THE " SMITTEN DE LISTE."
IT is quite evident that election by scrutin de liste is becom- ing the dominant question in French politics, and it is worth while, therefore, to study that proposal and its probable effects, more especially as the scheme has never been tried in any country except France. M. Bardoux proposes, then, with the approval of M. Gambetta, that election by districts should be abolished, and that each elector in a Department should have as many votes as there are candidates assigned to his De- partment. He cannot lump his votes, or plump for anybody, but must give in a list, containing as many names as there are vacancies. Supposing, for example, that the Departments of the Bouches du Rhone (Marseilles) is allowed eight members, each citizen must vote by a card, inscribed with eight names of legally-qualified candidates. As he probably will not care about eight, or even know eight, he will either take the list prepared by his party or his group en bloc, or he will erase from it a name or two, inserting those of his own especial favourites. As a rule, of course, he will influence the list as much as he can before the day of election, and then vote the "party ticket " as faithfully as an American does in a contest for the Presidency. The effect will be that which- ever party has a majority in the Bouches du Rhone will seat the whole of its candidates, leaving the minority in that Department entirely unrepresented. The name of a candidate locally popular might possibly creep in, being inserted on thousands of tickets, or in certain circum- stances, the Committee of Caucus might, as a compromise, admit hostile names—as, for instance, if Clericals and Extre- mists joined to carry Avignon against Bonapartists—but as a rule, each Department would be represented by its dominant party, and that alone. Any division of it of a different colour of opinion would fail to send up a representative.
The objections to this method of election are patent, and are very grave. In the first place, local minorities are extin- guished, and will either decline to vote altogether, or sympa- thise with agitators who advise resort to methods other than the ballot—to plebiscites, or even military revolts. The former result, indeed, is anticipated, and will be the justification for M. Bardoux's suggestion in his Bill that all voting should be compulsory, under penalty of a moderate but sufficient fine. In Departments of which great cities are the centre, the pea- Bantry may be totally silenced by the workmen ; while in Departments which are really only great cities, the wealthy, who live in quarters by themselves, will be absolutely crushed. Paris, for example, might, and probably would, send up twenty Clemenceaus. The whole influence, therefore, of each Depart- ment would be thrown one way ; and the minority, though, no doubt, its opinions might be reflected in the Chamber by strangers from a distance, as the Conservatives of Glasgow are represented by the senior Members for Liverpool, would lose the gratification of seeing them represented by men whom it had itself elected. It would, therefore, lose much of its acute interest in politics, as has happened with the cultivated and wealthy in America. Moreover the divisions of party would tend to become geographical, or as the Americans say " sectional," or as the Italians prefer to say, "regional." The old provincial boun- daries of France had often sound bases in differences either of character or circumstance, and entire regions, like Brittany, might be exclusively represented by the locally dominant party of the hour. How dangerous a mistake this might be has been shown in the whole modern history of France, and especially in that forgotten but most dangerous movement, the projected federation of Southern Departments during the war. And finally, it is not easy to believe that the system would not ultimately exclude great individualities from politics. It did not do so when first tried, but it was tried in a time of great danger, when the Committees were very new, and parties were doubtful of their own strength, and there was no time for the scheme to harden, or become debased. Its natural result is that wire-pullers should prepare lists, that they should regard obedience as the first of qualifications, and that they should omit from their lists all who might be suspected of in- dividuality, or who had become known enough to arouse strong animosities. The American President is very rarely, except by accident, the ablest man in the Union. Admitting, as we should do, that French tolerance for humdrum candidates is much less than English or American tolerance, we should still expect a gradual but certain deterioration in the capacity and independence of the Chamber, which would slowly be filled with men whom the Whips of the parties could praise as " perfectly safe."
On the other hand, the advocates of the scrutin de lisle have very strong arguments to adduce. They say the first necessity for France is to enable the electors to resist the pressure of personal and official and local influences. They think the rich too strong, and the Prefects and their subordinates too strong, and popular Clerics too strong, and even local agitators too strong, and they believe the election by list will paralyse them all. The electors called on to vote entire lista will vote on political or party grounds alone, and will not be moved by fear of indi- viduals, or listen to the argument that one bad Member can make little difference, in a Chamber of 600. They say also that eminent men of the right colour will be more certain of election than ever, for the Committees of selection will not be daunted by their local obscurity, or their want of influence in the arrondissement, or their want of money. The Committee must frame for each Department the list which will "go down " best, and the best list will be that which has the most attractive names. Indeed, they apprehend that a few names, like M. Gambetta, M. Clcnenceau, and M. de Mun, may be found recorded in too many lists, so forcing bye-elections. They consider that the regional difficulty will always exist, and will not be intensified by the change ; while they hold that it is expedient that Paris, being in the main Extremist, should return an Extremist representation. The minority may be disfranchised, but then the object of representation, as they contend, is to disfranchise minorities. Above all, they held that the first necessity of France is to obtain a Chamber in which the majority shall be great, resolute, and consistent, shall attend to general and not sectional interests, and shall determinedly support a determined and progressive Govern- ment. They conceive they will obtain this result from the scrutin de lisle, will paralyse the " groups," and will enable the dominant party to take great measures fearlessly. That they have reason for the last thought, they say, is proved by the conduct of the present Chamber itself, which is elected by arrondissement, and in which all branches of the Right are being aided by all the members who rely on local or petty interests for their seats to throw out the proposal. The opponents know, it is argued, how " homogeneous " the new Chamber will be, and are afraid it will not contain them. This, the election of a Chamber in which majority and minority shall be alike fairly uniform, and the minority, therefore, permanently powerless until the dissolution, is the true object of the Bill, and the one for which M. Gambetta, quitting his usual reserve, will. it is believed, give it all the support of his eloquence and his influence in the country.
We feel the full force of the last argument, for we see how very difficult steady administration in France tends to become. The legislative power, and therefore the controlling power, rests with the Chamber, and the Chamber, being nearly exempt from the chance of a penal dissolution, splits by degrees into groups, which combine, and separate, and recombine, until steady government becomes almost impossible. But that evil only shows the immense loss which France sustains by de- priving the Executive of a reasonable power of dissolution. The groups are all-powerful, because the Executive cannot appeal from them at discretion to the electors who send them up. Any combination not disapproved by the Senate and M. Grevy together can upset any Government, even though the electors are all the while strongly in its favour. The constituency in France is not allowed its due weight in the Constitution, and therefore the "groups" are allowed too much. The corrective for that evil is to replace a regulated power of dissolving in the hands of the Ministry, not to extinguish the voice of a minority till it has become a majority, and so reduce the civil history of France, and perhaps its whole history, to a series of sudden kaleidoscopic changes. We cannot feel sure that, without the power of dissolution, the scrutin de lisle will be fatal to the groups. They may form again, and though they will form within the same dominant party, " Caves " are at least as dangerous to Administrations as Third Parties or strong minorities either. No party, especially no Liberal party, can exist without differences of opinion ; and if these are suppressed by any means, the first use of deliberative assem- blies ceases to be felt, the Chamber becomes a mere Sovereign, and, from its sense of absolute authority, a very bad one. So far as the scrutin de lists extinguishes corrupt influences or official influences, it may do good, though we question if all " natural influences " can wisely be suppressed without deaden- ing local life ; but in extinguishing minorities, it will endanger the very life of the Representative system. If there is a necessity for a Republican Dictator—which we should strongly deny—let us have one, but not at the price of a system which enables each dominant party in turn to make its leader dictator, and suppresses not only power of action in the minority, but all power of argument and protest. So far as the scheme succeeds, it will tend to thrust the minor parties out of Parliament,—that is, to compel them to express them- selves through other means. What is that, but to lower pi s, tanto the moral authority of the Chamber, the only authority left in France to which all parties will bow, without even threatening an appeal ? We may exaggerate the danger, and we do not forget some circumstances in France, such as the sturdiness of the great mass of electors who own property, which may mitigate it, but we cannot, accept the scrutin de lisle as an improvement in the electoral law. It will cure many evils of representation, but at the price of lowering and mutilating representation itself.
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