MESSRS. GREEN'S AND GROSE'S "HUME."

E would testify cordially to the ability and industry with which the Oxford Editors have performed the task of introducing to the public Messrs. Longman's new edition of Hume, but we do not feel altogether satisfied with the plan upon which their work has been conducted. In the first place, it seems to us that the very- definite division of labour that they have mutually effected, though, no doubt, in many respects convenient, has some rather serious drawbacks. The first two volumes of the edition, containing. the Treatise on Human Nature and the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, are prefaced by elaborate critical expositions of Flume's philosophy, metaphysical and moral, considered in its historical relation to the systems that preceded it. For these Mr. Green is solely responsible. To the other two volumes (which have been published most recently) is prefixed a" History of the Editions "of Hume's works, written by Mr. Grose. A great part of this consists of a judicious selection from the correspondence already given in Mr. Burton's Life of Hume. But though the amount of inde- pendent information and discussion that Mr. Grose has con- tributed, either here or in the foot-notes scattered through the volumes, is not large, it is evidently the result of a very careful study of his author, including a laborious and complete collation of the different editions of essays published in Hume's life-time. Mr. Grose's work is laudably free from any taint of partisanship, and is not badly composed, if we allow for the difficulty of maintaining a thread of biographical interest through so much bibliographical detail. But though thus both the philosophical and the bibliographical branches of the work that we expect in a new edition of Hume have been carefully executed by the co-operation of Messrs. Green and Grose, we find that one very important aspect of the philosopher's intellectual career, the discussion of which may be said to lie on the margin between the two depart- ments, has been comparatively neglected. We mean the changes that Hume's philosophical view underwent, as shown by a com- parison of his first book, published in 1739—the Treatise on Human Nature, that "fell dead-born from the press "— with the restatements of his metaphysical and moral speculations that he issued in 1748 and 1751. Not that Mr. Grose is unaware of the importance of this question. Indeed, the only place in which the serene flow of his impartial narrative appears to be at all ruffled by emotion is where he maintains (against Professor Fowler and others) the permanent value of the Treatise an Human Nature, in spite of the advertisement in which the author-entreated his readers to ignore it. But the curt and rather supercilious dogmatism with which the editor enunciates his preference for this earlier work scarcely supplies the place of an instructive discussion of the differences to be found in the later ; nor can we think that Hume's emphatic repudiation of his earlier performance is satis- factorily disposed of by calling it the "posthumous utterance of a splenetic invalid." No one knows better than Mr. Grose the con- currence of testimony to the perfect philosophic serenity of Hume's last days ; and the posthumous advertisement is quite in harmony with the tone of a letter that the editor himself quotes, in which Hume says that he "has not patience to review" his earlier treatise. We quite admit that some of the most profound and interesting parts of Hume's speculations are only to be found in his first book ; hence it is no doubt a startling fact that this should have been so deliberately and emphatically disowned by its author, but it is a fact that cannot be explained away. If some writers have been too hasty in accepting flume's repudiation as final, the present

* 4 Treatise on Duman Nature. and Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Edited by T. H. Green and T. H. Grose. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, and 0o.

Emsys, Moroi, Literary, and Political. By David Hume. 2 vole. (Same Editora and PaMishar.) editors seem to have erred as much the other way, in ignoring the reality consists in the universal relations of thought which reflec- work which Hume wished to be "alone regarded as containing tion finds in it, and not in the mere aggregate of sensible impres- his views and principles." Mr. Green confines his metaphysical sions- into which Berkeley analyses our perception of it. We e,riticism to the Treatise on Human Nature, and Mr. Grose effaces cannot, Mr. Green urges, attribute these to God, without the PhilosophicalEssays as far as possible under the general title of degrading Him into a mere " cOif " j therefore we "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary." It must be admitted that must say, modifying Berkeley's formula, that the essence of the there is a partial truth in what seems to be implied by this classifica- universe is not " percipi," but intelligi." This view is not tion; and that Hume, in recasting his metaphysical system, some- difficult to seize, just simply and vaguely as we have given it. what subordinated. his philosophic independence of thought to his But when we try to conceive the relations of this Universal desire for literary suceess. This latter, as Mr. Grose justly observes, Thought and its Eternal Thinker to concrete matter, concrete was the one passion which all his aspiration after perfect philosophic sentience (in the lower animals), and to the individual subjects tranquillity of temper never quite succeeded in subduing. Still, it in whom out of mere sentience a rethinking of the eternal uni- seems tons no less true that his metaphysical point of view slightly versal thought gradually developer itself, we feel the need of changed between 1739 and 1748; and that the compromise between much more explanation than Mr. Green anywhere even suggests, Scepticism and Common-sense, which is Hume's real dernier mot in in order to construct a system which shall have even a prima facie all departments of thought, was made on somewhat different terms plausibility. And thus we cannot help thinking that _Mr. Green

at the two different periods. would have done more for his own purpose by a lucid and com-

At the same time, we quite admit that Mr. Green has had very plete statement of his positive beliefs, or by criticising some more good grounds for choosing the earlier treatise as the subject of recent expositor_of Empiricism ; than be could do by calling up his exhaustive analysis. But this is partly on account of the pecu- the long-laid ghost of Locke's metaphysical system, in order to liar view that he has taken of his editorial duties. We do not slay the forceless phantom in an elaborately formal duello.

wish to quarrel with his two Introductions, which are very able Indeed, it is difficult to say precisely what important end the first 'compositions, and in many respects deeply interesting, but we part of Mr. Green's introduction is really adapted to attain. Merely feel it necessary to warn the reader that they are very unlike most to exhibit Locke's inconsistencies was surely a superfluous labour. other "introductions." We admit that in the present chaotic As Hamilton long ago declared, "every philosopher who has had condition of metaphysical inquiry, it is difficult to lay down any occasion to animadvert on Locke has noticed that he is of all general rules as to the mode in which a bygone metaphysician philosophers the most ambiguous, vacillating, various, and ought to be edited. Though there is now a general agreement as to even contradictory in his language." A faithful statement of the permanent importance of Hume's work, there are probably as Locke's actual opinions, Mr. Green has certainly not given ; many different opinions as to the precise lessons that it has to teach indeed, in reading his introduction we have a continual sense of as there are different views of the scope and method of metaphysics. being confused between the real Locke, revealed to us through -Mr. Green, dominated by what we may describe as the pure the inartificial loquacities of the Essay, and the hypothetical Locke Hegelian conception of English philosophy—according to which, whom Mr. Green has constructed by a vigorous excision of all the one living torch of metaphysical research was passed from that is inconsistent with what he—not unfairly—selects as Locke's Hume to Kant, to be handed by the latter to Hegel—is naturally cardinal doctrines. But Locke without his incoherencies, without anxious to exhibit Hume in his proper place in this sublime his honest adhesion to common-sense conclusions which his view series. Now, regarded in this light, Hume's function is purely of knowledge does not allow him legitimately to reach, is a being destructive; he represents that sceptical reflection which, super- in whom we can take but little interest ; he is reduced to a very vening on the primitive affirmations of common-sense, destroys inferior flume; we wish him despatched with much more brevity. the apparently solid structure of ordinary beliefs, and clears If, however (as sometimes seems), what Mr Green is really con- the ground for true philosophy. But since the view taken of cerned to exhibit is the impossibility of reconciling the orthodox Hume's work by himself and by a long line of influential followers beliefs, in a permanent Ego, an external world, an intelligent First is very different from this, since it is the habit of our reigning Cause, with the general assumptions and method of the empirical philosophy to use Hume's principles constructively in the syste- psychology that Locke originated, then, again, he has scarcely matisation of science, Mr. Green is inevitably drawn into a chosen the best way of establishing his position. We grant that

polemical attitude not usually adopted by an editor towards the Hume's negations are logically as well as historically the most direct author whom he is introducing to the public. Coming forward development of Locke's system, but the reaction of Reid, though (as we suppose) to bless, we find that he is philosophically cursing based on the denial of one of Locke's fundamental presuppositions,

altogether through an introduction of 299 pages. Mr. Green was yet on the whole a reaction within and not against his method.

would, of course, answer that the proper way of paying homage It was not by disparaging our faculty of "looking into our own to Hume is to exhibit as impressively as possible the full effect of understandings, and seeing how they work," but by a more careful his method in its corrosive action on the fabric of ordinary know- exercise of it, by emphasising distinctions which a hasty empiri- ledge. Still we cannot but feel that Mr. Green's chief aim is not cism had overlooked, that Reid reconstructed the edifice of com- to enable his readers to enter into Hume's view, but to show mon-sense beliefs ; and it is his construction rather than Locke's- them the imperative necessity of emerging out of it. Under the whose mortar is certainly very untempered—that has to be over- guise of an introduction to Hume, he really offers us an elaborate thrown, before the ground is really cleared for the "method of refutation of English empiricism ; which he treats as a method Kant as elaborated by Hegel."

originated by Locke ; and developed into its final form by In spite of all this, we cannot but recognise the great metaphy- Hume. Indeed, the predominance of this polemical motive in sical ability displayed in Mr. Green's essay, and the real value of Mr. Green's work is clearly shown by his occupying nearly half it taken as a whole and considered as a contribution to philoso-

of his introduction with a minute criticism of Locke's Essay; since phical controversy. If Messrs. Longman's customers do not for the mere purpose of showing how far the form of Hume's object to buy along with the sceptical poison of Hume's system a

system was determined by the independent and originative, but somewhat bulky Hegelian antidote, we can testify to the unique thoroughly unsystematic, reflection of his great predecessor, 13 qualities of the latter. Mr. Green's work bears evidence in every pages would have been really better than 130. It must be added page of a most careful and exhaustive study of the great English that Mr. Green's criticism is the less adapted to illuminate the metaphysicians, and contains a really masterly exposition of the

minds of ordinary- English readers of either Locke or flume, in- difficulties of establishing what is commonly accepted as science asmuch as it is delivered from the point of view of a philosophy on the psychological basis which modern empiricists have taken

which has never yet been articulately expounded to the English from Locke and Hume. It has long been urged against the fol- public. We do not know whether we ought strictly to call Mr. lowers of the Mills and Professor Bain, whose line of thought Green a Hegelian,—that is, we do not know whether he accepts may still be called predominant in English philosophy, that they ass," Logic "that strange system of subtle paradoxes and ingeni- have overlooked the essential destructiveness of the principles ous paralogisms which English readers are now able to study in which they have borrowed from Hume, or at least have not M. Wallace's excellent translation. But he represents himself as explained how they reconcile them philosophically with the an adherent of the "method of Kant as developed by Hegel," materialistic psychology that Hartley originated, and with that and in one of the most interesting and best-written parts of his development of the Baconian view of science which is the most essay, where he is occupied in criticising Berkeley, he argues on famous achievement of John Mill. But Mr. Green's essay is the

behalf of an idealism which we may certainly call generically most serious challenge that has yet been given to a school which Hegelian, to distinguish it from the Berkeleian. While holding continually refers to Hume as its author, and puts prominently with Berkeley that the material universe is only conceivable in forward his most characteristic positions. That Hume's premisses synthesis with a Divine Mind, he maintains that its essential derive their plausibility and win the ready acceptance of the editors seem to have erred as much the other way, in ignoring the reality consists in the universal relations of thought which reflec- work which Hume wished to be "alone regarded as containing tion finds in it, and not in the mere aggregate of sensible impres- his views and principles." Mr. Green confines his metaphysical sions- into which Berkeley analyses our perception of it. We e,riticism to the Treatise on Human Nature, and Mr. Grose effaces cannot, Mr. Green urges, attribute these to God, without the PhilosophicalEssays as far as possible under the general title of degrading Him into a mere " cOif " j therefore we "Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary." It must be admitted that must say, modifying Berkeley's formula, that the essence of the there is a partial truth in what seems to be implied by this classifica- universe is not " percipi," but intelligi." This view is not tion; and that Hume, in recasting his metaphysical system, some- difficult to seize, just simply and vaguely as we have given it. what subordinated. his philosophic independence of thought to his But when we try to conceive the relations of this Universal desire for literary suceess. This latter, as Mr. Grose justly observes, Thought and its Eternal Thinker to concrete matter, concrete was the one passion which all his aspiration after perfect philosophic sentience (in the lower animals), and to the individual subjects tranquillity of temper never quite succeeded in subduing. Still, it in whom out of mere sentience a rethinking of the eternal uni- seems tons no less true that his metaphysical point of view slightly versal thought gradually developer itself, we feel the need of changed between 1739 and 1748; and that the compromise between much more explanation than Mr. Green anywhere even suggests, Scepticism and Common-sense, which is Hume's real dernier mot in in order to construct a system which shall have even a prima facie all departments of thought, was made on somewhat different terms plausibility. And thus we cannot help thinking that _Mr. Green

at the two different periods. would have done more for his own purpose by a lucid and com-

At the same time, we quite admit that Mr. Green has had very plete statement of his positive beliefs, or by criticising some more good grounds for choosing the earlier treatise as the subject of recent expositor_of Empiricism ; than be could do by calling up his exhaustive analysis. But this is partly on account of the pecu- the long-laid ghost of Locke's metaphysical system, in order to liar view that he has taken of his editorial duties. We do not slay the forceless phantom in an elaborately formal duello.

wish to quarrel with his two Introductions, which are very able Indeed, it is difficult to say precisely what important end the first 'compositions, and in many respects deeply interesting, but we part of Mr. Green's introduction is really adapted to attain. Merely feel it necessary to warn the reader that they are very unlike most to exhibit Locke's inconsistencies was surely a superfluous labour. other "introductions." We admit that in the present chaotic As Hamilton long ago declared, "every philosopher who has had condition of metaphysical inquiry, it is difficult to lay down any occasion to animadvert on Locke has noticed that he is of all general rules as to the mode in which a bygone metaphysician philosophers the most ambiguous, vacillating, various, and ought to be edited. Though there is now a general agreement as to even contradictory in his language." A faithful statement of the permanent importance of Hume's work, there are probably as Locke's actual opinions, Mr. Green has certainly not given ; many different opinions as to the precise lessons that it has to teach indeed, in reading his introduction we have a continual sense of as there are different views of the scope and method of metaphysics. being confused between the real Locke, revealed to us through -Mr. Green, dominated by what we may describe as the pure the inartificial loquacities of the Essay, and the hypothetical Locke Hegelian conception of English philosophy—according to which, whom Mr. Green has constructed by a vigorous excision of all the one living torch of metaphysical research was passed from that is inconsistent with what he—not unfairly—selects as Locke's Hume to Kant, to be handed by the latter to Hegel—is naturally cardinal doctrines. But Locke without his incoherencies, without anxious to exhibit Hume in his proper place in this sublime his honest adhesion to common-sense conclusions which his view series. Now, regarded in this light, Hume's function is purely of knowledge does not allow him legitimately to reach, is a being destructive; he represents that sceptical reflection which, super- in whom we can take but little interest ; he is reduced to a very vening on the primitive affirmations of common-sense, destroys inferior flume; we wish him despatched with much more brevity. the apparently solid structure of ordinary beliefs, and clears If, however (as sometimes seems), what Mr Green is really con- the ground for true philosophy. But since the view taken of cerned to exhibit is the impossibility of reconciling the orthodox Hume's work by himself and by a long line of influential followers beliefs, in a permanent Ego, an external world, an intelligent First is very different from this, since it is the habit of our reigning Cause, with the general assumptions and method of the empirical philosophy to use Hume's principles constructively in the syste- psychology that Locke originated, then, again, he has scarcely matisation of science, Mr. Green is inevitably drawn into a chosen the best way of establishing his position. We grant that

polemical attitude not usually adopted by an editor towards the Hume's negations are logically as well as historically the most direct author whom he is introducing to the public. Coming forward development of Locke's system, but the reaction of Reid, though (as we suppose) to bless, we find that he is philosophically cursing based on the denial of one of Locke's fundamental presuppositions,

altogether through an introduction of 299 pages. Mr. Green was yet on the whole a reaction within and not against his method.

would, of course, answer that the proper way of paying homage It was not by disparaging our faculty of "looking into our own to Hume is to exhibit as impressively as possible the full effect of understandings, and seeing how they work," but by a more careful his method in its corrosive action on the fabric of ordinary know- exercise of it, by emphasising distinctions which a hasty empiri- ledge. Still we cannot but feel that Mr. Green's chief aim is not cism had overlooked, that Reid reconstructed the edifice of com- to enable his readers to enter into Hume's view, but to show mon-sense beliefs ; and it is his construction rather than Locke's- them the imperative necessity of emerging out of it. Under the whose mortar is certainly very untempered—that has to be over- guise of an introduction to Hume, he really offers us an elaborate thrown, before the ground is really cleared for the "method of refutation of English empiricism ; which he treats as a method Kant as elaborated by Hegel."

originated by Locke ; and developed into its final form by In spite of all this, we cannot but recognise the great metaphy- Hume. Indeed, the predominance of this polemical motive in sical ability displayed in Mr. Green's essay, and the real value of Mr. Green's work is clearly shown by his occupying nearly half it taken as a whole and considered as a contribution to philoso-

of his introduction with a minute criticism of Locke's Essay; since phical controversy. If Messrs. Longman's customers do not for the mere purpose of showing how far the form of Hume's object to buy along with the sceptical poison of Hume's system a

system was determined by the independent and originative, but somewhat bulky Hegelian antidote, we can testify to the unique thoroughly unsystematic, reflection of his great predecessor, 13 qualities of the latter. Mr. Green's work bears evidence in every pages would have been really better than 130. It must be added page of a most careful and exhaustive study of the great English that Mr. Green's criticism is the less adapted to illuminate the metaphysicians, and contains a really masterly exposition of the

minds of ordinary- English readers of either Locke or flume, in- difficulties of establishing what is commonly accepted as science asmuch as it is delivered from the point of view of a philosophy on the psychological basis which modern empiricists have taken

which has never yet been articulately expounded to the English from Locke and Hume. It has long been urged against the fol- public. We do not know whether we ought strictly to call Mr. lowers of the Mills and Professor Bain, whose line of thought Green a Hegelian,—that is, we do not know whether he accepts may still be called predominant in English philosophy, that they ass," Logic "that strange system of subtle paradoxes and ingeni- have overlooked the essential destructiveness of the principles ous paralogisms which English readers are now able to study in which they have borrowed from Hume, or at least have not M. Wallace's excellent translation. But he represents himself as explained how they reconcile them philosophically with the

uncritical reader, through the presence in his mind of those very beliefs which they are afterwards used to undermine; that, again, the paradoxical character of the conclusions which Hume actually draws from them is half concealed by his skilful arrange- ment of the subject, and by a confusion:between the natural history and the philosophy of belief,: which we find persistent and wide- spread among his followers at the present day ; that, finally,. his method if rigorously pursued, would land him in a far more sweep- ing nihilism than he seems at all aware,—these points Mr. Green presses home with scrupulous fairness, but with an indefatigable and relentless pursuit of his opponent ritheory through all possible doublings and wrindinge, which seems to render escape impossible. Nre have not space ie. giVe even the barest abridgment Of'IIr Green's afguulent, but We may refer to his exposition' of the 'in:. consistencies involved in Humes treatment of time, space; - and the objects of mathematical thought, as especially original and effective. Vire will take as a specimen a single paint' In it Whieh admits of being separated from the rest It is a Well-knoWn doctrine of Hume's, that we cannot form any abstract ideas of time and space, as distinguished from their empirical contents. My impression of apace, lie, says, can be onl,y., a compound "impression of coloured points disposed in a certain manner ;", my "idea)' of space, therefore; is hut a, copy.. of this corn.

pound impression. - •- Similarly, time :itself is nothing but different ideas and impressions succeeding , each other," this stecessien being "the succession of our perceptions of every kind, ideas as well as iinpressions, and iinpresrione of reflection as Well as of sensation." At the same time; "it is evident that the parts of time are not Co-existent, for that quality of the Co-existence of parts belongs to extension, and is what distinguishes it from duration." Here, then, is a very mat contradiction. Certain impressions, as parts of space, are pronounced co-existent; then all impressions, , parts of time„ are pronounced, successive..,. Hume must abandon one of these positions, but he cannot abandon either without some detriment to this part of his system..

Mr.,Greern'a shorter essay,prefixed to, the,second volume of the Treatise on Iftiman Nature, contains, -a searching criticism of the ethical psychology a Locke awl liume, together , with some acute criticism of modern utilitarian ethics. We.think„how, ever, that he has brought ,Ifunie into, too close a relation to Locke, and depreciated unduly -the intervening line of moralists Mt Green holds .so Strongly the .liantian: view that volition is necessarily determined either-by reason, or by-pleat-nit' or pain in prospect, that he does scant juktiee to the English school that maintained in the eighteenth century the disinterestedness of our natural impulses. Thus he tells us that "Shaftesbury, as the child of hie age, could scarcely help thinking that every desire has pleasure for its object," which seems rather a "high h priori," judg- ment on the thinker who first gave currency to the opposite doc- trine, afterwards thrown into a more precise and complete form by Butler. But even Butler's argument is pushed aside very lightly ; and thus the extent to which these. two writers (together with Shaftesbury's other disciple, Hutcheson), contributed to determine the character of Hume's ethical speculations, is not sufficiently recognised.