage of its heiress with the Comte d'Eu, many of the causes of instability may be dismissed at once. Loyalty is a prin- ciple which supplies strength ; and the Army and Navy might be reorganised so that insurrection would be- come as improbable as in England, or even Germany. Genuinely Monarchical officers cannot revolt, and the Throne acts as a stable centre round which the parties must contend. But the only sign of a counter- revolution at present is, that some leading Monarchists joined in the movement which upset the Dictator, and that all parties so far recognise the Monarchical tertium quid as to be anxious for its alliance. There would, however, be serious obstacles to such a return to the old order of things. The Imperial House has no one in it to whom Brazil could look with confidence, the Emperor himself being, to speak plainly, a sickly dilettante in science, his daughter a distrusted Clerical, and his grandson too young to be used for any purpose except that of sheltering some Regent. The "principal Monarchists," moreover, will have great posts under the new regime, and will be much more likely for the present to try and work the Republican Constitution, than to risk civil war and embark on the unknown from devotion to an idea for which, during the two years of the virtual dictatorship, they made no attempt to struggle. A loosely tied Federation, with the separate States claiming a great deal of all the available revenue, seems at present the most probable outcome of the disorder ; and that, we greatly fear, must remain to a large extent at the mercy of the Army and Navy and the disaffected in the provinces. There is no doubt some " Brazilian " feeling, as is proved by the instant sub- mission of Rio Grande do Sul, if that is accurately reported ; but hitherto it has appeared to be of a very thin kind, and to be effective it must be sufficient to induce those who entertain it to fight, with rifles, against all whose conduct threatens disintegration.
Previous page
