BOOKS

Crisis at the Curragh

By ROBERT BLAKE

THE fiftieth anniversary of 1914 is producing its predictably heavy crop of books. They divide into two categories. The first and larger are Popular histories presenting in assimilable form the facts often buried in a multitude of dry volumes. The second and smaller actually tell us something new. Mr. Thomson's story* of events from July 24 to August 4 is a good example of the former category. He draws much—and with ample acknowledgement—upon Albertini's mas- sive study of the origins of the war, and he makes good use of that neglected source, old newspaper files. The result is a series of brilliant photographs of familiar scenes taken from un- usual angles. It is a superb piece of reporting, but it tells us nothing that could not be found elsewhere.

Sir James Fergusson on the other hand has made a real contribution to history. He,has come as near as anyone can come to writing a definitive account of the curious episode which gives his book its title. There has been one previous study, by Mr. A. P. Ryan, who used some, though not all, of the same sources. But he did not attempt an hour-by-hour narrative— rather, a general analysis of background and consequences. Using his father's unpublished papers, the Royal archives, and many other sources, Sir James Fergusson has investigated the affair with great care and thoroughness. He, writes extremely well and his clear arrangement is a model of historical narrative.

Early in 1914 all efforts at a compromise over Irish Home Rule had failed. The Ulster Volun- teers with the full backing of the English Con- servative Party intended to proclaim a pro- visional government in Belfast as soon as the Home Rule Bill became law, which could not he before June at the earliest. Until that date they had every interest in keeping to a strictly legal and peaceful course, and no evidence has at any time emerged to suggest that they contemplated doing otherwise. Neverthe- less, Sir Arthur Paget, GOC Forces in Ireland, was summoned to London on March 18 and 19 for urgent consultations. The principal figures whom he saw were Seely, the War Minister, French, CIGS, and Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty. No record was kept of the numerous discussions which ensued, nor did Paget receive any written instructions, although Asquith's biographer, J. A. Spender, appears to have deliberately falsified a document in order to give the contrary impression. (This scandalous Piece of work, which has misled several writers including the author of this review, is very Properly exposed and castigated by Sir James Fergusson. It is not the only example of Spender's disingenuousness.)

On March 19 Churchill, ordered the 3rd Battle

* THE TWELVE DAYS. By George Malcolm Thomson. (Hutchinson, 25s.) t THE CURRAGli INCIDENT. By Sir James Fergusson. (Faber, 30s.)

Squadron to steam at once from Spanish waters

to Lamlash. sixty miles from Belfast. The previ- ous day General Macready was appointed Military Governor of that city with instructions which have never been revealed. On March 20, back in Dublin, Paget summoned the relevant commanders from the Curragh Camp and else- where, told them that he expected the country to be 'in a blaze' next day, that all government offices in Belfast would be occupied at dawn, and that he meant to display 'such an enormous force' that resistance would he impossible. He then said that officers with domicile in Ulster would be allowed to `disappear.' Any others with scruples about marching north must offer to re- sign their commissions, in which case they would at once be dismissed from the Service. The com- manders were ordered to put these alternatives to their officers and secure answers that day. Faced with this intolerable ultimatum the officers reacted with universal indignation, but they did not all make the same choice. Sir Charles Fer- gusson (the author's father), commanding 5th Division, felt it his duty to stay and persuaded the vast majority, 280, of his officers to do like- wise. But Sir Hubert Gough, who commanded the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, elected to resign, and his example was followed by fifty-seven out of his seventy officers.

As soon as the news reached London the Government saw that Paget had made a major blunder. Moreover there had been another hitch. Macready was suddenly taken ill. He could not go to Belfast. Seely ordered Paget to appoint someone in his place, but omitted to pass on whatever instructions had been given to Mac- ready. Perhaps he dared not telegraph them. At this juncture Asquith intervened. He cancelled Churchill's orders to the 3rd Battle Squadron, and insisted that every effort should be made to persuade Gough to return to duty. But Gough and his colonels insisted on a written pledge that they would not be required to enforce the Home Rule Bill on Ulster. Without Asquith's authority this was given by Seely and French. The Prime Minister repudiated it in the House, though he took care not to send any official letter to Gough. The War Minister and CIGS were obliged to resign, but it was clear that the Army could never now be used to 'coerce' Ulster.

In the tempestuous parliamentary debates which followed two charges were repeatedly made. Radicals argued that Tory cavalry officers playing a role more familiar on the Continent than in Britain had intervened actively in politics to sabotage Home Rule. The Opposition was no less convinced that the Government, or a clique within it, was engaged in a 'plot' to provoke the Ulster Volunteers into rebellion and then crush them with overwhelming force—a plot which had been frustrated at the last minute by Gough.

The first charge has little substance. Apart from the egregious Henry Wilson in Whitehall no serving soldier appears to have engaged in politi- cal intrigue. All the evidence suggests that if Gough and his officers had been given straight orders to march north they would have obeyed.

These they never had, and it is a gross distortion to describe what they did as 'mutiny.' The author considers, however, that credit should be given to those officers, too readily forgotten, who fol- lowed his father's example. If everyone had re- signed, the blow to Army morale would have been shattering. In fact, about the right number did; enough to prevent action which might have led to civil war, but not so many as to damage the Army irreparably.

What about the Conservative accusation of a 'plot'? It was always hotly denied by the Liberals. Clearly Asquith kii..nv nothing about it— on that point the author's evidence is con- clusive. But the more sensible Conservatives always acquitted the Prime Minister. The real charge was that Churchill, Seely, possibly Lloyd George, and one or two others stretched their authority . as members of the Cabinet Committee dealing with Ulster, in order to make moves which would precipitate a crisis, and of which the majority of their colleagues would have strongly disapproved had they known.

It is impossible to read Hansard without sus- pecting that something was being hushed up. The contradictions, prevarications and down- right lies of the various Government spokesmen were exactly what always happens on these occa- sions. Moreover, such features of the crisis as Churchill's orders to the 3rd Battle Squadron, the absence of written instructions for Paget, the refusal of the Government to reveal their reasons for fearing a coup in Ulster—their favourite ex- cuse—all suggest that plans existed which they dared not reveal.

Sir James Fergusson concludes that there prob- ably was a 'plot,' though not quite of the nature suspected by the Opposition. Churchill may well have been genuinely furious when Balfour accused him of being an agent provocateur. It is more likely that the plan was to overawe the Ulster Volunteers into complete submission than to provoke a rebellion. It never came off, partly because of Macready's illness, partly because Paget, who was an Irascible dunderhead, presen- ted his officers with blunt alternatives never in- tended to be put. On any view and with every allowance for the situation in Ulster, the 'plot' was a piece of reckless folly. Churchill's ultimate biographer will have to deal very carefully with this matter which on current evidence stands to the discredit of all concerned. When Asquith dis- covered what was up he forced his rebellious subordinates into reverse, but he had to pass off the affair in Parliament as a misunderstanding if he was to prevent the break-up of his Cabinet. Liberal apologists adhered to this line at the time and have done so ever since. Yet it is incredible that Paget misunderstood all his orders, even if he misunderstood some. And it is inconceivable that the Government would have backed him as they did, if his blunders had been all that was at stake. Bonar Law, as quoted in Hansard, had what seems to be the last, if not the most civil, word.

MR. CHURCHILL: . . . It is admitted that on this! point a misunderstanding arose.

MR. BONAR LAW: Rubbish!

MR. CHURCHILL: Do I understand the RI Hon. gentleman to say 'Rubbish'?

MR. BONAR LAW Yes.

And rubbish it remains until Churchill's own 'papers or the relevant War Office files prove otherwise. I doubt whether they will or whether any fresh revelations will seriously challenge Sir James Fergusson's fascinating account of this strange, dramatic, and hitherto mysterious episode.