CYPRUS
THE proposals put forward by Lord Radcliffe for a constitution in the island of Cyprus have at least the merit of showing that the Government has finally realised that it cannot continue indefinitely to suppress the demand for enosis by purely military means. The history of the Cyprus dispute might, indeed, be put into a textbook of how not to cope with colonial problems. In the first place we were faced by a demand from some four-fifths of the popula- tion for union with Greece. In order to resist that demand we pleaded our responsibilities towards the Turkish minority and brought Greece and Turkey face to face at the London conference. The consequences of that have been an estrange- ment between the two countries which has ruined the southern end of NATO and the Balkan pact acid a growing tide of violence in the island itself, which all the forces deployed by Sir John Harding have failed to put down. Now the question is how the legitimate aspirations of the Cypriots to decide their own future can be reconciled with the far more important Point of assuring a stable and peaceful future to that area of South-Eastern Europe—a future which would be jeopardised by any permanent Greco-Turkish enmity. The Radcliffe pro- posals must be judged by the extent to which they fulfil these different criteria.
The constitution proposed by Lord Radcliffe does all the obvious things. It makes concessions as to an elected Greek majority on the legislative body. It provides safeguards for the Turkish minority. It reserves defence, security and foreign affairs for the Governor. In fact, it is unexceptionable as far as constitutions go. However, the situation has probably moved far beyond constitutional niceties, and the Radcliffe report will be judged in Athens and Ankara rather for its promises as to the future than for its arrangements during the period for which the island is to remain under British sovereignty. Here the Colonial Secretary's statement was a disappointment. The eventual right to self-determination of the Cypriots was admitted, but no date was given when that right might be exercised. Indeed, there was more than a hint that the Colonial Office still cherishes the rather pathetic illusion that the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus can be made in the course of time into good little Cypriots with no wicked predilections for their homelands.
How does the British Government now envisage the future of the island? It was difficult to tell from what Mr. Lennox- Boyd had to say in the House of Commons. In spite of Suez— and in spite of caustic comments from Field-Marshal Auchinleck—our strategists still think (until the next staff exercise?) that Cyprus is necessary to us as a base in the Mediterranean area. But after that, and even supposing all goes well with the new constitution (which at the time of writing looks exceedingly unlikely)? Here the most significant part of the statement was the reference to partition not being excluded. This has been considerably criticised as only making the situation more difficult. But as in so many similar prob- lems, partition—illogical as it may seem from the geographical point of view—may come to appear the only viable solution. Assuming—what seems fairly certain—that the Greek Cypriot population will continue to prefer union with Greece to any other solution, the main problem will remain the question of Greco-Turkish relations, and that will not be affected in the very least by any changes introduced by the Radcliffe recom- mendations. Some kind of agreement must, therefore, be reached between Greece and Turkey if the Cyprus question is not to continue to bedevil international relations for the next fifty years. And it is difficult to see what form that agreement could take except that of partition. Condominium would, no doubt, be much more sensible, but would hardly be possible in the present heated atmosphere. To agree to anything like this would be a considerable concession for any Greek govern- ment and a still more considerable one for any Greek Cypriot, but it might be one worth making rather than run the risk of a conflict which could only disadvantage Greece herself still more than Turkey.
It is unfortunate that, while accepting the principle of self- determination, the British Government should have placed the emphasis in its proposals on the interim period rather than on the eventual fate of Cyprus. As long as our intentions remain vague and are still thought to be suspect, full rein is given to political demagogy on all sides of the dispute. By first refusing to consider a transfer of sovereignty and then put- ting it off into the dim future we have given no incentive either to Greek or Turk to come to a compromise. Now, by failing to fix a date for the application of the principle of self-deter- mination, we have probably given a handle to extremists which will cause another outbreak of terrorism followed by a worsened political atmosphere. As was shown in India, an announcement of a definite date for a, transfer of power does not have the effect of unleashing irresponsible forces but rather the reverse.
One does not need to disbelieve the good intentions of Lord Radcliffe's recommendations to condemn them. What Cyprus needs now is some kind of assurance about the future. And the Greek and Turkish Governments need it too. To put off the decision as, in effect, Mr. Lennox-Boyd has done will cause a gradual deterioration in the situation even supposing that the constitution ever goes into operation. As yet it is too early to be quite sure of the reactions of the Greek Cypriot community, but there is one section of it which will certainly have its word to say—EOKA. Unfortunately, neither the report nor Mr. Lennox-Boyd had anything to say about the possible release of Archbishop Makarios, who is probably the only figure capable of holding these extremists in check.
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