THE WAR SURVEYED : THE YUGOJLAV SURRENDER
By STRATEGICUS
ALTHOUGH the Balkan theatre of the war may represent merely a diversion, it contrives to hold attention to the exclusion of other aspects which are of more essential import- ance. It is true, as was expected, that the shipping losses are down for the second week in succession from the high level reached in the opening spurt of the German attack. That, of course, is one of the most dependable characteristics of the German attack—that it should develop its maximum force at the very outset. But in this assault upon the shipping, that must form the basis of our war strategy, it could hardly be expected that it should show such a decrescendo as has been the case ; and we cannot safely conclude that we have yet seen the worst of it. The air-attack goes its way, and the checks administered in the moonlit nights have not been maintained. There is evidently much still to do before we can be assured that this threat is under control.
But, although these two forms of attack ought to loom larger in our thoughts, they fail to occupy the place monopolised by the Balkans. There, we know Germany is slowly fitting together the parts of a plan that, complex when examined in detail as it unfolds itself, will develop finally on broad, simple lines as a threat to the whole of our position in the Near and Middle East. When the German airmen invaded Sicily and were followed by ground troops, it was possible to see a pawn slowly advanced on the chess-board ; but now it has been so moved as to suggest something of a threat. German armoured troops are undoubtedly in Tripolitania and, although they are not in great force, they are growing stronger. In spite of the great minefield which has been laid across the path of vessels leaving the south of Italy, it has proved pos- sible for ships to reach the Tunisian coast and, passing through the waters that wash it, to get to Tripoli. They may not be able to get through in any great numbers; but they are clearly finding their way to the remnants of Graziani's army a.nd pre- sumably the new commander, General Garibaldi, is a figure- head behind whom the German Staff will function.
The total force cannot be large at present ; but it must be assumed that it has not been sent to Africa for the sake of a rest cure. It must further be taken for granted that its presence in Tripolitania has a definite relation to the cam- paign in Italian East Africa, where the curtain is falling upon Mussolini's dreams, but falling very slowly. It cannot be long before the onset of the rainy season, and the Duke of Aosta is clearly trying to evade a mortal blow before that time imposes a check upon the operations. On general grounds it is a sound thing to do, though what it would advantage the Italian com- mander to be shut up in the central plateau, with a hostile population pursuing its guerilla tactics and the Imperial forces pressing their attack even on less forcible terms, it is difficult to guess. Of course he would detain in that area Imperial forces that might have a more important role to play elsewhere ; but, gathering about the position are many units which would not be of the highest value elsewhere, and the developments of the next week, even, cannot be foreseen.
One further inference can be drawn from the growing strength of this German force: the move must have a bearing upon the plan that is working out in the Balkans. Yugoslavia has now joined the number of those small nations which have preferred hara-kiri to the possibilities of death. At this point there can surely be no illusions left in Europe on 'the mean- ing of supping with Hitler. The terms upon which Yugo- slavia has joined the Axis are not yet known in detail, and it is only their military implications that concern me at present ; but whatever should be the written terms it is quite certain that they are meant to advantage Germany immediately in her Balkan plans. It will no doubt be represented to her leaders that it will be sufficient if Germany can depend upon the neutrality of the Yugoslav army. That clearly had to be secured. The German Staff could hardly have launched a German expeditionary force southward if an army of a million men had threatened its flank. The fact that Italy and Germany had cast a net so closely about the country was only of importance as making the decision to maintain neutrality imperative. This was the reason for the German movements in Rumania and Bulgaria. It was more of the careful chess- playing at which Germany appears today to be so adept.
But it cannot be the mere security for the flank of her army that the German Staff desires ; and, a past-master at repudiat- ing her word whenever it seems convenient, Germany is the very last nation to rest content with mere assurances. From the purely military point of view she would be foolish to embark upon a campaign that may develop on unpredictable lines on no better guarantee. To pretend to be content with what is at present claimed and promised is no more than to offer the acceptable lie. As she will certainly demand full control of Yugoslavia before many days are past, she will claim much more than the safety of her flank. She will need direct communication with her main bases, and this cannot be obtained via Bulgaria and Rumania. Only through Yugoslavia is there direct communication between Vienna and Western Europe and the Greece upon which Germany has set her mind. The further the web of her dreams is cast, the more impera- tive it is that her communications should be simple, direct and secure. If she plans to restore the original design of a con- verging attack upon the British position on the Canal through Syria, as seems quite possible, she is unlikely to open her campaign until she has seen to this lifeline. The communica- tions would inevitably be long under the best circumstances, and their service would require the policing of a growing number of troops. But nothing is more important to such an ambitious plan than directness and simplicity here. It might well prove fatal if the communications should break down when the columns are launched into the eastern distance.
It is at this point that we begin to wonder how much Germany has really achieved by the coercion of Yugoslavia. The country is admittedly divided, and it is the lack of a tradition of order and unity that has caused the division to go to such lengths. Will it be possible to depend upon the Serbs, who fought so fiercely in the Great War and have resisted the signature of this shameful instrument now? Sabo- tage is peculiarly easy in Yugoslavia. ' There are a number of places where the essential railway could be cut and placed beyond repair for some time. Will Germany be able to depend upon immunity from interruption of the line? 11 she even think she can? If she should think no chance can be taken in this direction, it seems likely she will be compelled to maintain a considerable number of troops in the country. If she should propose to cross Thrace and advance through Syria against the northern flank of the British position on the Canal, she will drag a longer line of communications needing careful safeguard against interruption. Whatever military triumphs she might achieve this would be a growing factor of weakness.
Yet the possibility of using the Yugoslav communications is a vital increment to her strength ; and the probabilities are that the launching of the German offensive against Greece mil not now be long delayed. Whether it will begin through the Struma valley or not it is impossible to say. What seems . certain, beyond a doubt, in spite of the Axis assurances, is the fact that before long the Vardar line will be involved. The threat in the Near East is serious and it will impose new burdens upon our fortitude. It will not become actual untal the plan seems perfect in every particular, and once launched we shall know no respite until either it is crushed decisively or it has attained whatever end the German Staff has designed. Our resources in this area are now well known. Lord Croft has just informed us of the relative losses in the recent African campaign, and there can be little better assurance than is c.°0- tained in these remarkable figures and the light they cast Era the generalship of the British commander in the Near East.
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