CORRESPONDENCE.
THE LESSONS OF THE WAR.
[To THE EDITOR OP THE "SPECTATOR."] Sin,—I think your readers may be interested to read the following notes in regard to the lessons of the war made by one who is a thoroughly capable military critic. His name, though communicated to you, cannot be published, but he does not speak without authority, and he has visited the chief scenes of the war and studied the military problem on the "A Colonial who served through the Transvaal War said that be went home persuaded of two thin ge,—one, that his own country was impregnable, and the other, that the British Army was not what he had hitherto believed. There seems no doubt that the war has brought home the conviction that for defence purposes an almost untrained people in arms, which can move and shoot and which knows its country, can hold its own against a very large invading force. if the Boers bad chosen to make for Durban, Port Elizabeth, East London. and Cape Town, instead of playing into our hands by concentrating round Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley, it is painful to imagine what might have been the result. So much is in favour of the defenders of well-selected positions in these days of long-range weapons and smokeless powder, before which drill, discipline, and courage in the attack are apt merely to serve to increase the slaughter in the attacking ranks. In considering the Colonial's feeling of dis- appointment with the Regular Army, we must remember that hitherto the Colonial troops have only been brought into actual contact with a selected few, usually zealous and sympathetic officers, carefully selected for their special qualifications. They had not been brought into contact with the British Army as a whole ; and these Colonials, themselves selected from among the pick of our race, and having their intelligence unfettered by the bonds of red-tape, which sooner or later crush out of the soldier educated under our present system the one quality for which we eagerly seek in time of war, could not but draw unfavourable comparisons between the average Imperial officers and their own. There must always be a tendency for an army to crystallise during a prolonged period of peace, and the precepts of great generals, which may have been excellent in their day, besides becoming obsolete in due course, further become distorted and hackneyed until we arrive at 'something as remote from the original conception as is much modern theology from the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount. The end is sacrificed to the means, and the drill, discipline, and smartness which were originally legitimate means to an end have come to be regarded as a fetish, in the worship of which common-sense efficiency for war has been lost sight of. Granting this, and recognising the fact that to the average mind fixed standards are preferable to variable theories, the great point on which we must insist is that whenever we do have an opportunity of profit- ing by real warfare, we should do our utmost to seize the fleeting occasion of correcting our theories, and remodelling the rubrics which, I suppose, are indispensable for the subordinate teachers of the art of war.
No business man, if he had taken a contract to dispose of the Boer War, would have 'preferred infantry,' nor would he have sent out the limited number of horsemen available with lances in their right hands to fight people with whose mode of warfare we were already too familiar. Even the carbine, carried on the saddle as a third weapon, in the use of which the trooper had expended only a traction of the time absorbed by the mediaeval sword and lance, was useless against the Mauser rifle, and, though I suppose not a sword is at present worn throughout South Africa, it will be many a year before the experience gained out here will be taken advantage of elsewhere. Notwithstanding all we have learned during the last two years, little alteration can yet be detected in the system of our training, which aims at a standard which may produce something pretty in peace, but which is not only useless, but pernicious in reference to the only purpose for which armies exist,—viz., war. How can intelligent individuals, officers, non-commissioned officers, or men study their profession more seriously when, in barrack-room parlance, an afternoon's 'soldiering' consists in a complete overhauling, pipe-claying, and polishing of every part of a man's equipment ? From the polished spike on the white or burnished helmet to the spurs on the soldier's heels, his very dress and equipment are utterly unsuitable. Not only does the burnished metal and snowy pipeclay represent time wasted, but it is all as dangerous as it is useless. How many men's lives have been lost through the highly polished mess-tin worn on the back of the infantry soldier, which has only been worked up to its standard of bril- liancy to serve as a mark for the Boer while its bearer was endeavouring to obtain cover in the grass during ta frontal attack across one of the many glacis which have been so often and so carefully selected for us? Years ago the Indian cavalry aban- doned their steel chains and scabbards. Yet, though we are taught that the object of scouting is to see without being seen, to this day the burnished and jingling equipment of our cavalry acts as a heliograph by day and as a foghorn by night. Nothing makes a regiment so unaoldierly as active service,' an old adjutant used to say, and to this day it is the ambition of most commanding officers to get their men together,' which means leaving them to their company officers as little as possible, and leaving no stone unturned to get every man as nearly the same as possible. Why should we allow all this valuable time to be wasted during the long years of pence, when we well know that the moment we go to war we must give all up and begin practically as amateurs? A common argument in favour of mediaeval training for modern war is that we must not imagine that our experience of the Boers will serve when we have to deal with a European Power. The detail will probably never be the same in any two of the wars in which we continually find ourselves engaged in various parts of the world, but principles rarely change, and those of us who have profited by our late experience are far ahead of Continental critics, who still base their theories upon the war of 1870-71. Mobility, taking cover, and marksmanship must overcome every- thing. Mere numbers in masses only swell the list of casualties. It is more than ever a question of quality and not quantity; and, like our late adversaries, we must learn to fight to live' instead of fighting to die,' as the Boers say the British soldier loves to do. The principle of courage in the attack stands for as much as ever, but however well adapted the frontal attack of infantry as performed upon an English parade-ground may have been for dealing with muzzle-loaders, it becomes nothing less than murder when the enemy is well concealed in a series of carefully selected positions and armed with the latest repeating rifles :— .Thoirs not to reason why, theirs but to do and die I ' Possibly magnificent, but thoroughly nnbusinesslike.
An officer who commanded eight companies of mounted infantry daring the war observed to me that after two or three months in the field each man began to be an individual.' The detail has changed, but the principle stands, and a much higher order of courage is required by the private soldier of to-day, who has to work his way in a semi-independent fashion across the bullet- swept veldt without the moral support afforded by close com- radeship and leadership, than of the soldier of the past, who was merely carried along with the mass. Now, a section of infantry —a sergeant's command—is the very largest unit that can be personally controlled by an individual, and when the members of even a section are strung out in loose extended order and single rank the sergeant must rely upon each man to carry out his own part. A commanding officer must nowadays take all his officers into his confidence. He cannot explain the general plan too clearly to each, and the officers must see that their sergeants and rank-and-file understand as well as they do. Then, when the advance begins, each component part knows what is required of him, and it lies with the subordinates to carry out the detail of the scheme which has been entrusted to them by their superiors. Mounted infantry has done good work, and so has cavalry, but again we come back to the point that it is wholly unreasonable to train men systematically in one way and use them in another. Mounted infantry are no doubt armed and equipped as they should be, and the cavalry regiments and Yeomanry in South Africa have been compelled to follow their example. But Albrecht is right: • You do not want to teach your infantry to ride ; teach your cavalry to shoot.' `Away with ironmongery,' says Mr. Winston Churchill, and there can be no doubt that the horsemen of the future must put their trust in their repeating rifles, not in cold steel. The argument is often advanced that an enemy much dreads the lance, and this is doubt- less true, but I have never been able to hear of any serious or even proportionate damage being done in any cavalry charge or pursuit within my own experience, except as a rule to the cavalry them- selves ; and if a fleeing foe is really to be destroyed, a mounted force with repeating rifles and galloping Maxims which can get up close and then come into action will assuredly do far more damage than one which must deal with each man hand to hand.
Times have changed, and we must not be left behind. Repeating rifles have superseded pikes, and our drill-books want bringing up to date. Go on to any British infantry parade-ground and sound the Prepare for cavalry.' A square will be formed, and the men brought to the position of Charge bayonets. The bayonet is put first—instead of every man realising the fact that he is in a position to mow down as many horse-soldiers as care to approach, long before they can be expected to impale themselves upon his bayonet. The Boer is as practical as we have shown our- selves to be unpractical. He does nothing for show—nothing without a purpose, and endeavours to act always in accordance with the soundest reason. He does not allow tradition and superstition to interfere with his judgment, but when he sees any reason to modify his system adopts the line he thinks best without a moment's hesitation. It is often said that the British officer is stupid, and the Boer does not pay a high tribute to his intelligence when he dubs him 'Onoosel' or • Innocent.' But it is the system that is to blame, not the individual. An officer who may act in the most foolish way as a commander can often be very intelligent off duty, and there is no doubt that the young men who now obtain commissions are at least up to the average intelli- gence of their class. But as soon as it comes to service matters, common-sense, the most valuable of all qualities, is put aside, and the unfortunate officer racks his brain to think what the military text-books would have him do. If he has been to the Staff College he will still further meditate as to the probable- action of Frederick the Great or Napoleon if they had been in his place, and the result is more disastrous than ever. One of the best and most intelligent cavalry officers I ever knew, who has well sustained his reputation during the war, went through the course of instruction at this establishment, and the highest
praise we could bestow upon him was that one would never believe he had been there. This is typical of the effect of the system of instruction in the Army, from that of the recruit, commencing with Para. 7, Drill-Book (the first position of a soldier) up to that of the Staff College.
It is often urged that officers should be of a different class, and that they should devote all their time to their profession. No sensible officer could devote much more time than at present to polishing, pipe-claying, obsolete steady drill, impossible field-days, filling up endless returns, or even to military history, which for any practical purposes under the wholly changed and ever-changing conditions of modern warfare is as misleading as it is generally inaccurate. As regards its inaccuracy, let any officer who has taken part in a campaign or battle study its official history in comparison with what he knows to have actually taken place. Accidents become 'phases,' and the various situations which arose and were saved by the initiative of obscure individuals figure as part of the carefully thought-out scheme of the master-mind. By all means let officers read military history, but let them make a very large allowance for the desire of the historian to present all in the most favourable light, and let them remember that under varying conditions nothing but general principles can in any case apply.
Passing from officers to the rank-and-file, every endeavour is still made to crush out the one thing—initiative—which under old-fashioned conditions was quite out of place, but is now indispensable. During the morning following the disaster at Magersfontein a Captain observed a man of his company firing with great steadiness, taking perfect cover, and en- couraging a considerable group in his neighbourhood to follow his example. The Captain pointed him out to his colour- sergeant, and asked the latter what sort of a man this was. 'He's all very well at this kind of thing, Sir,' replied the colour-sergeant, but he's no manner of use as a " soldier."' The rifleman of to-day is not a halberdier, and it is childish to go on training the former as if he were going to act as the latter. All this is fully recognised in South Africa, but no result is yet apparent elsewhere. A. full-grown private in a garrison town cannot be trusted to go anywhere on duty unless marched by a corporal. Hours are spent on drill which, once learned, should only require to be remembered. and the soldier's life is shortened by sentry-go and all the formalities attending mounting and dismounting guard over little or nothing. The numerous surrenders which have characterised the war have usually been unavoidable. The fault lay in the want of circumspection which led to the British troops being continually found in a series of impossible situations. The Boers made a practice of laying traps into which we usually walked with the same result. Yet in every garrison town we see soldiers who are already use- lessly on guard continually standing to arms on the approach of 'all armed parties.' Presumably this was originally intended as a precaution against surprise, but though the sentry on the gate thunders, Guard turn out !' on the approach of every two or three men of his own company wearing side-arms who may pass his post, all this antiquated formality affords no 'instruction in the direction of guru anteeing our soldiers against being con- stantly outwitted in real life. Halt, who comes there ? ' 'Friend: &c. And when the field officer of the day goes his rounds at 11 p.m. in review order and on his horse, he is required to give the countersign.' All this would be mere waste of time if it did not induce the Army gradually to acquiesce in leaving out any reference to common-sense when dealing with matters military, and live in a world of formality and routine stereotyped by the tradition of years.
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It is difficult to imagine that the Army can be reorganised from within. Generals and other superior officers have passed their lives under the system which is now con- demned, and the younger men are not in a position to speak. The expert is apt to see the trees, but not the forest ; and the Army can only be placed upon a sound footing by civilians who know what they want and insist on having it. The soldiers must be heard on every point, and their recommendations will often render material assistance, but the reformers will ignore objections which are only based upon tradition and have no solid foundation in fact. A most im- portant essential for the training of infantry is a new drill-book. The name Drill-book' should be abolished, and the handbook entitled 'Infantry Training.' Nothing should be retained which is not really necessary.
Double should at once be abolished in favour of single rank, and, generally speaking, cavalry and infantry dis- mounted drill and bugle calls should be assimilated on the lines of the former. The present cavalry drill is simplicity itself, and far ahead of infantry. The training of all ranks must commence with a course of free gymnastics, for the introduction of which into the British Army enough credit cannot be accorded to Colonel Fox. Then the instructors wha complete the men's training must carry on the same system, which aims at the development of the man's intelligence and physique in such a way as to enable the two to work together with the best possible result. The personnel of our standing Army or Imperial police of the future cannot be too highly trained, and the foundation of their training must be in the com- bination of the development of their minds and bodies, not in the annihilation of the one and the distortion of the other."
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