China prepares for war

John Erickson On 8 may, that enemy whom Sir Neil Cameron so recently described as being common to ourselves and to China and whose lair is Moscow hammered on China's northeastern door in rude and peremptory fashion. According to the Chinese account thirty Soviet soldiers intruded to a depth of !our kilometres on Chinese territory, shootIn.g and wounding several Chinese in addition to beating up others. The Soviet resPonse stressed the accidental nature of this incident: a mistake genuinely incurred While Soviet border guards were in hot Pursuit of some dangerotis criminal, and Nvhen these same river border guards on the Ussuri mistook the Chinese bank for the Krestovskie Islands which are Soviet. Having already denounced this action as an organised 'military provocation', the Chinese are apparently dissatisfied with this explanation (which does indeed sound ante) and dismissed it as one not conforming with 'reality'. Not unnaturally, with memories of the Ussuri river clash in March 1969 which cost 86 Chinese and 240 Russian casualties in fierce fighting, Chinese suspicions have been aroused and there is a hint of the Soviet whip being flicked at a time when talks on Sino-Soviet boundary problems had just been resumed in yet another spurt in this eight-year marathon or possibly in conjunction with Chinese preoccupation with the modernisation of its defence forces. Indeed, the Soviet plan, involving as it does energetic activity by Soviet military advisers in Indochina and deliberate interference with the proposed Sino-Japanese 'treaty of friendship', amounts to nothing less than the 'strategic encirclement' of China.

Rather more dramatic in its form and context, this frontier incident is nonetheless simply one among innumerable incidents along the Sino-Soviet border, mostly trifling and very local affairs concerning stray animals and stray humans. However, the Chinese can only look with a jaundiced eye on the Soviet military deployments along their borders: on 13 April, Mongolia reportedly told the Chinese government that the three Soviet divisions stationed there would remain, the Soviet troops were present `by invitation' and in response to a Chinese threat, a retort (which cannot have come as any surprise to Peking) in response to a Chinese demand that the Soviet Union withdraw its forces from Mongolia and the Chinese border. Though slackened since the tense and dangerous days of 1969, the Soviet military build-up in the Soviet Far East has continued steadily over the past few years. Four Soviet Military Districts (Central Asia, Siberia, the Trans-Baikal and the Far Eastern MD) cover the SinoSoviet frontier, with a total of thirty-nine motor rifle divisions, six tank divisions and one airborne division, the Far Eastern Military District presenting by far the greatest concentration of force with nineteen motor-rifle divisions, two tank divisions and an airborne division. In general terms, this deployment pattern has not changed substantially since 1945, when Soviet forces were used in the Far Eastern campaign to attack the Japanese — a poss ible pointer to offensive operations aimed at Manchuria and northern China, though my own interpretation is that the Soviet military build-up in the Far East represents more the implementation of a decision (also taken in 1969) to embark on a permanent and large-scale garrisoning of the Soviet Far East.

Other developments point to this longterm policy of permanent garrisoning of the Soviet Far East (and here one should remember that twenty years ago this same frontier line was held by a mere fifteen divisions, all in the days of Sino-Soviet friendship). The new SAM railway, built by Soviet army construction and railway troops, is an additional track running north of the Trans-Siberian (and thus well Out of Chinese reach): the completion of this track will mean more urban settlements, more factories and speedier transit for military equipment. New airfields to accommodate military transports are being built northeast of Vladivostok and new bases for the Pacific Fleet are in the offing, a fleet which is a considerable force and which could be used for seaward operations (including blockade and amphibious landings) against China. Meanwhile the Soviet command keeps one-quarter of its IRBM/MRBM arsenal trained on targets in China and already the latest SS-20s have been emplaced east of the Urals.

The imminence, even the short-term prospect of an all-out Soviet military cam paign against China is probably not one of Peking's most pressing concerns: though the BAM railway and air transport could speed the process of bringing the Soviet Far Eastern forces up to full War strength, a minimum of thirty days and probably two months would be needed for all-out war.

The Soviet command might well adapt its 1945 battle plan to present conditions, striking on Peking from Mongolia and .repeating its drive into Manchuria, which would cost China much of its heavy industry and the Taching oilfield. On the other hand, Soviet military action might well be limited intervention designed to 'protect' some dissident group, the 'true' Chinese Communists who might be brought within some Soviet-controlled enclave. Certainly Moscow misses no chance to identify • such sources of dissidence and could well offer 'fraternal protection', should the need arise. It may well be that Moscow still hopes to separate 'true Marxist-Leninists' from a leadership clique they dislike, even as it pursues its containment policy towards China (including more intensive development of Central Asia and Siberia) and steadily piles up military strength and applies military pressure.

What, then, of Chinese 'strategy'? The Chinese press does not hesitate to point to the 'million-strong army' the Soviet Army -on the northern borders, at the same time warning of the danger of surprise attack (citing as one example the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968), hence the need following the precepts of Chairman Mao and Chairman Hua to accelerate 'the revolutionisation and the modernisation of our Army.' The theme of the inevitability of a third world war receives constant attention: the danger arises from the imperialism of the United States and the socialimperialism of the Soviet Union, from this mutual struggle for global hegemony and the consequent arms race which must finally engulf all in war, including China, though the main theatre will be Europe. The main enemy is the Soviet Union, against which China seeks to build a 'united front' a tactic which accounts not only for the limited rapprochement with the United States but also with western Europe and Japan. In the case of the latter two, by appealing to nationalist feelings here China can play a card against both the Soviet Union and the United States, should it so

please. This political tactic, which is not dissimilar to that developed after the 7th Comintern Congress and the beginning of the anti-Japanese struggle, is backed by a strategic view which sees the world divided into three elements, the super-powers, the second intermediate zone and the Third World. Thus, China has as potential allies not only the national bourgeoisie but also the global peasantry and the burgeoning proletariat of the Third World. When addressing the Third World, China will castigatt both brands of imperialism as a mortal danger: when directed towards western Europe and Japan, this opinion emphasises the danger of 'social-imperialism' (the Soviet Union), supports NATO and encourages Japan to develop military self-sufficiency even as it warns that the United States may not be so sure a shield and defence. Certain American support and presence in Asia may be welcome but not as a permanent feature of the Asian scene: Keng Piao of the CPC's International Liaison Department intimated that one day it will be 'Please, Uncle Sam, pack and go,' while more recently Chairman Hua on his visit to North Korea laid the blame for Korea's misfortunes at the door of United States imperialism and called for withdrawal.

Given the Chinese attitude which envisages great danger from the Soviet Union and only uneasy counterbalance via the United States, current defence policies and the modernisation of Chinese forces must assume considerable prominence. Economics and defence are closely related and the 'four modeinisations' programme encompasses agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology, targets reaching to the year 2000. Though the Chinese preference would appear to be, logically enough, strong and modernised conventional forces supported by a nuclear deterrent, the awkward question of defence expenditure and the internal allocation between arms and services of such resources. In brief, military modernisation is and is likely to remain largely dependent on general economic modernisation. Strategic forces include a small force of missiles and bombers, with two types of IRBM/MRBM (CSS-1 and CSS-2) and two ICBM types (CSS-3 and CSS-X-4) and 80 TU-16 (Soviet-designed) bombers for air nuclear delivery. A submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and a nuclear-pow ered missile submarine may be under development, while there is also obvious Chinese interest in developing space sys tems. Progress on strategic weapons sys

tems must inevitably bite into those resources which could be used for rapid

modernisation of the conventional forces, though in view of the Chinese projection of the world power balance it is unlikely that the strategic programme will be slowed.

'Modernisation,' however, is not quite the simple issue it seems. In the first place, the internal politics of the Chinese military add their own complications: while mod

ernisation and professionalism received fresh emphasis, the older concept of a 'people's war' and the role of the militia drowning the invader in 'the vast sea of our people's militia' was given a fresh airing. It is possible that a working compromise could, emerge, something on the lines of Chen Hsi Lien's modest programme of modernisation concentrated on 'the army of steel', the select formations of the PLA combined with an armed militia. This is a political battle as much as a debate on strategy, tactics and technology. As for that technology itself, though seeking limited and very selective outside aid, it is inconceivable that modernisation would be widely based in external, non-Chinese sources, not to mention the fact that economic considerations must preclude such a buying spree. That selectivity has been well demonstrated in western Europe, with special purchases of Swedish, British and French equipment (the latter source reportedly providing HOT anti-tank missiles and its manufacturing technology). No doubt, bearing in mind China's chastening experience with the USSR, these purchases will be carefully spread to avoid any undue reliance on a single country or supplier. Where possible, the search will be for licensed production in China itself, though not all Chinese experience in this realm has been happy. Meanwhile, perhaps the most immediate resort will be to an intensified training programme to squeeze as much as possible in the way of performance and effectiveness from existing equipment, though that has been scathingly caricatured by the National Defence Scientific and Technological Commission which attacked 'gradualism' and demanded that the pLA should possess all the weapons and combat means which an enemy has or may have: broadswords against guided missiles make no sense.

The modernisation debate will no doubt continue. Meanwhile China will continue to

urge the strengthening of NATO, self

reliance and military progress for the Japanese, all out of understandable self interest. There seems to be more than mere rhetoric in the Chinese assertion that 'We, must embrace the concept of inevitable war and consequently 'put ourselves on a foot; ing to fight on a large scale at an early date.

China is hardly likely to join NATO or even want to (though the recent trade accord signed with the EEC is a significant political step). However, if the Chinese prognosis is correct, the fate of China and that of western Europe are inextricably linked, point put much more savagely by the Soviet press which sees in Chinese diplomatic moves in Europe a design to turn European nations against the Soviet Union, wreck the Helsinki agreements and 'reinforce the aggressive NATO bloc.' Such vituperation can only confirm for Peking that its course Is right and that Europe is a crucial area in a vital power struggle. No doubt Peking also hopes that the Europeans will recognise this for themselves in timely fashion.