THE CONDITION OF THE NAVY.
THE Pall Mall Gazette—whose general services to Liberalism we heartily acknowledge—spoils its "finds," often hunted up with great cleverness, by screaming so loud over them. Nothing practical has been done to remedy the evils described in " Outcast London," or will be done, until sense supersedes sensation, and the reformers, recognising the limits of the possible, and admitting that in crowded cities the residuum will never be well housed, confine their demand to the sewerage, ventilation, and light, which can after a year or two of severe and irritating compulsion be secured. We are not one whit nearer to a reasonable settlement of the Soudan because of the preposterous exaggeration of General Gordon's qualities, or the still more preposterous incitements to the British Government to become indirectly responsible for order in a semi-desert nearly as large as Europe. Nor will the British Navy be strengthened by demands which, if they were granted, would compel us to vie with combined Europe in a race of expenditure, only to discover in the end that we could not keep our overgrown Fleet afloat or in decent repair for want of men and money. The Navy may want, does want, more money spent upon it in one or two particular directions ; but what is the use of rousing every economist or friend of peace in the country by hypotheses which have for their basis the possibility that Europe may combine against us, that we shall have no ally, that our fleets will never win again against superior forces, that Great Britain is in danger of an effectual blockade, and that we must keep up a Fleet ready to drive coalesced mankind from the universal ocean ? It is that, and nothing less, which is implied in those sensational allusions to the danger of starvation during a maritime war, which are always made to give an air of urgency to suggestions for expense. Corn is not contraband of war, and unless an effective blockade were established, it could not be seized afloat. Even combined Europe would hardly venture to apply force to America to compel her to desist from sending us corn saleable at 100s. a quarter ; or, if it did, the compulsion would bring about an alliance of the English-speaking peoples, which might face all
Europe at sea with every chance of success. Then the Pall Mall Gazette grows poetical over the " sea-wolves " which would ravage our commerce, and close our trade as the ' Alabama ' closed the trade of the North in the great Civil War. What would our own sea-wolves be doing the while ? The Gazette forgets that more than 70 per cent, of the steam marine of the world is English ; that the British Government could cover the seas with armed steel cruisers taken from the mercantile marine ; and that any assailant would have ships to lose and cities on the coast to be bombarded of its own. Even the professional correspondents of the journals, or men who, like Mr. W. H. Smith, strive, while swelling the chorus, to seem cool, omit all mention of the fact that our potential enemies, like ourselves, have weak places in their maritime armour, and are no more ready than we are to throw their whole strength upon the waters at five minutes' notice. The French Government admits that it cannot contend with England in first-class ironclads, and for any attack to have even a hope the French Government must be at the bottom of it, and be ready to invade. The notion that with all the coal in Asia in British hands, and English cruisers sinking every coal-ship, the French Department of Marine could scatter its strength all over earth to attack our Colonies, is as foolish as the notion that we could protect the Colonies by a similar dispersion. These sayings are exaggerations used to create a public emotion, which they only exhaust prematurely.
We do not mean in any way to deprecate a de- mand for the further extension of the Navy. We entirely repudiate any idea of economy in the matter, except so far as economy means insistanc,e that for every penny spent there shall be a pennyworth of the required strength obtained. We are as sensible as any Tory alive that England, with her comparatively small Army, must remain the greatest—by far the greatest—Naval Power. If a million more ought annually to be allowed to the Navy, we vote for the million. If" My Lords" think the country not safe with- out a grant of five millions for new ships and heavier guns, let the five millions be granted unanimously. But let us thoroughly understand what it is that we seek, what degree of security is to be attained, whom we expect to have to fight. Mere expenditure without any object will not help us, any
more than it would help us to store up a year's supply of wheat on Joseph's plan, because some day or other the people might not have enough to eat. The precise extent of force that is needful is, and must be, matter for experts. But writing as politicians, we should entirely admit that the British Government, with its scattered possessions, its obliga- tion to keep the route to India open, and its dependence for revenue on trade, must keep a powerful Navy ready for im- mediate service, whatever the cost. We also admit that, just as Great Britain would not fight upon the Continent without an ally, so no Power will fight us on the water without seek- ing an ally ; and that, therefore, the Admiralty ought to reckon upon a possible necessity for defeating two first-class Powers at once. But we should limit preparation by that theory, or a better one carefully drawn up by experienced officers, and not indulge in vain dreams of the whole civilised world steaming upon England to erase her from among the nations. That may happen one day, and so may an in- vasion by balloons, but statesmen cannot reckon on such contingencies, and must confine themselves to the reason- ably probable. If France and Russia, or France and Germany, or France and Italy make war upon us, we should be ready from the first for the encounter, so ready, that no serious loss could be incurred through want of ships, of materiel, or of competent officers to lead ; but, being so ready, we should wait tranquilly, and not dream of still worse emergencies. It is quite possible that the reservoir of Naval strength is not just now adequately full. Naval experts are so expert, so proud of their special knowledge, so eager to prove that the 4 Charon ' is obsolete and the Astyanax ' fitted with the wrong boilers, so devoted to their favourite weapons, and so contemptuous of each other, that it is impossible for mere taxpayers to understand what they say ; but there seems to be a consensus on a few points. One is that the Admiralty, hampered by the Treasury, does not keep its building work forward enough, allows vessels to remain half-ready which ought to be finished off at once. That is probable enough, the Treasury finding that money can in that way be spent slowly, and the Dockyards being as anxious as private ship- builders always to have work to do. Another is that the num- ber of second-class ironclads of unusual swiftness is too small, —which, again, is probable, the strength of the building yards having for some time past been concentrated upon larger vessels. And a third is that torpedo-boats are much too few, which, besides being in itself probable, appears to be admitted in the orders just announced as issued by the Admiralty. But surely all these facts can be ascer-
tained. past question by the experienced officers at the disposal of the Admiralty, and placed before the Cabinet with at least as much effect as if they were collected by the cumbrous machinery of Parliamentary or Royal Commissions of Inquiry, which, when they report, will, even if they are unani- mous, tell the country nothing that the heads of the Service did not know before, and make no impression on the Treasury which could not be made by the Department itself. We are sick of these inquiries from without, which in the first instance give the Executive a full excuse for doing nothing until they have reported, then supply material for endless discussion, and then are constantly quoted to diminish the responsibility of the regular Government. What can a Commission tell us as to the grand datum of all—the chance that the French Chambers will allow a war with England, undertaken to convince Europe that France is still a Great Power ?
But, it will be said, the Treasury is so anxious to save money that, unless there is a great outcry, and a grand debate, and a Commission of Inquiry by outsiders, nothing will be done. We doubt the anxiety to save money. If there is such anxiety, how is it that we are going to Ethiopia in row- boats to rescue an officer who remarks in an incidental manner
that he is going to raze the only city held by the enemy between himself and the country held by British troops? We
shall spend on the Expedition up the Nile more than any sum the reasonable Naval alarmists are at all likely to ask, and spend it without any distinct Parliamentary demand.
There is reluctance to spend without necessity, especially upon
armaments ; but let the Department once show the Cabinet that an outlay is indispensable, and it will be provided for. Mr. Childers has himself presided over the Navy, and ,Mr. Gladstone is conscious to pain of the new dangers in- volved in our incessant extensions of dominion in Asia,
Africa, and the Mediterranean. We do not believe, if a solid case were Made out, that there would be any resistance, and there is certainly none to be expected from Parliament, which,
as regards the Navy, is practically unanimous, even Radicals hardly criticising Naval outlay. It is the business of the Admirals in office, who alone know all the facts, to make out such a case if the foundation exists, not to shift their own work upon a Commission of men, who may or may not be as instructed as themselves, but who must in any case be only imperfectly responsible. Let the House of Commons but signify that it is uneasy at some imperfections in the Navy, and the Depart- ment will be ready enough with its figures and the Cabinet with its sanction to expenditure. What is needed is not inquiry in its official sense, but a little attention from Members, who in an evening can ascertain all the facts indispensable to an opinion.
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