THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIFFICULTY IN VICTORIA.
THE despatch in which the Secretary of State for the Colonies conveys to the Governor of Victoria the con- clusion at which the Home Government have arrived in regard to the dispute between the two branches of the Colonial Legis- lature will approve itself to most persons in this country. It is not in form a decision for either party in the controversy, and at home this of itself may perhaps be accepted as a recommendation. Colonial self-government would be rendered incalculably more difficult than it is, if every difference between the Houses could be referred to the Imperial Government, with a reasonable certainty that the decision would be determined by the acci- dent that the Liberals or the Conservatives happened to be in office. It is an undoubted merit in Sir Michael Hicks Beach's despatch that it is absolutely free from party colour. From the first word to the last, the sum of it is that the matter is one in which the Colonial Parliament is, and ought to be, the judge. The Secretary of State does not deny that under certain cir- cumstances the impossibility of any decision being arrived at by the Colonial Parliament may be so obvious that the Imperial Government may have no choice but to interfere. But, with what may perhaps be thought superabundant caution, he refuses to accept anything that has yet happened as evidence that such a contingency has arisen. He says, in effect, 'If, after all conceivable expedients have been tried, you are still unable to come to terms with one another, we will see what can be done ; but, as yet, the list of experiments is by no means exhausted ; there is no evidence that either the Council or the Assembly intend to stand by the extreme pre- tensions that have been put forward on their behalf ; what is wanted is the exercise of a little common-sense and forbearance on both sides ; if this can be secured, there is no reason why the Council and the Assembly should not agree as well as the Lords and the Commons in England.' Were this all that the despatch contained, we should not have much hope that Sir Michael Hicks Beach's expectations would be realised. The reason why the Council and the Assembly do not agree is that some of them do not possess that common-sense and forbearance which mark in so striking a degree the relations of the two Houses in England. So far, therefore, the Secretary of State does little more than a man who should try to prevent a separation between man and wife by bidding them take example by some conspicuously affectionate couple. Advice of this sort is seldom useful, except when it is already superfluous. The despatch wisely expresses no opinion on the facts in which the Mission to England had its origin. It simply remarks that "the recent difference between the two Houses of Victoria, like the most serious of those which have preceded it, turned upon the ultimate control of finance." Upon this point the Secretary of State hints that both parties are in the wrong. The difficulty of which Mr. Berry com- plains would not arise, if "the two Houses of Victoria were guided in this matter, as in others, by the practice of the Imperial Parliament The Assembly, like the House of Commons, would claim, and in practice exercise, the right of granting aids and supplies to the Crown, of limiting the matter, manner, measure, and time of such grants, ' and of so framing Bills of Supply that these rights should be maintained inviolate ; and as it would refrain from annexing to a Bill of aid or supply any clause or clauses of a nature foreign to or different from the matter of such a Bill, so the Council would refrain from any steps so injurious to the public service as the rejection of an Appropriation Bill." No doubt, if this view of their several provinces were adopted by the two Houses, no further cause of quarrel would arise. Probably, however, Mr. Berry would maintain that the Assembly, and not the Council, is the fitting judge whether a particular clause annexed to a Bill of aid or supply is, or is not, foreign to its matter ; while the Council would, in turn, claim the right of determin- ing when the rejection of an appropriation Bill has been rendered justifiable by the previous act of the Assembly in importing extraneous matter into a money Bill. It is to meet this statement, perhaps, that the Secretary of State points 'out that the clearest definition of the relative position of the two Houses, however arrived at, would not suffice to prevent collisions, unless interpreted with that discretion and mutual forbearance which have been so often exemplified in the history of the Imperial Parliament. The really important sentence in the despatch comes a little later. The Secretary of State admits that differences between the two Houses sometimes arise upon questions not connected with finance, and that legislation may be necessary to put a mechani- cal end to these differences, when all other methods of settling them have proved inefficacious. But this, he says. can only be possible on the supposition that the Council of Victoria will not recognise its constitutional position, and so transact its busi- ness that the wishes of the people, as clearly and repeatedly ex- pressed, should ultimately prevail ; and this is a supposition which Sir Michael Hicks Beach will not allow himself to entertain. Similar bodies in other great colonies have yielded to the force of circumstances, and have admitted that, when once the wishes of the people have been unmistakably ascertained, further resistance is neither politic nor possible. If it should be found that the Council of Victoria does not take this sensible view of its position, it is possible that the Imperial Parliament will take upon itself the responsibility of amending the Constitu- tion. But before it could do so, certain things would have to be made good to its satisfaction. The Assembly must have made some reasonable proposal for regulating the future relations between the two Houses ; the Council must have refused to concur with the Assembly in such a proposal ; and the proposal so rejected must have been ratified by the country, and have been again sent up by the Assembly for the consideration of the Council. When all these things have happened, the Imperial Parliament may consent to alter the settlement embodied in the Constitution Act. This may not seem a very encouraging prospect to hold out to the Assembly, but in substance we hope that it will insure to the Assembly all the power that it really needs. The paragraph is an intimation to the Council that in the last resort they will not be supported by the Home Government. Somehow or other, they must settle their quarrel with the Assembly, or prove by the result of a General Election that the country is with them, and not with the Assembly. If they cannot accomplish one or other of these ends, they will find no help in Downing Street. They will be supported against the Assembly until it has been ascertained that the Constituencies are in accord with the Assembly, but they will be supported no longer. We are inclined to expect that this intimation will be sufficient to obtain all that the reasonable partisans of the Assembly can desire. That the wishes of the people, as clearly and repeatedly expressed, should ultimately prevail is inevitable in a Democratic society. In securing time for these wishes to take shape and substance, a second Chamber has exhausted its capabilities. It exists to prevent the people from mistaking a momentary fancy for a deliberate desire ; and if it attempts to accomplish anything more than this, it becomes simply a hindrance to good government. Now that the issue has been thus clearly and thus cautiously placed before the Council of Victoria, we can- not believe that it will claim any higher function than that attributed to it by the Secretary of State.
Previous page
