The defect of the Italian preparations in Abyssinia is a
certain want of boldness. The Government is so afraid of the effect of a reverse on Italian opinion, that it has fortified Massowah as if it were to be attacked by a civilised Power, has established four entrenched camps, has accumulated thirty thousand of its best troops, and is laying a deep strategic plan for" drawing" Ras Alula and the Abyssinian Army. Movable columns are to penetrate deeper and deeper into King John's country, until the Abyssinian Commander-in-Chief, impatient of his loss of prestige, allows himself to be provoked into a pitched battle. This the Italians expect to win, and then they will dictate the terms of a permanent peace. This would be an excellent plan with a civilised enemy; but the Abyssinian may not care about prestige, and may retreat when defeated, instead of making peace. Even should the scheme succeed, after a sanguinary battle with the fifty thousand fully armed and half- armed militia whom Ras Alula can bring into the field, the cost of the fortifications, of the transport of such an army, and of the preparations as for a great campaign, will make the victory appear to the Italian people a dearly bought one. No Power except ourselves as yet understands that nothing can be done in Eastern warfare without audacity, and the fortitude to bear an occasional reverse. No resources can suffice to conduct such expeditions in the style of a European campaign.
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