BOOKS.

THE LIFE OF THE PRINCE CONSORT.•

[FIRST NOTICE.]

SIR THEODORE MARTIN has completed his work, and completed it in a manner which has fairly entitled him to the honour•- conferred upon him by the Queen ou its conclusion. It is well done from beginning to end, iu its way,—a too courtly way for the general reader, a way that gives you the impression of a perpetual attitude of obeisance, and that reflects, moreover, too much even of the passing moods of Court opinion. There is no ignoring the wide difference in drift and effect between the volume concerning the outbreak of the Crimean war, which was pre- pared /afm-e the reappearance of the Eastern Question on the scene of European politics, and the volume concerning its conclusion, which was prepared after that reappearance. Nor is there any possibility of ignoring the difference in tone assumed towards such statesmen as Mr. Gladstone in the earlier and later volumes of the work. In a word, the book reflects not merely the general moral atmosphere of the Court, which it was inevitable,—if we were to have the advantage of any free communication of original documents, that it should reflect,—but even the momentary wave of Court opinion concerning leading statesmen, which we think it was by no means desirable that it should reflect, and which, in the preface to his first volume, Sir Theodore Martin expressed his intention to avoid. Of this criticism we will immediately give an illustra- tion from the volume now under review. In the meantime, we must say that, take it for what it is, and what it was pretty sure to be if the author were to continue from the commencement to the close, as it was not undesirable for many purposes that he in confidential communication and full sympathy with the Queen, the Life is well done. Oue wearies of the constant admiration expressed for everything the Prince Consort said,— whether it was wise, as it often was ; or common-place, as it often was ; or unwise, as it sometimes was. And one habitually feels that a little frank criticism from the bio- grapher would greatly increase the interest of the book. But if it was to be uniformly stately and courtly, it could hardly have been uniformly stately and courtly in a better fashion. Si,: Theodore Martin's style is deeply impregnated with his atmosphere,—which is a somewhat close and official atmosphere, —but, for a style so affected, it is in good-taste, and he keeps within the limits of good-sense. He performs his obeisances too frequently to the rare thoughtfulness and kindliness of the Prince Consort ; but after all, the thoughtfulness and kindliness of the Prince Consort were of a rare order, and Sir Theodore Martin knows very well when his hero is at his best, and when. he is a little overburdened by the terribly trying conditions of a royal position ; and he does not admire the Prince quite so elaborately when he is in the latter case, as he does when he is really himself. Very few men who could have adapted them- selves at all to Sir Theodore Martin's conditions, could have written the book so well as Sir Theodore Martin has written it. And perhaps, on the whole, it was better that it should be written in the first instance by one who could adapt himself to these conditions, or we might never have had placed before us all

the interesting materials we have got. Still, now there is room, if any able literary man likes to attempt it, for a really impartial estimate of the Prince Consort as a statesman, founded on these interesting volumes, but disencumbered of their monotonous: admiration and superfluous detail.

We have said that we would give from this last volume an illustration of Sir Theodore Martin's failure to keep that " attitude of strict neutrality " iu dealing with political events which, in his preface to the first volume, be declared it had been at least his aim to maintain. He is compelled in this closing volume, which relates to the years 1860 and 1861, to deal with the question of national armaments and national expendi- ture, which, during Lord Pahnerston's last Government,. assumed considerable importance when it emerged in relation

• The Life of his Royal Highness the Prince Consort. By Theodore Martin. With. Portraits. Vol. V., concluding the Work. London: Smith and Elder. 1880.

to the expenditure on fortifications after the Franco-Italian war and the scare caused by the annexation of Savoy and Nice which followed that war. It is well known that Mr. Glad- stone thought the expenditure proposed at that time on national fortifications excessive, and especially, considering that it was an excessive expenditure, one unfairly thrown upon the future. Indeed he was perhaps not far from separating himself from Lord Pahnerston's Government on this issue. Sir Theodore Martin makes the most of this. He quotes passages from Lord Paltnerstou's private communications to the Queen, which are couched in a spirit decidedly contemptuous to Mr. Gladstone, the quotations being evidently intended to depreciate Mr. Gladstone in public esteem. Thus on page 99 we are told :—" In writing to the Queen (24th May) reporting the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet upon the subject, Lord Palmerston mentioned that the Duke of Newcastle had told him that Mr. Gladstone's intention was to resign, if the works were to be done by loan. ` Viscount Palmerston hopes,' he added, to be able to overcome his objection, but if that should prove impossible, however great the loss to the Government by the retirement of Mr. Gladstone, it would be better to lose Mr. Gladstone, than to run the risk of losing Portsmouth or Plymouth.' " And again, on page 148, there is a passage taken from a still more con- temptuous communication :—" The Fortifications Bill had been introduced by Lord Palmerston himself, in a vigorous speech, on the 23rd of July. Writing to the Queen the next day, he [Lord Palmerston] said, Mr. Gladstone told Viscount Palmerston this evening that he wished it to be understood, that though acquiescing in the step now taken about the fortifications, he kept himself free to take such course as he may think fit upon

that subject next year, to which Viscount Palmerston entirely assented. That course will probably be the same which Mr. Gladstone has taken this year, namely, ineffectual opposition and ultimate acquiescence.' " Sir Theodore Martin does not tell us that in reality Mr. Gladstone's opposition was not in- effectual, that in 1862 Lord Palmerston found so strong a feeling in the House of Commons in the same direction that he gravely modified and reduced his scheme. Nor are we told what Mr. Glad- stone's view precisely was ; but as we do learn that his objection was rather to the mode of payment by loan for these fortifica- tions, than to the payment for them at all, it seems probable that Mr. Gladstone thought that though the scare was exces- sive, it was reasonable enough to gratify the wish of the people for perfect safety, so long as they did not throw the burden of their anxieties upon posterity. If that were his real view, -as, from Mr. Gladstone's speeches at Manchester in April, 1862, it would, we think, appear to have been, it would agree very remarkably with the view he has taken within the last year or two of the finance of Sir Stafford Northcote in rela- tion to the accumulated deficits of the present Ministry. Bnt -what we complain of in Sir Theodore Martin is that while he gives us this very hostile glimpse of Mr. Gladstone's financial objections to the expenditure,—or, at all events, to the mode of providing for the expenditure,—on national fortifica- tions, he conceals from us the great effect produced both on Lord Palmerston and on Mr. Disraeli by Mr. Gladstone's line of action, and gives us a most distorted and misleading view of the latter's attitude in relation to the same subject in the same years. The only notice he takes of Mr. Disraeli's attitude on this subject is the following :— " One of the visitors, who followed Lord Palmerston, was Mr. Disraeli, from whom the Prince gathered the general views of the Conservative Opposition as to their policy in the approaching Session. Their strength was considerable, composed, as they were, of a com- pact body of three hundred members ; but they had no wish for the return of their leaders to office, and, indeed, were anxious to strengthen the hands of the Government in a bold national policy. A movement for a reduction of the expenses of our armaments, which had been initiated by Mr. Cobden and his friends, and had -taken the shape of a letter to Lord Palmerston, signed by about sixty members of Parliament, calling for such a reduction, had shown the existence of a considerable division in the ranks of the usual Minis- terial supporters. Many of the latter had, however, declined to sanction this appeal, believing, to use the expression of one of their number, General de Lacy Evans, ' that it was neither safe nor ex- pedient to disarm the country.' But the working majority of the Government was not so large as to make the defection, on questions of finance, of so large a section of their party otherwise than embar- rassing. The Conservative party, Mr. Disraeli said, were in no way inclined to take advantage of this state of things. On the contrary, they were prepared to support the Government, all they required from them, in return, being that they should state explicitly the principles of their policy, and not enter into a line of what he termed

democratic finance.' These remarks were made without reserve, and in communicating their tenor to Lord Palmerston (24th January),

the Prince added Mr. Disraeli said, no Minister since Mr. Pitt had been so powerful as you might be. The Conservative party was ready not only to give general support to a steady and patriotic policy, but even to help the Minister out of scrapes, if he got into any.' This time- honoured rule of an honourable Opposition was strictly observed in the Session which ensued ; and Lord Palmerston's biographer states, that an attempt by the Radicals to enlist the Conservatives in a joint effort to turn out the Government proved wholly unsuccessfal—(Life of Lord Palmerston, Vol. II., p. 205)."—Vol. V., pp. 286-7.

And from that, of course, the reader would conclude that Mr. Disraeli had done all in his power to sustain the Government in an expenditure which he believed to be not only desirable, but needful for the national safety. Yet, in point of fact, in the celebrated speech on bloated armaments, delivered by him in relation to Mr. Stansfeld's motion in June, 1862, he made a de- termined attack on the Government on this very point, and bit- terly condemned his own follower, Mr. Walpole, for withdrawing the amendment which Lord Palmerston declared that he would accept as a vote of want of confidence, even describing Mr. Wal- pole,—it was on the eve of the Derby day,—as a favourite who had " bolted." Possibly Sir Theodore Martin Will say that his Life does not extend to the year 1862, but only to the death of the Prince Consort, in 1861. But the fact is, that on this sub- ject he anticipates the discussions of the year 1862 in relation

to Lord Palmerston's policy, and quotes Lord Palmerston's comments on Mr. Gladstone's speeches of that year, in order to illustrate the mistake of Mr. Gladstone, while he neverthe- less fails to record the signal illustration given by Mr. Disraeli himself of the little meaning that should be attached to his own professions of 1861. In 1862 Mr. Disraeli actually threw his whole weight into the scale of economy and Mr. Gladstone. Here is a sentence from his speech of June 2nd :—" The first duty of the Minister is to make such reductions as shall equalise the charge and revenue of the country ; and the policy inti- mated should be a diminution in that war taxation which, used in time of peace, is sapping and wasting our financial reserve,— that financial reserve which is the surest source of our influ- ence with foreign nations, and our best security for our prosperity at home." Now, we submit that if Sir Theodore Martin was so anxious to show us how well Mr. Gladstone's

objections to the policy in relation to national fortifications, and Lord Palmerston's answer to those objections as developed in 1862, illustrated the line taken by those statesmen in 1861, as to give us the story of the following year by anticipation, he ought to have given it impartially, and been equally anxious to show us by anticipation how little Mr. Disraeli's course in 1862 agreed with his professions in 1861. As it is, he poses Mr. Disraeli, as being in Opposition, the noble bulwark of an imperial and so-called national policy, whereas he proved him- self in that year its active and most effective assailant.

This is not, however, the only case in which Sir Theodore Martin shows how strong is his bias towards the reigning Premier. Here is the only notice we have of Mr. Disraeli's policy in relation to Italian affairs, in the great year of Italian revolution (1860) :—

" In the House of Commons, attention was chiefly concentrated on the affairs of Italy, where the prevailing rumours of an alliance, offensive and defensive, with France to prevent interference by any Foreign Power, were made use of with great effect by Mr. Disraeli to extract from the Government an explicit declaration of their policy. The very strong feeling against any such alliance elicited by Mr. Disraeli's speech showed conclusively that any engagement of this kind would have been fatal to the Ministry. No part of what he said commanded warmer applause than a passage in which, after depicting the absolute uncertainty that existed as to the solution which the Italians themselves would propose for the extrication of their affairs, he went on to say What is the moral that I draw from these conflicting opinions P It is that Italy is at the present moment in a state far beyond the management and settlement of Courts, Cabinets, and Congresses. It is utterly impossible to create a national independence by protocols, and to guarantee public liberty by a Congress. All this has been tried before, and the consequence has been a sickly and short-lived offspring. Never mind what faults or previous errors may have been committed. I say that what is going on in Italy can only be solved by the will, the energy, the sentiment, and thought of the population themselves. The whole question, in my mind, is taken out of the sphere of Congresses and Cabinets. We are at this moment pure from any circumstances of previous interference in these affairs, and it is of the utmost import. ance that we should remain so.' As Lord Palmerston listened to the cheers with which these words and others to the same effect were received, he could scarcely have regretted that his Cabinet had re- fused to be persuaded by his Memorandum of the 5th of January, and that he was therefore able to assure the House that at the time he spoke her Majesty's Government was 'totally free from any engage- ment whatever with any foreign Power upon the affairs of Italy? No less unqualified assurance, he must have felt, would have satisfied the House or the country ; and when the demand of France for the

cession of Savoy, of which he had been for some days aware, came to be known, as in a few days it was sure to be, ho could not but feel that, if it had found his Government under any pledge to France, not even his popularity could have withstood the storm of indignation which the intelligence would have provoked."

And to this wise advice of Mr. Disraeli's, Sir Theodore Martin subsequently recurs with some emphasis of approbation. We are never told throughout the story of this eventful year (1860) how vehemently Mr. Disraeli defended the temporal power of the Pope, how strong was his sympathy with the enemies of Italy, how little, indeed, he entered into the general current of national feeling on this subject. We venture to say, without hesitation, that if Mr. Gladstone had made any of these serious blunders, then, instead of our having had but one lucky passage extracted from almost the only successful hit among his speeches on the subject, we should have had a running comment from chapter to chapter on the serious character of his mistakes.

And even as regards the Italian policy proposed by the Prince Consort himself, Sir Theodore Martin is far from lucid. He makes a great point of the foresight shown by the Court in antici- pating that the French Emperor would certainly ask equivalents, such as he did eventually ask in demanding the annexation of Savoy and Nice, for letting Italy liberate herself from Austrian and domestic fetters, and unite herself with the House of Savoy and Piedmont. He makes the Prince complain that he had warned the Ministry of Lord Palmerston that this would be the result, and that he had warned them " in vain." But he does not tell us what the Prince wished to be substituted for that strong advocacy of the policy of non-intervention in the affairs of Italy which the English Ministry had so wisely addressed to Austria and France and the other Courts of Europe after the cam- paign of 1859. Hence we are left with a vague impression that the Prince was much more far-sighted than Lord Palmerston and Lord John Russell and Mr. Gladstone as to the designs of France, and that he would have had them do something (unexplained) which would have defeated those designs, but we are not told what it was that he would have them do. Apparently, judging by the letters in the previous volume bearing on this subject, the Prince Consort would have had the British Government abstain pedantically from the expression of any kind of wish for Italian freedom and unity,—in short, hold aloof alto- gether from the negotiations,—for fear of France taking advant- age of our wishes to set up a claim in the shape of compensa- tions for complying with those wishes. If we had acted in that way, we might certainly have greatly retarded the emancipation of Italy, but assuredly we should not have prevented the annex- ation of Savoy and Nice.

We must leave to another notice other points of general interest which have occurred to us in the perusal of this volume.