TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE CRISIS IN EGYPT. THE Government has acted wisely, as well as firmly, in doubling the garrison of Egypt, which had been gradually reduced, under the influence of apparent quiet, and the greatly improved condition of the Anglo-Egyptian Army, to two thousand five hundred effective men. The situation had been improved by the dismissal of Fakhri Pasha and the appointment of Riaz, who is, at all events, no pronounced enemy of England ; but it had by no means become a pleasant one. In all Oriental States the opinion of the Sovereign is an important factor, for moral right is believed to rest with him, and in a State like Egypt, with a Mahommedan population controlled by an intruding Christian Power, it is, in its action on popular feeling, almost the dominant one. Abbas II. is not so young as a European of his age (nineteen) would be, and he is thirsting for the pleasure, which to every Asiatic is the supreme one, of seeing his own will instantly executive within his own sphere of action. He has, probably, much of the energy and courage which, except in the case of Tewfik, have always distinguished his House ; and though at the moment of crisis he yielded to the veiled menace conveyed to him by Lord Cromer from the British Cabinet, he yielded without willingness, and im- perfectly. He boasted to his friends that he had forced a compromise on the British representative ; he threatened to remove many English officials from their posts ; and he let it be seen that he desired the evacuation of the country, which would leave him an absolute Sovereign, able to reward his friends, to crush his enemies, and to spend his own money on himself, instead of bondholders and fella- keen. Instantly there was uneasiness in Cairo and Alexandria. The former place contains three thousand fanatical students of Mahommedan Divinity and Law, who can hardly tolerate infidel ascendency, besides a population singularly vain of its position as the first of Arabian secular cities ; while the latter is filled with a populace at all times unruly, and penetrated just now by all kinds of foreign Anti-English influences. An outbreak like that of 1882, directed against the "enemies of the Khedive" was perfectly possible, and had it been momentarily successful, might have produced un- controllable excitement among the native soldiery. They are turning out well, responding readily to discipline, but they are conscripts, not paid soldiers ; they are nearly all Mahommedans, and though they may be faithful in battle to their European officers, their loyalty, their creed, and their military oaths alike bind them to the Khedive, who, of course, would be represented to them as a man under infidel coercion. To ask such men to cling to their foreign officers against their native Sovereign and their own creed, is to rely on discipline beyond what is either wise or expedient. It was, at all events, necessary to consider the soldiery doubtful, the mob of the cities was known to be hostile, and the fellaheen, even if they do not attribute to the Khedive the great improvements in their condition, all of which, we must recollect, though sug- gested by Englishmen, have been made in his name and under his authority, are unarmed, unorganised, and un- accustomed for centuries to act. It was necessary, as it always is in the East, to support authority with the visible appearance of force, and, fortunately, this was not too difficult. With a strong garrison in the Citadel, Cairo is always powerless ; while Alexandria, though less dominated by any single position, is always at the mercy, as was shown in 1882, of a fleet in the Mediterranean. With the two great capitals quiet, with five thousand British troops in the country, and with five thousand more within three days' steam, Abbas II., even if headstrong, as such Princes usually are, was not likely to favour a rising which could not succeed, and Egypt would be forced to reassume its normal attitude of restless and gossipy tranquillity. The reinforcement of the garrison was the more effectual because it at once dissipated the grand hope of the mal- contents, of the Sultan's agents, and perhaps of Abbas II. himself. We do not believe that the French Government stirred up the Khedive to revolt, for the French Government is much occupied with internal troubles, and though bitter on the subject of Egypt, is aware that its voters would consider a war with England a terrible waste of strength. If they approve of war at all, it is a war with Germany, which would give France back her military pres- tige, not with England, which at the utmost must be a maritime campaign without glory for the Army, and with huge risks of all kinds to commercial prosperity. But we do believe that the French in Egypt diligently propagated the idea that the Republic would forbid the English to act, that Mr. Gladstone would yield, and that after the first pause of consternation, the Khedive would resume his place as actual as well as legal Sovereign of the Delta. He is, be it remembered, legally in full possession of his prerogatives, and bound by no formal treaty to act on British advice. The removal of Ruillier Bey, former tutor to the Khedive, chief of his Foreign, Household, and head of the anti-English party, shows. that, in Lord Cromer's judgment, the influence of this. belief had its effect on Abbas, who cannot be expected to understand all the conditions of the political equilibrium. in Europe, or to see how impossible it is that France should voluntarily drive England into the arms of the Triple Alliance. It is probable that the agents of Turkey, the principal of whom, a son of Ismail, must also be removed, also made this mistake ; and it is certain that the hope was entertained by the foreigners in Egypt, the majority of whom look upon the British occupation as a barrier to a thousand schemes of peculation and aggrandise- ment. Their hope was that the coup d'etat would succeed, that the Khedive would be absolute, and that the English would either evacuate the Valley or find themselves dis- liked and powerless guests within it. That hope was shattered at a blow by the increase of the garrison, for if England had resolved to hold on, nothing but war could dislodge her ; and the very fact of the decision to increase the garrison showed either that war was impossible or that England had resolved to face even that contingency. That mist which, owing to her habit of self-depreciation, so often surrounds England's policy in foreign eyes, was, dissipated, and for an instant, at least, the Turks, foreigners, and Native intriguers who make up the anti-English party in Egypt, saw clearly that Mr. Gladstone's Govern- ment, like Lord Salisbury's Government, like any Govern- ment possible in this country, had resolved to remain in Cairo until in its own judgment its work was done.
And lastly, the increase of the British garrison is by far the easiest precaution through which the British Govern- ment can obtain a decent security for the future. Their position, though of course a very strong one, as they hold the European mandate, and have actual possession of Egypt, has in it elements of extreme difficulty. We put aside for a moment their own loose talk while out of office, though it has been the first cause of all the mischief ; because, as they have repented in action, the nation and Europe may condone that, as an election expedient not to be judged too seriously, and speak only of difficulties on the spot. The British in Egypt are there theoretically as advisers of the native Sovereign ; but if he refuses persistently to take their advice, the position becomes insupportable. They cannot remain to• lend strength to Abbas II. if he undoes their reforms, or dismisses the officers of the Egyptian Army, or removes the most successful English officials, or issues orders to. the Treasury inconsistent with the financial credit of the country. They must, in short, govern in all great matters ; and if the Khedive will not be governed, what are they to do ? In English phrase, he, not they, legally holds the Seals. The legitimate course—or, at all events, the course according to precedent—is to ask the Sultan to re- move the Khedive ; but not to mention many objections to a course which reinvigorates the Sultan's authority over a State practically independent of him, he might, and under Franco-Russian influence, probably would, refuse the request. It would be necessary for Great Britain to act alone,—that is, either to change the Khedive by fiat, or to declare his Ministers responsible to the Resident alone, or to suspend him during the term of British occupation. Any one of those courses, though nearly inevitable in the contingency supposed, might create insurrection in Egypt itself, and would certainly cause a wild commotion among diplomatists as being, in fact, equivalent to an annexa- tion. The very situation which statesmen have striven to avoid would be upon us, the dilemma, whether to abandon Egypt prematurely, or to claim it, at all risks, as our own. It is far easier till circumstances change, or until we can offer France compensation, to maintain such a force in Egypt as will put disturbance out of the question, and endeavour to work on in the old lines, even with the impediment of a Khedive who wishes us away, and if he saw a chance, would ensure that we should go. The difficulty, at the worst, would rather be a new harass for the British Resident, than a new perplexity for the counsels of the European world. With the British seated in Cairo and Alexandria, and guarded by a force sufficient to ensure safety to all Europeans, and with time to summon reinforcements, what could the Khedive do, except make the lives of the English administrators a little more of a, burden to them by worrying opposition in council ? How far he would go in that way it is difficult to say until his character has revealed itself a little more clearly ; but in all probability he would yield to a manifest destiny, and be quiet. So far as he is European by training, he would understand that one cannot win battles with an inadequate force ; and so far as he is in heart an Asiatic, he would wait until his opportunity arrived. It is not a pleasant position for the British, or one that can be main- tained indefinitely ; but it is better to encounter it than take steps which might break the thin ice upon which Europe is now standing. After all, we could not reckon on a succession of Tewfiks, and it is hard to work in the East a constitutional system—for it was precisely that to which Tewfik lent himself—which, even in the West, has succeeded only in our own land. The patience required of British agents in Cairo will be extreme ; but we have done it all before in every part of India, and done it with success.
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