NASSER'S REBUFF
THE dangerous nature of the international game which Egypt has been playing under the guidance of Colonel Nasser has been sharply underlined in the past week. The removal of Mr. George Allen and Mr. Henry Byroade, Who were said to be the Colonel's chief advocates in the State Department, was quickly followed by the refusal of America and Britain to support the Aswan dam for reasons stated to be Primarily economic, but which certainly have a great deal to do With Egypt's behaviour in the international field over the past Year or so. It is, after all, the deliveries of Czech arms which have strained the already shaky Egyptian economy to a point Where it seems incapable of bearing its share of the dam project. Moreover, this rebuff comes after the Brioni conference whose communiqué, however offensive the Algerian references may have been to the Quai d'Orsay, hardly gave much satisfaction to Egyptian nationalism. Add to this that the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Shepilov, evidently made it clear on his recent Visit to Cairo that his Government would not support Egypt in a war against Israel, and it is clear that Colonel Nasser has sustained a number of considerable diplomatic defeats. At the time of writing, it is not clear whether in fact Egypt will get Russian support for the Aswan dam, but so far the Russians can hardly be said to have rushed into the breach left by the Western Powers; and the Politburo will have to weigh very Carefully the merits of spending the vast sum involved on an economically dubious scheme.
Egyptian policy recently has been based on two fundamental Principles. First, an attempt to establish Egypt in a position of leadership within the Arab world, this claim necessarily imply- ing (whether against Colonel Nasser's will or not) that Egypt Should regard herself as the spearhead of any future attack on Israel. Secondly, in the wider international sphere Egypt has tried to play off the two great blocks of powers one against the Other, andr by so doing, to obtain military and economic advantages for herself which could in turn be used in an eventual show-down with Israel. The basis of this policy, how- ever, was the assumption that the Eastern and Western blocks Were more eager to obtain immediate tactical advantages over One another in the Levant than they were scared of the conse- 9uences of the Arab-Israel conflict in that area. This assump- tion seems to have been a rash one.
Whatever its risks, the change in Anglo-American policy can only be applauded. Even if the Soviet Union does offer to build the Aswan dam and gains kudos in Egypt in consequence, it Still remains true that it is impossible for Britain and America to outbid Russia in every under-developed country in the World. No more in economic diplomacy than in armaments can democracies make the same efforts in peace time as totali- tarian states, and it is wise to recognise this fact at once. More- over, there is another side to the matter. American senators may believe that aid should be refused to neutralists, but a far more cogent reason for refusing to underwrite Colonel Nasser's adventures is that Egyptian policy now appears to be orientated towards a clash with her neighbour Israel, and that any support of it would be to assist a dubious friend against the one certain ally of the West in the Middle East. It would be unfortunate if the American initiative in this matter were to be taken as directed against the other Brioni powers as certain statements from Washington might lead one to suppose. The justification for getting tough with Colonel Nasser is not that he who is not for the West is against it, but that Egypt has all along played a disturbing and potentially explosive role in an area where explosions are likely to be fatal.
To approve of this new turn of events is not to underrate their possible serious consequences. A weakening of Colonel Nasser's prestige might cause his overthrow by even more virulently xenophobe elements. It is probable that Western unpopularity in Cairo will, if possible, be increased by this development, and, even if the USSR proves unwilling to fork out, it will certainly not be blamed for its attitude with anything like the same enthusiasm as were Britain and America. But, if the West had paid for the Aswan dam, would that have changed Egyptian hostility to the 'imperialists' to approbation? It is better to spend money on keeping friends than on keeping enemies.
The West should now draw the consequences of this new policy. Having decided against appeasement. Britain and America should start to consider their own interests and those of their friends. Having rebuffed Egypt over the dam it now becomes doubly absurd to leave Israel underarmed to face an eventual Egyptian assault. Every day sees a growth in the dis- proportion of armaments between the two countries (Mr. Selwyn Lloyd's calculations on this point seem to have little to do with armaments), and, with ninety-six incidents on the Jordan frontier since the Hammarskjold agreement, it is no wonder that the Israelis are nervous. They would, no doubt, be wiser to remain calm, but, in face of the flood of hatred emitted by the Egyptian press and Cairo radio, this is easier said than done. The way to end Israel's nerves and the danger of aggres- sion on the part of the Arabs is still to supply Israel with the arms she needs and to give her a real guarantee of the per- manency of her frontiers rather than the mere shadow of an Anglo-American intention to uphold the tripartite declaration of 1950. The first breath of a new realism has blown through Middle Eastern policy. This should now be carried to its logical conclusion by making the Arab States realise that Israel is there to stay. Only when they accept that fact will stability in the Levant become possible and peace be assured.
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