THE NEW ASPECT OF AFFAIRS IN MALAYA.
IT is very easy to deride or to denounce the expression " manifest destiny," but English Ministers must often be tempted to believe that there is some truth in the idea. They are always being compelled to govern somebody. Nobody, for instance, a month ago was dreaming of increasing British pos- sessions in the Malay Peninsula. The Government would have said, had they been asked the question in Parliament, that they had never thought of Malaya since Mr. Disraeli made his cele- brated speech about the Straits of Malacca ; and Lord Carnarvon would have asked why, with Fiji, and New Guinea, and Griqua- land affairs upon his hands, he should be suspected of wanting to increase his fresh embarrassments and responsibilities. As for the country, it scarcely knew where the Peninsula was, and had no more wish to take a huge cantle out of it than to acquire territory in Morocco or Manchooria. And yet we venture to say that another annexation must be the end of the imbroglio at Perak. The usual result has followed our presence in an Asiatic country, and the local officials have plunged the Home authorities into difficulties out of which there will ultimately be but one honourable method of escape. As our readers may remember, Sir Andrew Clarke, then Governor of the Straits Settlements, and an officer of unusual ability and zeal, got tired some months ago of the lawlessness in the centre of the Malay Peninsula. All manner of small chieftains were attacking one another, and oppressing Chinese miners, some of whom were our subjects, and sheltering the most dangerous and desperate of Asiatic villains, the commanders of Malay pirate prahus. He decided therefore to adopt the only system we have yet found in Asia to be consistent at once with subordination and auto- nomy, namely, the appointment at the native Courts of " Residents," — that is, Envoys whose advice the native Prince agrees by treaty to take. This system is universal throughout India, and whenever the Resident is a person of any tact, or willing to trouble himself to understand the local situation, it works exceedingly well. The Resident lets the native Court alone as much as he can, but prohibits all local wars, all great political crimes—for instance, the murder of heirs who are popular with the people—all great oppressions— as, for example, unreasonable forfeitures—and all unwise taxa- tion,—as, for example, transit duties. The native Prince retains his authority very little impaired, for the British guarantee in many directions strengthens his hands ; the natives re- tain their careers, for we send no •officials, and gradually a higher tone is infused into the administration. Sir Andrew Clarke thought this scheme would work in Malaya, and ac- cordingly induced the chiefs of Perak to accept Sultan Abdoollah as their head, and to admit Residents to their Courts, to whom they were, like the Indian Princes, to pay moderate fixed salaries. The scheme was approved from home, and seemed most able, but it lacked in Malaya one element of success. The chieftains did not see that behind each Resident stood the irresistible power of the British Government. One Prince therefore, the Pretender to the Perak sovereignty, Sultan Ismail, broke out in rebel- lion, and all the Princes, including, apparently, Sultan Abdoollah, appeared to regard the Residents as unimportant people. Their advice was not taken, and their salaries were not paid, and it is difficult to believe that, the amounts being so moderate, the failure was wholly involuntary. The Straits Government, of course, could not tolerate this state of affairs, which involved a breach of fresh treaties, contempt shown towards the British Govern- ment, and in the near future a renewal of the old disturbances. It was necessary to show that the British Government intended its treaties to be respected, and had Sir W. Jervois /required his ex- perience in India, instead of in the English bureaus, he would, we think, have known how to make his power felt in Perak.. He would have strengthened the hands of Sultan Abdoollah, have aided him with a couple of gunboats, and perhaps a mountain battery from India, to put down his internal enemies; have shown him how to organise a "contingent "—that is, a small native force with European officers—and have made every Malay feel, as every inhabitant of an Indian native State feels, that a British Resident may be an uncomfortable, but is, at all events, an inevitable and irresistible work of God. Sir W. Jervois decided, however, upon a very different course. With- out, apparently, any orders from the Colonial Office, which, in its Circular to the Press of November 23, intimates that it had not previously received his prochunations, he made a new arrangement with Sultan Abdoollah, under which the British Government assumes the administration of Perak, in the name of Sultan Abdoollah. The districts are to be governed by British " Commissioners and Assistant-Commissioners,"' and the Residents are appointed Judges, with power of life and death, and of appointing all magistrates ; and are " to collect and expend " the entire revenues of the country, which, how- ever, remains under the nominal sovereignty of Sultan, Abdoollah. This new arrangement was announced by three proclamations, and created such a ferment that a Malay tore the notifications down, and commenced the 6neute which resulted in the murder of Mr. Birch.
There may, of course, be circumstances, as yet unrevealed, which made the course adopted by Sir W. Jervois seem a wise one, or indeed the only one open to him to take, but on the evidence as yet produced he has been singularly ill-advised. His proclamations, one of which is signed by himself, amount to a decree of annexation, and of annexation in the worst of all possible forms. The direct government of an Asiatic province by a European acting through Europeans is, as we all know, not only possible, but easy, and is at this moment in force throughout territories occupied by 200,000,000 of people. The direct government of an Asiatic State by a European acting through natives, though much more difficult, is also possible, and is being tried at this moment in every Indian State where the Prince is a minor, or for any reason under sequestration or suspension. But the government of a native State by Europeans for the benefit and in the name of a native Prince is very nearly impossible. In the first place, the Europeans never know what to do with the revenues which flow into the Treasury from the moment their good government begins. It seems monstrous, and is monstrous,, to let the entire surplus which they have created be spent in wasteful or injurious prodigalities, at the discretion of a man who has nothing to do with the prosperity that enriches him ; and yet if the Rajah is allowanced, the treaty seems to be broken, and in fact is so, for he no longer rules. In the next place, the task of government is immensely impeded ,by the discontent of the people, who think the puppet Rajah ought to be able to hear appeals from the British, and who are of course told by those who surround him that if he were made all-powerful every grievance would end. And in the third place, the Rajah and his Council would interfere, if not directly by advice or threats, then by intrigue and promises, by building up a party of their own, and by refusing or delay- ing unexpectedly their consent to necessary measures. The scheme has been tried over and over again in India—once by Clive himself—has invariably failed, and has always compelled us either to pension off the Rajah, which he thinks oppressive, or to dismiss him, which is in his subjects' eyes annexation with- out the conquest which, to Asiatic minds, makes annexation fair; or to retire,—that is, to hand over the vast mass of interests created by equitable and strong government back to a barbarian, or at best a semi-civilised rule. To surmount a momentary and not very serious difficulty by pledging the British Government to a policy so repeatedly discredited is most unwise, and unless Sir W. Jervois, as is quite possible, has explanations to offer not apparent on the face of affairs—for his measure would not in any way prevent a massacre—he has assumed a very 'serious responsibility. So far as we can see, there is now no way out of the scrape except buying-out Sultan Abdoollah before he knows the magical effect of European management upon a native treasury. If we beat the Malay insurgents and then retreat, every Malay will say, and say justly, that British designs can be defeated even by unsuccessful insurrection, and that the only way to make us moderate is to fight hard. If, on the other hand, we beat the Malay insurgents and carry out Sir W. Jervois's proclamations, we shall have to endure the whole burden of organising a large anarchical Malay country, without reaping the reward, either in revenue 'or in credit, .
which is our due for the work done. We might indeed administer for a time, and then reseat the native officials, but the result of that will be merely civil war. Perak is full of minerals. The moment we begin to administer the country, British capital and Chinese labour will flow into it in streams ; and if, say, ten years hence, we surrender both to Malays, both will revolt, and the Chinese, then numbering tens of thousands, will make short work of opponents whom they hold no more fit to govern them than their own ourang-outangs. There may be no " manifest destiny," or no destiny at all, but Sir W. Jervois, apparently out of his own head, has made us claim supremacy in Perak, and we must carry out his will.
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