The Unmaking of a Prime Minister
By A. M. GOLLIN
FIFTY years ago this month there took place one of the decisive events of British history: the formation of Asquith's coalition government in May 1915.
Despite its high significance, the real meaning of this development has been neglected by British historians. Lord Beaverbrook has fixed our attention upon the intrigues which led to Lloyd George's seizure of power. Military historians by the score have recounted, for our edification, the details of every action that took place on land or sea in the course of the great struggle between 1914 and 1918. It is time for us to look at the meaning behind the political battles of those days and attempt the historian's most important task : to impose the charm of order upon the chaos of historical fact.
When the war began, Bonar Law, the Con- servative leader, agreed to a political truce be- tween the parties—in the national interest. By early 1915, however, Bonar Law was no longer able to control the passions which raged in Tory breasts, and elsewhere. Men in Britain were dis- satisfied with Asquith's conduct of the war. Asquith's government had gained no decisive victory on any front, and his critics believed that this general failure of British arms was not merely the result of ill-luck. But what was the substance of the argument that now divided the country's most important leaders? The Prime Minister's most capable critics were fully aware of his ability and his power. Their objections to his War premiership were directed against his method of waging war in the twentieth' century.
There • were two schools of thought that competed for power in Britain in 1915. On the one hand stood the Liberal laissez-faire econo- mists in Asquith's government. They argued that the fate of the Allied military effort depended upon the health and vigour of Britain's economy. They believed that they knew how the war should be conducted. They pointed out that Britain was required to maintain tremendous armies in every theatre of the war. She was required to sustain the largest and most expensive navy in her history. Beyond this, it was Britain's task to nourish her Allies with tremendous financial con- tribution, military equipment, raw materials and other necessities of national existence.
In this period, also, Great Britain was required to pay for the goods and war materials that came to Europe from the New World. The military effort of the Allied Powers depended upon the products of North and South America. For nearly three years of war these vital supplies were paid for by the British export trade.
These Liberals argued that Britain's laissez- faire economy was the source of her power. The mechanism was delicate : it should not be touched for any reason. To tamper with its efficient functioning would be to destroy the very basis of the Allied war effort. These economists were opposed by savagely critical enemies. In- side the Government Lloyd George was fierce in his hostility to Lord Kitchener, Asquith's Secretary of State for War. It was Kitchener's task to provide the armies with guns and shells. In the opinion .of Lloyd George he was failing
miserably in this vital work. Lloyd George was passionately eager to organise the peacetime industries of the entire country for the production of munitions: thus he was not an adherent of the laissez-faire arguments of his colleagues. '
On May 9 the British Army in France launched a tremendous attack, known as the battle of Festubert. The assault failed within an how, with fearful casualties. Part of the reason for the failure was a desperate shortage of high- explosive shells. Lloyd George became convinced that the Asquith-Kitchener control of munitions production was a blight upon the war effort.
Outside the Government even more vicious critics lay in wait. These Conservatives did not believe in the Liberal laissez-faire organisation of the country. They demanded military and industrial conscription. They believed that the laissez-faire system was incapable of dealing with the massive new burdens of the day. They advocated a programme of national military service, state direction of industry, and state control of the labour force. Others cried out for state control of every aspect of national activity. After the Festubert disaster they prepared, de- spite Bonar Law, to tear up the party truce.
Thus new and decisive alignments began to form and take shape. Eventually, Bonar Law gave way to the urging of his followers. On May 17 he called upon Lloyd George, and explained the rebellious attitude of his party. lie was received with open arms. Lloyd George suggested that a national coalition government should be formed, for the more efficient prosecu• tion of the war. The two men at once placed the plan before the Prime Minister.
Asquith accepted their proposal at once. Why was he unperturbed by the formidable combina• tion of the second minister in his Government acting in concert with the leader of the Oppost. tion? Asquith, with good reason:. believed in the extent of his own powers as a national leader. He had governed England by means of a parliamentary coalition since 1910. He was con- vinced that he was indispensable, and he believed that he could arbitrate between the two factions and thus decide matters as he wished.
The Prime Minister miscalculated. His col- leagues in the new Government understood that the destiny of the British Empire depended upon their decisions, and when Asquith sought to delay those measures of • state direction which were looked upon as vital, he earned the contempt of those who stressed the urgency of the matter.
Despite the Prime Minister, the struggle be- tween the two factions was fought out withal mercy. The issue was only decided in December 1916: then Lloyd George became Prime Minister. His Government relied for life upon the votes of men in the House of Commons who only supported him because he co-operated with their leaders—Bonar Law and Lord Milner—implac- able enemies of Liberalism and laissez-faire. A` a result of the struggle in all its phases Asquith ministry fell, the historic Liberal party dissolved in ruin, and the old fiscal system of the country' disappeared from the British scene.
In Germany General Ludendorff observed the political aspects of the Allied conduct of the war with admiring and envious eyes. His opinions resound like bursts of fire from his own machine: guns: 'What made this war different . . . was the manner in which the home populations sup' ported . . . their armed forces . . . . It wa', impossible to distinguish where the sphere 0! the Army began . . . and that of the people ended. . . . With an iron will . . . Clemenceali and Lloyd George . . . enrolled their peoples In the service of victory.'
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