China The Next Step
THE moment has arrived when we should try to clarify our views as to future British policy in the Far East. An adequate British force is now in China to safeguard British lives and British property, and it must, of course, remain there until conditions are more normal, but what then ? What arc the chief objects of British policy ?
Great Britain seeks first to protect the lives and property of her nationals in China, and had a Labour Government been in power, instead of Mr. Baldwin's, it would have done what the present Government has done, although it might not have sent so large a Defence Force. But Great Britain is playing for higher stakes than the mere safeguarding of her immediate interests ; she is seeking to recapture the confidence of the Chinese, to re-establish her right to be regarded as the friend of upward-striving humanity. What Great Britain does during the next twelve months or so will largely affect her whole position in Asia.
British policy in China has a threefold aim. It seeks to re-establish confidence by the removal of all sources of irritation and distrust ; to rehabilitate British trade under conditions which will give some promise of stability ; and, finally, to secure for Great Britain a permanent position of influence in the Far East, so that she can help to preserve world peace and to solve international disputes without recourse to war. The China question cannot be isolated, and our influence in other parts of the world will be affected by the success or failure of our methods there.
However great our provocations in the Far East, we must never lose sight of our primary objective—the re-establishment of belief in our good intentions. The name of America inspires greater confidence than does that of Britain in China to-day. Attempts to work up an anti-American boycott have hitherto never been successful, because the moderate-minded Chinaman be- lieves in the good faith of the American Government. In the recent discussions about Nanking, instructed opinion in China believed that Great Britain desired to take further action, and that she was only dissuaded from such a course by the refusal of America to have anything to do with such a project. It is to be regretted that such views should gain credence, for they largely undo the good of the Chamberlain Note of December. As it matter of fact, the British policy which culminated in this Note has been an enlightened one, and no country has done more than Great Britain in the past twelve months, not even America, to remould Western opinion along new lines in dealing with the Chinese situation.
If our good intentions are genuine, sooner or later they will carry conviction, but in the meantime there will be long months of misunderstanding to live through, during which we must lose no opportunity of proving our good- will towards China and our freedom from selfish aims. The present distrust of British motives by a large section of educated Chinese is due to several causes. It is a heritage of the past when all Western Powers, and especi- ally Great Britain because of its great trading interests, were credited with the intention of cutting up China into " spheres of influence." British support of the Japanese claims at Versailles; the delay in returning Wei-hai-wci; the delay in implementing the Washington Treaty—a delay for which this country was not responsible; the influence of the Nationalist movement with its demand for instant Treaty revision; the popular belief that Great Britain isthe villain of the piece, the supposed leader in " imperialistic exploitation," and has no intention of surrendering her previous Treaty rights, on terms that would be acceptable, despite the Chamberlain Memor- andum ; the influence of Russian and other propaganda ; and finally the habituully censorious attitude of certain British newspapers in the Far East ; these arc among the causes which have contributed to Chinese distrust of Great Britain.
There are three policies before Great Britain in the Far East—the big stick, the maintenance of the status quo, negotiation. Many arguments can be ad- vanced in support of the policy of armed intervention. There is natural resentment at the outrages suffered by British residents, and at the insults to the British flag. There are many who fear that a policy of conciliation will be interpreted as weakness, and who hold that security against fresh insults can only be obtained by the infliction of a sharp lesson. But the obstacles to this policy arc many. The British electorate is in no mood for sabre-rattling, and apart from reasons of economy it has no desire to sink deeper into the Chinese morass. To be effective the big stick must be very big, and no party in Great Britain could hope to obtain a mandate for extended operations in China and the occupa- tion of further Chinese territory. We can, therefore, rule out aggressive action, except under extreme provoca- tion. It is easier to visualize the beginning of armed intervention than the end. The permanent occupation of Chinese territory would defeat every object for which Great Britain is striving in the Far East, and would be directly contrary to the spirit of the December Memoran- dum and the Hankow agreement.
The second possibility is the maintenance of the status quo, and there is much to say in its favour. The disordered state of the country and the constant insults to foreigners make further concessions difficult. Till insults are atoned for and due protection is afforded no further negotiations should take place, say the pro tagonists of " wait and sec." But at best this is a negative policy, and one which will not re-establish British prestige, and it presupposes that the British taxpayer will be prepared to keep a large armed force in the Far East indefinitely. If we hesitate to proceed further in the matter of Treaty revision Chinese opinion will continue to be mobilized against this country and boycotts and strikes will probably recur. So long as we delay to put into operation the policy outlined in the Chamberlain Memorandum we give colour to the propaganda which says that the British Note was insincere, and that the leopard has not. changed his spots.
The third policy, and the one which the Spectator advocates, is that of continued negotiation with the de facto Government or Governments of China, along the lines foreshadowed in the Memorandum, with the object of completely revising our Treaty rein t ionship with her and of surrendering all non-reciprocal rights that we at present possess. Such a policy can only be carried out by slow degrees, and in so far as the Government or Govern- ments of China are able to do their part to meet us. During a period of years there would have to be co- operation between British and Chinese nationals in such matters as the control of the Concessions and Settlements, and of the Customs Service and in the jurisdiction over foreigners.
There would be need for much patience, but in the long run we should undoubtedly convince the educated section of the Chinese people that we were absolutely sincere in our determination to treat China in exactly the same way as we treat other foreign Powers, and to give up those privileges we no longer enjoy in other countries. Obvious arguments will suggest themselves against such a course. An enlightened and unselfish policy is apt to be regarded as weakness ; every concession, it is urged, will be made the occasion of fresh demands and of fresh insults. We shall be told that our policy will destroy Western prestige in China. We must not forget the difficult position of our fellow-subjects, engaged in commerce in the Treaty Ports, who would naturally be apprehensive at the abandonment of what they have hitherto regarded as essential safeguards to trade. They will have to balance the risks and decide whether it is better to possess the present " safeguards " of Concessions and Extra- territoriality, a constant source of irritation to national sentiment and an opportunity for misrepresentation by agitators, or to make a fresh bid for Chinese goodwill by giving up those privileges. Some residents in the Far East with many years' experience of dealings with the Chinese maintain that British merchants can get on quite well in the open ports, and think that they would be " in- finitely better off if there were not a Concession on the length and breadth of the China coast." The Chinaman with a sense of grievance is difficult to deal with, as old bands know, but once you remove that grievance he is a most reasonable being, with a strong sense of justice and a respect for fair dealing.
We come to the main difficulty, and it would be foolish to under-estimate it, in the absence of any strong central authority with whom to negotiate and the constant change of Governments. But, whatever Chinese Government emerges, we may be sure it will insist on Treaty revision ; this is the one subject upon which both North and South are agreed. Another danger which must be faced is the serious risk of the failure of China's credit, if and when the Customs pass out of the control of foreigners. We must not forget, however, that there are stable elements in China just as anxious to safeguard Chinese credit as we are. We admit that a policy of friendship and Co- operation is in the nature of a gamble, but it is a risk worth taking.
The present state of chaos and disunion makes action difficult, but a policy of drift is dangerous. There is an analogy between the situation in China to-day and the situation in Ireland prior to the settlement in 1921. What could have looked more hopeless than the position before the Anglo-Irish Peace Treaty was signed ? Yet the forces of reason won, and who would undo the Irish settlement to-day ? In that case the British Government courageously made terms with the effective leaders of Irish national opinion, as soon as these leaders were obviously ready and competent to negotiate. Similarly, in our dealings with China we should put ourselves in the position of the educated Chinaman, try to see things through his eyes and be quick to seize the first oppor- tunity for offering the most generous terms of settlement to any Chinese Government that posse: ;ses the requisite authority. The opportunity may come sooner than we suppose.
Previous page
